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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
Brazilian Internet freedom activists are on the front lines of an escalating global effort 
to preserve the Internet as a democratic, public space for creative and civic engagement. 
They are fighting attempts worldwide to restrict, censor, and monitor Internet access in the 
name of state security or for commercial purposes. In this dissertation, I examine the 
pioneering tactics activists in Brazil have used to defend what they refer to as the Internet 
livre – a free and open Internet.  
Internet freedom activists worldwide currently consider Brazil a global reference 
point for an open and democratic Internet policy. Indeed, in his December 2013 “Open Letter 
to the People of Brazil” in which he asked for political asylum, Edward Snowden hailed 
Brazil as one of the countries that was most concerned with Internet freedom and the future 
of the global computer network (2013). Interestingly enough, this is in spite of the fact that 
the Internet arrived relatively late to Brazil in 1992 and that the global network currently 
relies very little on Brazilian technology and infrastructure in order to function. Additionally, 
while access to high-speed, broadband Internet access is growing, it is still expensive and 
beyond reach to large sectors of the population. This immediately raises a number of 
important questions. Why has Brazil become a global leader in developing Internet policy? 
What lessons might activists in other places learn from their Brazilian counterparts? And 
how might an increasing Brazilian presence in setting global policies shape the future of the 
global Internet? 
I argue that the practices, values, and goals of Internet freedom activists in Brazil 
have been uniquely influenced by the country’s redemocratization process over the past 30 
years. In particular I show how understandings about democracy that were forged among 
social movements and labor union groups working in the 1970s and 1980s to end the military 
dictatorship (1964-1985) are now being applied to Internet policy and governance. In 
particular, I highlight how the ideology of participatory democracy – a form of democracy 
that strives to broaden opportunities for citizens to make meaningful contributions in policy 
decisions beyond public elections – has informed Internet freedom activism. According to its 
proponents, participatory democracy seeks to radically transform the political system and 
challenge elite control of the state by empowering previously marginalized groups to actively 
participate in governance decisions (Avritzer 2009; Santos and Avritzer 2007). In Brazil 
participatory democracy is most closely associated with the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), 
the Worker’s Party, and left-wing social movements closely aligned with it. The most well 
known example of participatory democracy is orçamento participativo (participatory 
budgeting), in which neighborhood councils in primarily poor regions are given power to 
decide how to allocate municipal funds in their communities. In this way, mechanisms of 
participatory democracy, such as participatory budgeting, differ from forms of liberal 
democracy in which periodic elections are considered the primary mechanism of citizen 
participation in determining state policy. Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
and Brazilian political scientist Leonardo Avritzer argue that liberal, representative 
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democracy – what they consider the “hegemonic” form of democracy since the second half 
of the twentieth century – actually restricts both individual and collective participation so as 
to prevent “democratic overload” that might jeopardize elite prioritization of capital 
accumulation over social redistribution (2007:li). They contend that the principle of one 
person one vote, which elides economic and social distinctions, along with the 
bureaucratization of the state apparatus in the Global North have led to a situation in which 
populations are largely disempowered to set the political agenda. Instead, elite classes 
supporting capitalist expansion have co-opted the democratic system to perpetuate 
accumulation under the guise of popular authorization. Thus, the spread of liberal democracy 
in the past 30 years is one element of neoliberal globalization. For Santos and Avritzer, 
experiments with forms of participatory democracy in Brazil and in other places in the 
Global South in the 21st century represent counter-hegemonic efforts to “democratize 
democracy” in hopes of addressing social inequalities exacerbated by neoliberal 
globalization.  
In this dissertation, I illustrate how notions of participatory democracy have shaped 
the practices of Brazilian Internet freedom activists. In Brazil many of the same political 
activists, union organizers, academics, liberation theology activists, and artists who worked 
to end the military dictatorship have found common cause in promoting Internet freedom. 
They are joined by a younger generation of activists whose memory of the dictatorship is 
either tenuous or non-existent, but who have embraced ideas of participatory democracy as a 
way to address issues of social justice and inequality. The emphasis on increasing citizen 
participation in democratic governance to radically challenge elite control of the state is now 
being applied to Internet policy and governance. This takes the form of innovating new 
online, digital platforms to collectively define national Internet policy as well as restructuring 
existing institutions like the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee to create new channels for 
citizen participation in policymaking. In this dissertation, I also draw attention to the 
potential limitations of such efforts. As my work demonstrates, mechanisms of participatory 
democracy have not always delivered the radical change that proponents hope to realize. This 
is often due to pushback from elite sectors and corporate interests unwilling to cede power to 
other groups. Thus, my ethnographic analysis exposes both the power of the rhetoric of 
participatory democracy and its limitations in terms of fundamentally challenging the 
dominant capitalist political economy. Indeed, in many instances Brazilian Internet freedom 
activists have had to turn to more traditional social movement tactics to advocate for political 
change. In light of this reality, I raise questions about the extent to which recent activist 
victories may be replicated on a larger, global scale.  
One of the central arguments of this dissertation is that the Internet has never been a 
fixed technology, but is rather a global computer network that is constantly in flux as new 
technologies are incorporated and individuals and groups use it for new and different 
purposes. Throughout this dissertation, I demonstrate how the socio-technical configuration 
of the Internet is embedded within the larger relationships of power and inequity. Brazilian 
activists refer to the specific configuration of the Internet that they are championing as an 
Internet livre – a free Internet. By free they do not mean free of charge, although many do 
believe that access to the Internet is a human right and that it should be made available to all 
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at no cost. Rather in this case livre, or free, refers to freedom.1 In a collectively written 
manifesto published in October 2013, a group of activists articulated their vision of an 
Internet livre. What is apparent in this manifesto is how their conception of freedom 
contrasts with dominant neoliberal ideas about the superiority of the private sector to 
distribute resources and structure social life. This, in turn, influences their view of how the 
Internet should be configured and what values should underpin its operation: 
 
The Internet is under attack. We are witnessing a battle between those who conceive 
of [the Internet] as only a lucrative business model and those who defend it as a 
precious network for creative collaboration, freedom of expression, social 
mobilization, and the strengthening of diverse fundamental rights like the rights to 
communication, culture, and access to knowledge (Grupo Marco Civil Já 2013).  
 
Evident in this statement is the way activists envision the Internet as a technological platform 
that possesses the potential to facilitate collective social mobilization and change. In Brazil a 
heterogeneous network of computer programmers, academics, labor union organizers, artists, 
consumer advocates, politicians, journalists, lawyers, and digital entrepreneurs are working 
to promote an Internet livre. These are the individuals whom I refer to as Internet freedom 
activists and whose backgrounds and tactics I analyze throughout the course of this 
dissertation. 
At present, the three most pressing policy concerns for Brazilian Internet freedom 
activists are maintaining user privacy, preserving freedom of expression by combatting 
restrictive intellectual property policies, and defending net neutrality – a technical principle 
that holds that the flow of information should not be restricted or fast-tracked based on 
content, user, site or application type. These issues are not unique to Brazil. They are the 
same as those currently being debated in the US, Europe, and elsewhere (MacKinnon 2013). 
Enacting policies and technologies that preserve these core values are central to the goals of 
activists. In this sense, Internet freedom activists are working to promote a specific vision of 
the Internet and how it should operate. For them, the Internet is a fertile space for knowledge 
sharing and democratic participation. Thus, threats to this type of Internet are seen as threats 
to freedom itself. 
In contrast, state security agencies and multinational corporations are working to 
shape an Internet in which it is easier to monitor and control the flow of data. For security 
agencies, increased control facilitates surveillance of individuals in order to identify potential 
threats (Greenwald 2014). For corporations, filtering data and restricting access to content 
creates new opportunities for profit. For example, telecommunications corporations would 
like to create Internet “fastlanes” for commercial content for which they could charge a 
                                                
1 Activists have adopted the term livre as it is employed by the free and open source software (FOSS) 
movement in Brazil. In Portuguese, FOSS is almost universally referred to as software livre as opposed to the 
more corporate-friendly alternative codigo-aberto, open source. Brazilian sociologist Rafael Evangelista argues 
that this semantic choice evidences a more radical technological agenda focused on social justice and 
sustainable development (2010). By linguistically referencing the FOSS movement, Internet freedom activists 
are drawing connections to emphasize how their vision of the Internet embraces values of widespread access, 
collaboration, freedom of expression, and resistance to corporate expropriation of knowledge that are central to 
the Brazilian FOSS movement. The connections between FOSS (software livre) and a free Internet (Internet 
livre) will be expanded on in Chapter 2.  
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premium to both customers and content providers alike. Corporations are also interested in 
tracking user behavior in order to develop large databases of user preferences that can then 
be used to determine target audiences for their products and services (MacKinnon 2013; 
Pariser 2012). Importantly, the power of both security agencies and corporations has 
increased significantly in the past decades, and without any type of democratic oversight. 
Neoliberal, free-market policies implemented since the 1980s have intensified the influence 
of private corporations in structuring social life. This development is particularly apparent in 
the telecommunications sector, which was a target of privatization efforts by private capital 
in the 1980s and 1990s since in most countries the telecommunications sector had been 
publicly owned (Harvey 2005). Likewise, the global “war on terror” initiated in the wake of 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, in the US has entailed an exponential growth in “signals 
intelligence” (SIGNIT) surveillance to monitor global communications networks (Greenwald 
2014). The revelations in June 2013 about US National Security Agency (NSA) mass 
Internet and telecommunications surveillance exposed by leaks of Booz Allen Hamilton 
systems analyst and former CIA operative Edward Snowden demonstrated how state security 
agencies and corporations have been colluding to monitor individuals using increasingly 
ubiquitous digital technologies. Thus the forces that threaten activists’ visions of a free 
Internet are growing in strength.  
American journalist Rebecca MacKinnon, one of the leading chroniclers of the 
emergent global Internet freedom movement, argues that individual Internet users have little 
influence over how the Internet is configured and thus the Internet functions without the 
“consent of the networked” (2013). In using this phrasing, she invokes Thomas Jefferson’s 
paean to popular sovereignty in the US Declaration of Independence in which he asserted 
that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” This principle, 
which was highly influenced by the political theories of Locke and Rousseau, has been the 
moral rationale for liberal, democratic forms of government since the 1700s. MacKinnon 
contends that at present, Internet users have an extremely limited ability to influence Internet 
policy. This pertains both to corporate terms-of-service policies that govern large, 
transnational corporate-owned websites (e.g., Google, Facebook, etc.) as well as the laws and 
regulations of nation-states that affect Internet use. For MacKinnon the key to resolving the 
lack of consent and to defending Internet freedom is to increase public awareness about 
Internet issues and to increase democratic participation. “People need to stop thinking of 
themselves as passive ‘users’ and ‘customers,’ and start acting like citizens of the Internet—
as ‘netizens’” (MacKinnon 2013). One of the primary ways she suggests people do this in 
countries with democratic systems is by making their voices heard at the ballot box by 
electing representatives attentive to issues of Internet freedom. Voting is the quintessential 
way to effect change within the liberal democratic system. In her opinion, the nascent 
Internet freedom movement should follow in the footsteps of the environmental movement in 
the US and Europe, which she argued scored victories after electing sympathetic politicians 
to national legislatures. 
In contrast, American media scholar Robert W. McChesney argues in his book 
Digital Disconnect that the current threats to the Internet stem primarily from the dominant 
capitalist system in which the interests of private capital dominate society and thus, in turn, 
the entire political system (2013). Elaborating on a fundamentally Marxist critique of liberal 
democracy, he asserts that the inequality that the capitalist logic of accumulation produces in 
society “promotes a thoroughgoing corruption of the governing process as wealthy special 
 
 
 
5 
interests come to dominate, forcing the system to maintain and even increase their privileges” 
(McChesney 2013:14). Thus, in his estimation, fundamentally addressing the threats to the 
Internet cannot be successfully accomplished from within the current neoliberal political 
economic framework given the unequal distribution of power it perpetuates. The only way to 
protect the Internet is to develop a more broad-based political movement motivated by a 
progressive agenda that challenges the role of private corporations in society and addresses 
income and power inequalities in a comprehensive fashion. In this way, “The 
democratization of the Internet is integrally related to the democratization of the political 
economy” (McChesney 2013:22). Ultimately, he contends that only a more radical 
reorganization of power within society will result in positive outcomes for the future of the 
Internet. 
Brazilian Internet freedom activists have championed democratic participation as a 
way to defend Internet freedom. However, their vision of democratic participation goes 
beyond the liberal model endorsed by MacKinnon. Brazilian activists’ emphasis on 
employing mechanisms of participatory democracy demonstrates a goal of not just wanting 
to gain the “consent of the networked,” but also a desire to encourage the networked to 
become actively involved in determining the ways in which they are networked. Thus, they 
are hewing to a more radical approach endorsed by McChesney that potentially generates 
solidarity and directly contests increasing corporate control over the global information 
network. From this perspective, the push by Brazilian activists to radically democratize 
Internet policy through participatory democracy ultimately challenges the underlying logic of 
liberal democracy, which is linked with corporate-led neoliberal globalization. In this way, 
participatory democracy is a tactic through which Brazilian activists are contesting both 
neoliberal commercialization of the Internet and the construction of state surveillance 
apparatuses that employ the telecommunications infrastructure.  
The influences of the redemocratization process on Brazilian Internet freedom 
activism have made it particularly unique in two important regards. First, Brazilian activists 
have pressured the state to guarantee the rights of Internet users. The most high-profile 
example of this is the Marco Civil da Internet – the Civil Rights Framework of the Internet – 
an Internet rights bill that has been hailed by Internet freedom activists worldwide. This is a 
novel approach for Internet freedom activists worldwide who in the past perceived of states 
as threats to a free Internet and frequently argued against state intervention in Internet policy. 
Second, Brazilian activists have championed new forms of citizen participation in shaping 
Internet policy and governance. This is evidenced by the collaborative fashion in which the 
text of Marco Civil da Internet was written as well as by new channels for citizen input built 
into the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee’s structure. Ultimately, the Brazilian case 
demonstrates how an increased understanding of the role of states in governing the Internet 
along with a belief in new forms of increased citizen participation may reshape global 
Internet policy. 
Brazilian Internet Freedom Activists 
 The network of Internet freedom activists in Brazil is heterogeneous and 
decentralized. This means that there is not one, central organization or leader that coordinates 
activist activities and objectives. Instead, likeminded individuals from a number of 
organizations and backgrounds are finding common cause to collaborate on efforts to shape 
Internet policy and governance. On the whole, these activists are largely urban, middle-class, 
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and well educated. Many, if not most, are politically active and have participated in 
progressive social movements or other activist mobilizations. Their concern with Internet 
policy is related to their own use of the technology and the role they see it playing in 
contemporary life. I have broadly classified Brazilian Internet freedom activists into the 
following four clusters for analytical purposes. 
 
Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) Militants 
The highly active and politically organized Brazilian free and open source software (FOSS) 
militants have been central to mobilizing in favor of Internet freedom. As I discuss in 
Chapter 2, the critique of proprietary software central to the FOSS movement became 
entwined with left-wing, anti-neoliberal politics in Brazil. Promoting FOSS became 
understood as a technological component of a larger political project to create a more 
egalitarian society. Indeed, some of the most important FOSS militants are also longtime 
members of the PT. For these individuals, the preservation of an Internet livre serves the 
same ends as software livre – the Portuguese term for FOSS. During the course of this 
dissertation, I will highlight the role of leading FOSS militants like Sergio Amadeu, Marcelo 
Branco, and Mario Teza who helped start the FOSS movement in Brazil and have also been 
some of the most vocal proponents of Internet freedom.  
 
Media Democratization Activists 
As the Internet has come to be an ever more important platform for accessing all sorts of 
news and media (newspapers, television, film, radio, etc.), individuals concerned with the 
corrosive effects of corporate media control have come to see the Internet as a way to bypass 
the centralizing control of corporations. For these media activists, the decentralized nature of 
the network creates space for a diversity of opinions and perspectives that are not always 
tolerated by large media conglomerates, like Brazil’s Globo, Grupo Folha, and Grupo Abril. 
In turn, media companies increasingly understand the Internet as part of their business model 
and are seeking to create policies that restrict the flow of information (e.g., severe copyright 
enforcement measures). Thus, journalists Pedro Ekman and Bia Barbosa, who work with the 
NGO Intervozes in São Paulo, see defending Internet freedom as part of a larger project to 
“democratizar a mídia” – to democratize the media. By this they mean increasing the ability 
of individuals and groups both to access information and to have their views represented. For 
these individuals, discussions about Internet policy are part of larger debates about how 
society, and in particular the media, should be organized. 
 
Progressive Legal Scholars 
A community of progressive lawyers has been central to framing the debate about Internet 
freedom in terms of a discourse on rights and to shaping legal code in a way that preserves 
Internet freedom. In many cases they became interested in Internet policy through their 
exposure to the free and open source movement and its critique of the current global 
copyright regime. It was Ronaldo Lemos, a legal scholar from Rio de Janeiro and the director 
of Brazil’s Creative Commons initiative, who first suggested creating an Internet rights law 
in 2007. Young lawyers Pedro Abramovay, Guilherme Almeida, and Paulo Rená then 
worked in the Ministry of Justice to help draft the text of the law. For these lawyers, 
developing a legal code that facilitates using technology to increase access to information is 
imperative for helping to build a more egalitarian, democratic society.  
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Science and Technology Researchers 
Professors, particularly from computer science, physics, engineering, and other STEM fields, 
have been central to the development of the Internet in Brazil. Accessing the data processing 
power of foreign research centers and collaborating electronically with international 
colleagues proved to be extremely beneficial to their own research, and because of this some 
of the first connections to the global computer network in Brazil were created by Brazilian 
academics at federal and state universities. The continuing legacy of the academic 
community in helping to build out the Internet in the 1990s is evidenced by the prominent 
role of academics at the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, including the Executive 
Secretary, physicist Hartmut Glaser, and emeritus board member and engineer, Demi 
Getschko. These researchers were some of Brazil’s Internet pioneers and thus feel a 
responsibility to protect the computer network that they were so instrumental in creating. 
 
 These four clusters of Internet freedom activists are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
represent analytical categories. Indeed, a number of activists I met could easily be 
categorized in more than one of these groups. Nonetheless, identifying these groups helps 
paint a picture of the background and motivations of Brazilian Internet freedom activists.  
The Anthropology of Democracy 
This dissertation belongs to a growing body of research in the field of political 
anthropology, which critically interrogates the political ideal of democracy and the enactment 
of democratic institutions worldwide (Paley 2002). Ever since the colonial period when the 
field of anthropology was in its nascent days, anthropologists have been concerned with 
analyzing the structure and organization of power within societies (Radcliffe-Brown 1950). 
Often, the knowledge generated from this research, on what were predominantly non-
Western groups, was used to abet the colonial governance project (Johnson 1982). More 
recently, however, political anthropologists have shifted their gaze to Western political 
models and institutions, such as democracy, which have traditionally been the purview of the 
field of political science. The anthropological interest in studying democracy as a political 
ideal grew in the early 1990s in the wake of the end of the Cold War as the seeming defeat of 
socialism as a political system and a utopian ideal led to a widely acclaimed capitalist 
triumphalism that linked democracy to free market, neoliberal economics. Anthropologists, 
noted, however, that there was a simultaneous disillusionment among many about the way 
diverse arrangements of democratic institutions worldwide were functioning and how social, 
political and economic conditions of inequality persisted (Paley 2002:473). Thus, unpacking 
the meanings and practices of democracy globally became a new subject of anthropological 
research. 
Anthropologists’ use of ethnographic research methods, which often depend on 
relationships with people outside formal political institutions, as well as their attention to 
alternative worldviews have permitted them to look beyond official discourses about how 
democracy operates in theory. Thus, cultural anthropologists have paid attention to how 
democratic systems function in day-to-day life, their local meanings, and who they benefit in 
practice. In this way ethnographic exploration of democratic processes has raised important 
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new questions about what the term democracy means in a particular context, who is using it, 
and to what ends. As Julia Paley notes, “discourses labeling certain regimes as democracies 
are strategically deployed by groups with strong interests in particular definitions and 
contested by others differently situated in relations of power” (Paley 2002:471). The role of 
the anthropologist is then to reveal these underlying power structures and to examine how 
changing political regimes represent shifting power.  
The term “democracy” is oftentimes a floating signifier that can be filled with any 
number of given meanings, sometimes even contradictory ones. This is particularly true in 
societies, such as Brazil, that have undergone the so-called transition from authoritarian 
military rule to civilian control. In her work on post-Franco Spain, Begonia Aretxaga noted 
what she called the “fetishization of democracy,” in which the promise of a new, modern 
European democratic political system obscured the traces that connected the Socialist 
government elected in 1982 to the former regime in the form of the Francoist military and 
administrative bureaucracies that were left largely intact. This fetishization of the new 
Spanish democracy was ultimately the legitimizing discourse that allowed the Spanish 
government to continue policies of state terror against Basque nationalists (2000:64). In the 
Brazilian context, James Holston and Teresa Caldeira have labeled the persistence of the gap 
between what is promised in democracy and what is actually experienced by individuals as 
“disjunctive democracy” (1998). By this, they refer to the uneven enactment of citizenship 
rights based on race, gender, social class, and other social differences that persist even in a 
regime where, theoretically at least, all citizens are equal before the law. These distinctions 
are the legacy of long-term power inequalities in Brazilian society that are the legacy of the 
colonial project. They argue that this disjuncture is why even though forms of democratic 
governance have taken root in Brazil, they have also resulted in new forms of violence, 
corruption, and impunity that make Brazilians feel more threatened by everyday violence 
than they were by the repressive military regime. The paradoxical characteristics of 
democracy in so-called post-transition societies expose how democracy can be fetishized in 
ways that obscure or even exacerbate long-standing inequality depending on the way in 
which it is enacted.  
The meanings given to the term democracy suggest that it is not a single condition 
that societies do or do not have, but rather a set of processes unevenly enacted by different 
groups over time in different contexts. In this dissertation, I examine how Brazilian Internet 
freedom activists are calling upon specific conceptions of democracy, in particular 
participatory democracy, in order to promote more socially equitable Internet policy. Yet, as 
Julia Paley points out, invoking democracy in order to obtain their policy objectives is not 
without risk, particularly given the capaciousness of the term and its multiple, contested 
meanings: 
 
Social movements' invoking of democracy discourse may be a tactical move, a 
carefully selected appropriation of dominant logics, or a less reflective reproduction 
of dominant tropes; in a particular context it may also be a risky choice, one that 
plays into and legitimates a Cold War discourse of democracy and its opponents, or a 
post-Cold War imaginary linking political freedom to liberated market forces (Paley 
2002:486).  
 
Ultimately, my anthropological analysis of the meanings of democracy in Brazil and the way 
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that Brazilian Internet freedom activists are employing the term necessarily pays attention to 
broader historical trends and the shifting power relationships in Brazilian society over the 
past 30 years.  
Interrogating Participation: Critical Perspectives on Participatory Democracy 
The central argument of this dissertation is that initiatives by Brazilian Internet 
freedom activists to democratize Internet policy are characterized by an emphasis on 
participatory democracy. Activist initiatives to create an Internet freedom bill through an 
online, interactive website as well as new channels of citizen participation in the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee represent contemporary applications of participatory democracy 
theory applied to developing Internet policy. While some social scientists studying the 
Brazilian context have understood participatory democracy as a novel democratic approach 
toward a more redistributive social model that challenges neoliberal policy objectives 
(Baiocchi 2005; Nylen 2003; Santos and Avritzer 2007; Santos 1998), others have noted how 
the rhetoric of participatory democracy is, in fact, compatible with the neoliberal political 
economy (Dagnino 2007; Junge 2012). As I analyze the application of theories of 
participatory democracy to developing Internet policy in Brazil in this dissertation, I examine 
contested notions about democracy and seek to understand whether this strategy can 
potentially lead to radical change in the way that power is distributed within society.  
For advocates of participatory democracy such as Santos and Avritzer, it represents a 
counter-hegemonic move to broaden understandings of democratic participation and to 
effectively “democratize democracy” by increasing popular participation, especially among 
traditionally marginalized groups (2007:lxii). In this way it stands in contrast to liberal, 
representative democracy as practiced in the Global North, which tends to be low-intensity 
and which has been successfully coopted by powerful corporate forces through intense 
lobbying of politicians and the financing of political campaigns.2 The ability of corporations 
to exert influence in liberal democracies has made it virtually a condition of neoliberal 
globalization (Santos and Avritzer 2007:lxv). Indeed, the implementation of a liberal 
democratic system in Brazil was part of a larger wave of democratization in Latin America in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. What political scientists have called the “third wave” of 
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s paralleled the enactment of neoliberal policies in the 
region. These economic liberalization policies implemented across Latin America, 
commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus, resulted in the shrinking of social 
welfare programs, the privatization of public resources, the lowering of trade barriers, and the 
establishment of flexible labor policies that reduced labor union power (Harvey 2005). 
Santos and Avritzer contend that liberal democracy serves the neoliberal project by giving it 
the veneer of popular approval (2007). For these scholars, mechanisms of participatory 
democracy are a possible solution to the “crisis of representation” in which citizens are 
participating less in mechanisms of liberal democracy (i.e., lower voter turnout) and are 
feeling less and less represented by their elected officials. Implicit in their belief in 
                                                
2 In the US, the power of corporations in political life has expanded recently in wake of the Supreme Court’s 
2010 ruling in the case of Citizen’s United v. Federal Elections Commission, in which the conservative majority 
found that the First Amendment of the US Constitution prohibits the government from restricting political 
expenditures toward direct advocacy by corporations, labor unions, and other associations. This ruling 
overturned existing federal law that restricted such advocacy during election season. It has resulted in increased 
political spending by corporations and wealthy individuals. 
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participatory democracy is the notion that more popular participation in political decision-
making will result in more progressive social policy, which in turn will lead to a more 
egalitarian distribution of wealth. For them, participatory democracy will result in 
governance decisions that more closely align with the interests of the masses rather than 
those of the elite and of private capital. 
Conversely, others have critiqued the overly utopian outlook of proponents of 
participatory democracy and noted how, in practice, the concept of participation has been 
coopted by proponents of neoliberal development to signify market-oriented, individualistic 
forms of social interaction (Dagnino 2007; Junge 2012). For example, Brazilian political 
scientist Evelina Dagnino has drawn attention to what she calls a “perverse confluence” 
between the rhetoric of participatory democracy and neoliberalism: 
 
The perverse nature of the confluence between the participatory and the neoliberal 
projects lies in the fact that both not only require a vibrant and proactive civil 
society, but also share several core notions, such as citizenship, participation, and 
civil society, albeit used with very different meanings. The common vocabulary and 
shared institutional mechanisms obscure fundamental distinctions and divergences. 
The apparent homogeneity conceals conflict and contradictions by displacing 
dissonant meanings (Dagnino 2007:548). 
In her estimation, the notions about democratic participation and citizenship that emerged 
among social movements during the 1970s and 1980s were primarily about demands for 
social inclusion of the working class and a more egalitarian sociability. It was a productive 
vernacular that allowed a diverse set of movements (workers, women, blacks, gays, 
environmentalists, etc.) to generate solidarity in an effort to contest the traditional social 
hierarchy in which they had little power (Dagnino 2007:552). It is important to point out that 
the rhetoric of participatory democracy did not contain any class component, as did earlier 
socialist and communist ideologies. This meant that there was no explicit prioritization of the 
participation of the working class in decision-making, even though the participation of 
workers was one of its proponents’ implicit goals. In turn, the concept of participatory 
democracy has been more easily resignified by proponents of neoliberalism in such a way 
that participation is conceived of as a process through which individuals become further 
integrated into the market system. The notion of collective solidarity that originally 
underpinned the participatory project has been substituted by one that focuses on individuals 
and which therefore erodes “the sense of public responsibility and public interest that had 
been so hard-won in the democratising struggles of Brazil's recent past” (Dagnino 2007:554). 
Ultimately, Dagnino criticized the PT because it continued to employ the rhetoric of 
participatory democracy while simultaneously advancing some components of the neoliberal 
project that it originally opposed.  
Central to critiques of participatory democracy are questions about what constitutes 
participation and who is actually allowed to participate in a meaningful way. Indeed, 
government institutions increasingly ask for participation in “civil society,” a vague category 
in which distinctions of power (race, class, gender, etc.) are not explicitly addressed. Even 
when such differences are acknowledged by governments, as is the case with racial 
minority/indigenous cultural rights policies that anthropologist Charles Hale refers to as 
“multicultural neoliberalism,” the potential power of these supposedly empowered groups to 
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contest the status quo is so delimited that it essentially poses no real challenge to the overall 
neoliberal governance project (Hale 2005:13). In fact, participation may be limited to sectors 
of society whose behavior is supported by the government, what some have called the “five-
star civil society” (Dagnino 2007:554), or what Hale has referred to in the case of 
multicultural politics as the “indio permitido”, or “authorized Indian” (2004:17). While 
popular participation was initially perceived as a radical path to challenge dominant power 
structures of neoliberal capitalism by incorporating the working class and other marginalized 
groups, participation is no longer seen as a threat to the status quo. Indeed, participation has 
become a “politically attractive slogan” worldwide, and it has even been coopted by non-
democratic repressive regimes (Rahnema 2010:129–131). Ultimately, the call to participation 
in democratic governance is rhetorically attractive, but what that means in practice may be 
much less radical than what was originally envisioned by proponents of participatory 
democracy. Whether participatory democracy merely tames capitalism around the edges or 
can lead to a more radical redistribution of power within society is at the core of debates 
about its efficacy as a political tactic to effect change. 
Reenvisioning the State and Democracy: The Brazilian Redemocratization Process and 
the Emergence of Participatory Democracy 
I contend that the source of current ideas about democratizing Internet policy and 
governance can be traced to anti-dictatorship activism in the late 1970s and early 1980s when 
there was an effervescence of new democratic ideals and practices that coalesced among 
movements that were working to end the military dictatorship that had been in power since 
1964. Some of the strongest pro-democracy efforts to end the dictatorship emanated from the 
urban peripheries and were the result of the spread of practices of liberation theology and 
labor union organizing (Holston 2009:235–247). These often overlapping movements created 
new forms of social mobilization that engaged individuals and asked them to be more active 
participants in making demands upon the state to address social inequality. The claim to 
“rights” and “social inclusion” specifically as “citizens” that was emanating from the poor 
and working classes represented a radical departure from traditional Brazilian social 
organization since the colonial era (Baiocchi 2005; Holston 2009; Keck 1986). 
The demands for social inclusion and citizen participation were channeled primarily 
through the PT, which was founded in 1980 once the dictatorship authorized the formation of 
opposition political parties. While union members, including their young charismatic leader 
Lula da Silva, dominated the party, its grassroots base was quite heterogeneous and included 
middle class intellectuals, “new” working class sectors (bank workers, teachers, etc.), 
activists from traditional neighborhood movements, and members of “new” social 
movements (women, people of color, environmentalists, and homosexuals). The party 
envisioned itself as one where “‘social movements can speak,’ with an emphasis on internal 
democracy and openness, rejecting democratic centralism and vanguardist positions, and 
aligning class struggle with citizenship” (Baiocchi 2005:11). The military dictatorship had 
brutally repressed and outlawed Marxist political movements but tolerated the PT, which was 
never officially Marxist and avoided using overtly communist rhetoric so as to avoid also 
being crushed by the military regime. Thus, the PT grew in strength as a political party that 
voiced the demands of the working class in a political environment in which explicitly 
critiquing the capitalist political economy could land one in jail.  
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Violent repression by the military dictatorship decimated Marxist political parties, 
which were officially outlawed in Brazil until 1979. 3 This that the PT necessarily generated 
new forms of left-wing political organizing. In particular, new union deliberation practices 
referred to as novo sindicalismo (new unionism) that emerged in Brazil in the 1970s served 
as the template. Novo sindicalismo rejected previous corporatist, state-directed unions and 
instead encouraged the rank and file to help determine union priorities. Thus, within the PT 
members were organized into local committees that then met at conventions where party 
policy was hashed out. This bottom-up, grassroots system represented a radical departure 
from traditional Brazilian political parties, including communist and socialist parties that 
maintained vanguardist, top-down organizational hierarchies and which were often led by 
individuals from the middle and upper classes (Abers 1996). In contrast, the PT believed that 
politics was not “merely an elite activity exercised in Congress and in organs of the state but 
involved all kinds of popular struggles” (Keck 1986:87–86). Many of its leaders came from 
the working class. This strengthened the party’s ties to grassroots social movements and it 
empowered individuals to have the ability to influence the immediate decisions that affected 
their communities. Thus, the PT pioneered new forms of participation within the party, which 
ultimately led to new notions about larger political participation in society itself.  
The current liberal democratic system in Brazil was implemented in the 1980s when 
the military dictatorship acquiesced to national and international pressure to return power to 
civilian control. The gradual transition was overseen by ruling elites—both supporters of the 
dictatorship and its opponents—in such a way that enabled them to retain control, albeit 
under the aegis of an ostensibly more democratic system (Hagopian 2007). This elite 
management was evidenced by a deal to institute indirect presidential elections that was 
reached between the dictatorship’s official party ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional) 
and some sectors within the only military-approved opposition party, the MDB (Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro); ARENA and MDB were the two largest parties in Congress at the 
time. Indirect selection of the president by Congress gave elites more power in selecting the 
president. They worried that a direct election open to the masses would result in a populist, 
non-elite individual being elected and enacting radical redistribution projects. This accord 
was made even in the face of the massive street protests that swept across Brazil in 1983 and 
1984 in which millions of Brazilians specifically demanded direct presidential elections. 
These Diretas Já! (Direct Elections Now!) protests included large swaths of the pro-
democracy movement, with the PT serving as one of the leading protagonists (Nylen 
2003:39). Ultimately, the first post-dictatorship civilian president who took power in 1985 
was José Sarney representing the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), a 
Brazilian oligarch from the northeastern state of Maranhão who had previously been a leader 
in the pro-dictatorship ARENA party.4 Thus, the return to a democratic system in Brazil did 
not result in a radical break from the past, but instead evidenced how the traditional, 
paternalistic and elite-driven system persisted. 
                                                
3 Until 1979, all political parties were banned except than the dictatorship’s official party ARENA (Aliança 
Renovadora Nacional) and the military-approved opposition party the MDB (Movimento Democrático 
Brasileiro). 
4 Tancredo de Almeida Neves (PMDB) was elected president by the electoral college in Brasília but died before 
taking office. This led to his vice-presidential candidate, José Sarney, taking office as president on March 15, 
1985.  
 
 
 
13 
Popular demands for more participation in the political process being made by social 
movements and the PT, which were apparent in the Diretas Já! protests, were ultimately 
impossible for elites to entirely ignore. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which was 
drafted in Brasília between 1986 and 1988 by a popularly elected Assembléia Constituinte 
(Constituent Assembly) restored direct presidential elections and created new mechanisms 
for citizen participation. During the assembly, hundreds of citizens groups, many from the 
working classes and associated with the PT, mobilized to educate the population about the 
constitutional process through public debates and publications. These groups drafted and 
submitted their own popular amendments, which were guaranteed debate if they had more 
than 30,000 signatures. In all, more than 122 popular amendments were submitted with 
signatures that included more than 12 percent of the electorate. Social movements and 
citizens’ groups also packed the galleries of Congress where the debates were being held in 
order to exert pressure on assembly members. While very few of the popular amendments 
were passed outright, their concerns were incorporated into the final, ratified version of the 
constitution (Holston 2009:250–252). New participatory mechanisms in what is popularly 
referred to as the Constituição Cidadã, or citizens’ constitution, included the possibility for 
plebiscites on important issues, policy management councils that included civil society 
participants, and the ability for the public to initiate legislation. The PT members of the 
assembly, including Lula da Silva, were some of the most vocal proponents of these 
initiatives among the elected representatives. Overall these participatory components were a 
relatively minor element of the country’s new legal framework. However, the inclusion of 
nods toward participatory democracy in the constitution demonstrates that the tension 
between liberal democracy and participatory democracy has been ongoing in Brazil since the 
return to civilian democratic control.5 The tactic of weakening the traditional elite power 
structures by creating new forms of participatory democracy is not a new strategy among 
social movements in Brazil, but is one that they have been promoting for decades now.  
The Constitution of 1988 was heralded as a victory by social movements that 
championed its enumeration of rights for previously marginalized groups (blacks, 
indigenous, etc.) and calls for more popular, democratic participation. However, the promise 
of inclusion has not been matched in practice. Anthropologists James Holston and Teresa 
Caldeira refer to this gap between what is promised and what is delivered as a characteristic 
of “disjunctive democracy” (Holston and Caldeira 1998). Indeed, rather than ushering in a 
more egalitarian society, the new legal framework allowed for the implementation of 
neoliberal policies. It was the first directly elected president since the dictatorship, Fernando 
Collor de Mello (Partido da Reconstrução Nacional, 1990-1992), a young, telegenic scion 
from an elite political family from the northeastern state of Alagoas, who began 
implementing neoliberal policies immediately upon taking office in 1990.6 Neoliberal, 
market liberalization reforms had been opposed by the military dictatorship because they 
clashed with generals’ fervent nationalist ideology. The enactment of neoliberal policies 
continued throughout the 1990s under the leadership of a handful of center right parties such 
                                                
5 While the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 included many of the demands of social movements and the PT, PT 
representatives to the constituent assembly were the only votes against the constitution because they did not feel 
that it was sufficiently radical, particularly in terms of agrarian reform and curtailing the power of the military. 
6 Collor de Mello defeated Lula da Silva in a presidential run-off in 1989, which was the first time since the end 
of the dictatorship that Brazilian citizens directly elected a president. 
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as the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), whose leader and former Marxist 
sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso occupied the presidency from 1995 to 2003. These 
included the privatization of many state-owned companies and agencies, import 
liberalization, and reduced government spending (Alfredo 2010). The loss of manufacturing 
jobs due to lower tariff barriers for imported consumer goods and diminished state spending 
on social security and welfare programs disproportionally affected the working class and 
poor. While the implementation of neoliberal policies in Brazil was not as severe as it was in 
some other Latin American countries, their enactment nonetheless indicated the extent to 
which elite classes continued to control state power in the service of capital accumulation. 
 While neoliberal, market-orientated policies were being implemented on the federal 
level, the PT put its participatory philosophy into practice on the local level when it won a 
handful of important mayoral elections in 1989. The mayoral victories were made possible 
by the decentralization of political power in the Constitution of 1988 that granted more 
autonomy and political power to Brazilian cities and states. These electoral victories enabled 
the party to implement public policies that embodied its participatory ethos. The most 
emblematic of these was orçamento participativo, or participatory budgeting, a process 
whereby citizens collectively identified budget priorities and determined how government 
funds were spent, which was first launched in 1989 in Porto Alegre (Abers 1996; Avritzer 
2007; Baiocchi 2005; Goldfrank 2003; Santos 1998). Through a series of neighborhood, 
regional, and citywide meetings, citizens determined how a small segment of the city budget 
allocated for public works would be spent in various neighborhoods. The idea was that 
individuals in their own communities were better judges of how money needed to be spent 
and that this participatory initiative would increase overall citizen engagement in politics, 
particularly among citizens from vilas, or poor neighborhoods, where the PT and other social 
movements had been organizing. By including poor and working class citizens in making 
decisions traditionally carried out by politicians or civil servants with technical expertise, 
participatory budgeting looked to reshape ideas about both how the state should function and 
whom it was meant to serve. The state was envisioned to function more in the mold of a 
social movement.  
 Brazilian ideas about participatory democracy gained a global platform with the 
emergence of the World Social Forum (WSF) in 2001. The WSF represented the coming 
together of a diverse number of social movements that shared in common a desire to contest 
the dominant forces of neoliberal globalization that had taken hold during the 1980s and 
1990s and had increased the power of multinational corporations worldwide (Santos 2008; 
Sen and Waterman 2007). The WSF was global in nature and was facilitated by the spread of 
communications technologies, particularly the Internet. The first three gatherings of the WSF 
were held in Porto Alegre because of the PT-controlled local government’s ability and desire 
to host the event. Thus, increasing democratic participation as a way to promote social justice 
took center stage. Porto Alegre was also the site of a burgeoning FOSS movement, which 
was, in part, spearheaded by the local PT militants. They were attracted to FOSS because it 
represented an alternative to expensive proprietary software created by multinationals, and 
because the collaborative way that FOSS is developed among communities of programmers 
resonated with notions about civic participation (Evangelista 2010; Murillo 2012). Therefore, 
at the WSF the relationship among technology policy, democracy, and social justice first 
entered into the global debate. This initial connection between technology and democratic 
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participation presaged current debates about Internet policy and governance that Brazilian 
activists continue to lead. 
 The momentum behind demands for participatory democracy reached new heights in 
2002 when longtime leader of the PT and then presidential candidate Lula da Silva was 
elected president. His assumption of the presidency in 2003 along with a majority coalition 
of parities in Congress represented an opportunity for the party to reshape democratic 
participation and to reorient the state to addressing issues of social inequality. Once in power, 
the PT slowed the forward progress of neoliberal reforms that had been implemented in the 
1990s, created a number of social welfare programs that resulted in a significant reduction of 
social inequality and an increase in size of the middle class, and invited social movements to 
work more closely with the government. However, on its path to electoral success the party’s 
original, more radical goals of reshaping democratic participation had become significantly 
moderated and the party opted to push its agenda using the existing liberal, democratic 
political structure (Hunter 2010). Thus, while Lula’s administration often rhetorically 
championed participatory democracy and created a political environment conducive to 
limited experiments with participatory democracy, the PT government did not so fully 
embrace it once it was in power. Indeed, it was unclear how mechanisms of participatory 
democracy that might have worked well on the local level could be transferred to the national 
level. This meant that both during Lula’s administration (2003-2011) and the administration 
of his successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011-present), movements calling for even more forms of 
participatory democracy encountered resistance. It is important to note that while the PT has 
been a primary channel through which calls for participatory democracy have been made, not 
all sectors of the party have embraced it. Likewise, there are factions within the progressive 
left outside of the party who also champion notions of participatory democracy.7 The 
ongoing tension between liberal democracy and participatory democracy is bigger than the 
PT itself. It encompasses larger debates in Brazil about the configuration of the political 
economy and the distribution of power and resources within society. It is within this political 
context that Internet freedom activists in Brazil have been working to secure policies that 
facilitate an Internet livre and increase democratic participation. 
The Internet and the State: From Cyber-utopianism to Digital Realism 
In order to understand how the tactics of Brazilian Internet freedom activists in the 
past decade represent a profound shift from those of Internet freedom activists in other 
places, particularly in the US and Europe, it is necessary to briefly explore the ideologies of 
Internet freedom activists in the 1990s when the Internet was first coalescing as a global 
network. At the time, some scholars and pundits argued that the post-Cold War era 
represented the dawn of a more globalized and borderless era in which nation-states were less 
relevant and their power was fading (Appadurai 1996; Castells 2003). At this point, what 
Internet scholar Morozov calls “cyber-utopianism” prevailed in which the Internet was 
heralded as a revolutionary technology that would by its very nature spread democracy and 
empower citizens worldwide (2011:xiii–xiv). Thus, because the Internet was understood to 
be a technological platform that transcended boundaries, many thought that it should not be 
                                                
7 A prime example of this is the opposition party Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL), which was founded 
in 2004 by individuals who were expelled from the PT because of their opposition to President Lula’s pension 
reform plan, which they considered to be pro-market. 
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subject to state regulation or control. The Internet pioneers who helped build the Internet 
considered themselves members of virtual communities in which one’s national citizenship 
was irrelevant (Goldsmith and Wu 2008). Indeed, in the 1990s the most prominent Internet 
freedom activists embraced “globalization” ideology and believed that states should not 
interfere with the Internet. This philosophy was encapsulated in John Perry Barlow’s 
manifesto “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” published online in 1996. In 
it, the cyberlibertarian and founding member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an 
NGO that defends Internet freedom, proclaimed: 
 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come 
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the 
past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty 
where we gather… 
 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have 
neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor 
do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think 
that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is 
an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions… 
 
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and 
fair than the world your governments have made before (1996). 
 
Barlow wrote the manifesto in response to the passing of the US Telecommunications Act of 
1996, the first US law to directly mention the Internet. While the law’s main policy objective 
was to deregulate the telecommunications sector, lawmakers also inserted language 
regulating Internet indecency and obscenity.8 For Barlow and many of the computer 
“hackers” who helped create the Internet’s infrastructure and protocols, this represented an 
intrusion of the technological platform they helped construct, and which, in their eyes, was 
functioning sufficiently without state intervention. 
 I contend that the belief that the Internet should not be subject to state control, in 
many ways, overlapped with neoliberal philosophy that gained traction worldwide in the 
1980s and 1990s (Harvey 2005). Proponents of neoliberalism argued that state regulation 
interfered with the functioning of the “free market” and thus state power should be reduced 
so that corporations could more efficiently distribute resources and generate wealth. In this 
way, neoliberalism complemented “globalization” ideology endorsed by the Internet pioneers 
like Barlow in that it advocated decreasing the power of nation states. In the context of the 
telecommunications sector worldwide, neoliberal policies resulted in the privatization of 
many state-owned telecommunications companies and/or infrastructure in the 1980s and 
1990s. In this dissertation I argue that this neoliberal restructuring of the telecommunications 
sector is largely responsible for creating an environment in which the decentralized computer 
network developed by “hackers” could spread from the US to a create a truly global network. 
                                                
8 Portions of Title V of the US Telecommunications Act of 1996 that created penalties for indecent and obscene 
speech online were eventually ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court because it violated the First 
Amendment of the US Constitution, which protects free speech. 
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However, while neoliberalism relaxed government regulations and allowed for the growth of 
the Internet, the growing power of multinational corporations that neoliberal policies enabled 
would later become one of the biggest threats to an open and free network. This is because 
while neoliberal rhetoric espouses a “free market” and champions competition, in practice 
neoliberal policies lead to a concentration of wealth and the creation of monopolies and 
corporate cartels. Thus, while the creation of a decentralized network was a response to 
popular demands, particularly those of the Internet pioneers, it was also ultimately 
compatible with the neoliberal policies of multinational corporations and financial 
institutions that are now in the process of capturing the network for commercial profit. 
 As the cyber-utopian euphoria surrounding the Internet in the 1990s subsided, in the 
early 2000s activists became more cognizant of the real power that states possess in terms of 
regulating the Internet. Indeed, the physical infrastructure on which the Internet depends (i.e., 
telecommunications cables, computer servers, data centers, etc.) is subject to the laws of the 
countries in which they are located. The creation of the “Great Firewall” in China in 2003, a 
massive, nationwide Internet surveillance and censorship project, as well as instances in 
which countries in the Middle East effectively cut off access to the Internet nationwide 
during political uprisings during the Arab Spring in 2011, drew attention to the real power 
states retain in controlling the flow of information on the Internet (Morozov 2011). State 
control also has been extended to flows of content. Court rulings in Europe that ordered the 
removal of material deemed offensive showed how the threats against freedom of expression 
were not restricted to authoritarian regimes, but were also taking place in well-established 
democracies like France (Goldsmith and Wu 2008).  
In the past decade Internet freedom activists worldwide have changed course from 
working against any form of state intervention in Internet policy to acknowledging the power 
of states and taking efforts to help shape policy that protects Internet freedom (MacKinnon 
2013). I argue that Brazilian Internet freedom activists have been global pioneers of this new 
focus among Internet freedom activists worldwide to pressure states to defend Internet 
freedom. What makes Brazilian activists particularly interesting is that they are not only 
focused on changing laws and state policies, but they are also working to change the 
mechanisms by which these decisions are made. In this sense, they are not only pressuring 
the state, but also actively challenging how state power is organized. I argue that this focus is 
due to the influence of ideas about participatory democracy that emerged during the Brazilian 
redemocratization process as social movements and political parties worked to envision a 
post-dictatorial Brazilian society. 
Methods: Ethnographic Fieldwork in the Digital Age  
 My analysis is based on more than 20 months of multi-sited ethnographic research 
conducted over four years in Brazil between 2010 and 2014. The majority of my time was 
spent in the cities of Porto Alegre and São Paulo, which are home to the some of the most 
important organizations promoting Internet freedom (e.g., Associação de Software Livre in 
Porto Alegre and Coletivo Digital, Intervozes, and the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
in São Paulo). In these two cities I spent time with activists, participated in activist-organized 
events, and conducted extended semi-structured interviews with individuals in order to 
capture their activist trajectories and experiences. I also conducted shorter stints of research 
in the nation’s capital, Brasília, where I conducted interviews with activists as well as 
government officials in both the executive and legislative branches in order to understand the 
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process through which policy and law are created in Brazil. Overall, I conducted more than 
60 semi-structured interviews. The data from my observations and interviews were 
meticulously recorded into my field notebook and these data represent the core of my 
analysis. 
 During the course of my fieldwork, I traversed the country and became a regular 
attendee at the most important technology conferences heavily attended by individuals 
concerned with Internet freedom (e.g., Fórum Internacional de Software Livre (FISL), 
Campus Party Brasil, Fórum da Internet do Brasil, Conexões Globais, and the Congresso 
Internacional Software Livre e Governo Eletrônico). Given that activists are geographically 
dispersed throughout Brazil, these gatherings represent critical networking opportunities for 
activists, some of whom rarely meet in person. These spaces provide an opportunity to 
discuss issues, develop strategies, and draw attention to their cause. At these gatherings I 
attended presentations, observed activist interactions, and conducted interviews on the 
sidelines. These highly attended conferences allowed me to interact with a large swath of 
activists, not just those based in São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and Brasília. 
 In addition to more traditional in-person participant observation, the very nature of 
the type of Internet-related activism I was observing required that I also become an active 
digital ethnographer. This involved two related, but distinctive, components. First, many 
activist groups worldwide rely on the Internet and digital technologies for internal 
organization (email, video chat, text messaging, collaborative word processing, etc.) as well 
as outreach and publicity (websites, social media, video, etc.). This was particularly true of 
the Brazilian Internet freedom activists who were constantly experimenting with new 
technologies and media to accomplish both of these tasks. I methodically recorded their 
digital publications (blog posts, social media posts, videos, etc.) in order to capture how they 
were presenting their values and objectives to the public. After developing rapport with key 
informants, I was invited to join an activist-only, private organizing email listserv created in 
2012. This access allowed me to follow the internal debates among activists as they frankly 
discussed both tactics and policy. These digital materials and the process through which they 
were elaborated have been valuable in informing my understanding of how activists operate. 
That is, my data include electronic records of the collaborative process by which manifestos, 
statements, and strategy documents were produced. Having access to these data allowed me 
to understand the collective process by which Brazilian Internet freedom activists operate.  
Second, Brazilian activists are pioneering a double-pronged (in-person and virtual) 
protest tactic that they refer to as operating na rede e na rua – online and on the street. 
Activists believe that influencing public opinion through active participation on social media 
is important, but that it must be accompanied by more traditional activist tactics, such as 
street protests and mobilizations at Congress, in order for it to be most effective. In practice 
this means that street protests were often broadcast live on the Internet. These protests were 
simultaneously accompanied by online protests, such as twitaços, when activists bombard 
social media like Twitter with posts in order to generate attention from the public and press. 
This combined, interactive dynamic has amplified their impact. Thus, my digital ethnography 
took many forms and entailed spending countless hours in front of my laptop recording 
activist media productions and accompanying protests performed both online and in cities 
around Brazil.  
While in some cases ethnographers employ pseudonyms in order to protect individual 
privacy, I have not done so in this case because it was neither necessary nor practical. The 
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people chronicled in this dissertation are often high-profile individuals or activists who want 
their opinion to be broadcast to a larger audience. Indeed, everyone I interviewed specifically 
gave me permission to use their name in publications. It is my hope that the voices of these 
individuals will come through in my research. As such I have quoted them at length when 
necessary. Since virtually all of the research material I collected is in Portuguese (interviews, 
emails, social media posts, news articles, activist publications, etc.), I have translated into 
English the majority of the material I present. All translations are my own unless otherwise 
noted. At times I have preserved specific phrases in the original Portuguese, and in these 
cases the Portuguese phrases are written in italics. It is my belief that both the use of real 
names and the incorporation of quotes adds validity to my research and also creates a 
valuable resource for future researchers. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 Throughout this dissertation I analyze the local particularities and political contexts 
that have shaped Brazilian Internet freedom activism. In Chapter 2, I examine the emergence 
of the Internet beginning in the 1970s in the US and demonstrate how its creation and spread 
is socially embedded in terms of how its development is entangled with larger socio-political 
forces. I demonstrate how the global expansion of the Internet in the 1990s was linked to 
neoliberal policies, but also how in Brazil the concomitant spread of FOSS resulted in the 
software’s incorporation as the technological platform of a larger, anti-neoliberal political 
project among left-wing labor union organizers aligned with the PT. This history exemplifies 
how Brazil has served as a base for developing counter-hegemonic technological futures and 
helps explains the emergence of the techno-political Internet freedom activism in Brazil. 
Ultimately, I argue that the political context and cultural values of the individuals who 
steered the geographical spread of the Internet to Brazil expose how local particularities have 
shaped the creation of a global network. 
 In Chapter 3, I specifically examine activist mobilization against a cybercrimes bill 
that led to the conceptualization of an Internet freedom law that enumerated citizen rights on 
the Internet. I show how the practices and discourse of this mobilization were highly 
influenced by the pro-democracy movement of the 1970s and 1980s. I then argue that the 
activists’ demand to draft the bill’s text via an online, collaborative website represents the 
application of notions of participatory democracy to the development of Internet policy. 
Activists referred to this collaborative approach to lawmaking as the “hacking” of the 
legislative process because for them, this collaborative process that included more voices was 
less beholden to powerful lobbies and is thus more democratic. I examine how the rhetoric of 
participatory democracy was applied to creating Internet policy, yet I also show how the 
process involved less citizen participation than is often represented.  
In Chapter 4, I examine how the logic of participatory democracy embedded in the 
creation of the Marco Civil da Internet – the Civil Rights Framework of the Internet – 
collided with the logic of liberal democracy once the bill was introduced to the Brazilian 
congress for debate. The elite-controlled, liberal democratic system, which is highly 
influenced by corporate interests, resulted in the bill being stalled for three years in large part 
due to the opposition of the telecommunications industry. At this juncture, Internet freedom 
activists resorted once more to traditional social movement tactics to influence policymakers 
and legislators. Ultimately, revelations about NSA mass surveillance generated a renewed 
interest in Internet policy and captured the attention of President Rousseff, who soon adopted 
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the banner of Internet freedom and made the Marco Civil da Internet a part of her political 
platform. Thus, together Chapters 3 and 4 recount the unlikely story of the passage of the 
Civil Rights Framework of the Internet, which has now been hailed by Internet activists 
worldwide as the blueprint for a global Magna Carta of Internet rights. 
 In Chapter 5, I examine the creation and development of the Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee (Comitê Gestor da Internet), a national Internet policy advisory board. I 
argue that by creating this institution in 1995, Brazilian Internet freedom activists negotiated 
the neoliberal restructuring of the state during the 1990s in such a way as to construct an 
institutional mechanism to defend against corporate capture of Internet governance by 
telecommunication companies. I highlight the ways that Internet freedom activists have been 
pushing to increase democratic participation by creating elected positions from non-profits 
and NGOs on the committee and also by holding yearly forums that allow interested citizens 
to affect the committee’s agenda. Ultimately, the development and strengthening of this 
organization represent a unique tactic by which Brazilian Internet freedom activists are 
carving out an important institutional platform that is not corporate-dominated from which 
they can defend the Internet as an open, public platform for creative and civic engagement. 
However, I also draw attention to the way that the new channels of participation have also 
been opened up for corporations, which raises the question of whether or not this 
arrangement is capable of resulting in radical change. 
 In Chapter 6, my concluding chapter, I analyze the impact of Brazilian Internet 
freedom activists on global Internet policy by examining the significance of the NetMundial 
Internet governance summit held in April 2014 in São Paulo. The fact that President Rousseff 
called this global summit in the aftermath of the revelations about NSA mass surveillance is 
evidence of the extent to which Brazil became a leading protagonist in developing global 
Internet policy. In large part this has been due to the work of Brazilian activists who have 
successfully influenced Brazilian government policy. Indeed, the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee helped organize the meeting and President Rousseff held up the Marco Civil da 
Internet as a model law for other countries to replicate. However, many of the Internet 
freedom activists themselves were excluded from the summit, which was largely reserved for 
official government, industry, and NGO representatives. Thus, activists organized their own, 
parallel summit called Arena NetMundial at which they continued to make demands for 
increased democratic, citizen participation in developing Internet policy. Drawing on legal 
scholar Lawrence Lessig’s argument about how computer code takes on the function of legal 
code in that it shapes individual conduct (2000), I argue that the contribution of Brazilian 
activists at NetMundial was to insert new participatory notions about the creation of Internet 
policy into an emergent global Internet legal code. 
While in the early days of the Internet many held to the cyber-utopian belief that the 
computer network’s spread would inevitably empower citizens and lead to more democratic 
societies, the work of Brazilian activists shows that this is not the case. Democracy does not 
merely arrive alongside new technology, but rather it is nurtured and constructed. The 
Internet is just the latest battlefield for much larger struggles over how society should be 
governed and what democracy actually means. The ubiquity of the Internet means that the 
fight to democratize the global network is imperative. There is no doubt that Brazilian 
Internet freedom activists will be on the front lines of these debates as they work not only to 
shape the future of the Internet, but of democracy itself.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
FROM SOFTWARE LICENSES TO GLOBAL NETWORKS – THE CULTURE AND 
POLITICS OF BRAZILIAN INTERNET FREEDOM ACTIVISTS 
 
 
It was 8:00 in the evening on a Friday night in Porto Alegre, yet the large conference 
center auditorium at the Pontificia Universidade Católica was packed to the seams with more 
than a hundred young, mostly male, hackers and techies who were seated and anxiously 
awaiting one of the last and most anticipated presentations of the day. The conference-goers 
had traveled from all over Brazil to participate in the eleventh annual Fórum Internacional de 
Software Livre (FISL), one of the largest FOSS conferences in the world. However, the 
session they had gathered for was not about software production or computer programming. 
Rather, they were waiting to listen to a presentation about threats to Internet freedom titled A 
Internet Sob Ataque II: O Império Contra-Ataca (“The Internet Under Attack II: The Empire 
Strikes Back”) by professor of sociology Sergio Amadeu. The title ominously compared the 
forces that would restrict Internet freedom to the evil Galactic Empire in George Lucas’s Star 
Wars. It no doubt captured the attention of the hackers at the conference, many of whom 
were fans of science fiction and who most likely instantly understood the warning of a 
potentially dystopic future. Amadeu, one of the most well-known figures of the Brazilian 
FOSS movement, was famous for his captivating speeches that mixed academic theory with 
real world examples and his ability to distill complex concepts into easy to understand, 
colloquial language.  
The room quieted when Amadeu arrived. Like most of the conference attendees, he 
was casually dressed. His t-shirt had the words “I love to share” in English emblazoned on 
the chest. Amadeu began his impassioned presentation by arguing that even though the 
Internet was a decentralized network that empowered individuals to create and share, the 
increasing ubiquity of the technological platform could also be harnessed to create new 
mechanisms of control and surveillance.9 He discussed a handful of new laws and recent 
judicial rulings around the world that targeted Internet users on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks 
and social media who had been sharing music, video, and software. In Amadeu’s analysis, 
one of the driving forces behind these “attacks” on the Internet came from the indústria da 
copyright – the copyright industry – the pejorative term he used to refer to companies that 
generate profit from their intellectual property, the most notable examples being media and 
IT companies. The financial and political clout of these companies, particularly in the US and 
Europe, meant that they were able to successfully lobby for the passage of legislation that 
criminalized sharing of knowledge and required the increased policing of Internet users, 
which represented a fundamental threat to an Internet livre according to the professor. 
Implicit in his talk was a critique of liberal, representative democracy because of the ways it 
was producing Internet policies that he argued were contrary to the popular interest. To close 
his presentation, Amadeu charged the audience to take action on legal, judicial, and 
                                                
9 He drew heavily on media studies scholar Alexander Galloway’s book Protocol: How Control Exists after 
Decentralization (2004), which argues that control in the form of software protocols, not freedom, is the central 
organizing principle of the Internet. 
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technological fronts to defend the Internet because “liberty in the future depends on our 
victories in the present.” To drive home his point about what was at stake he flashed an 
image of the Star Wars character Obi-wan Kenobi holding a lightsaber on the screen. This 
reminded the audience members of the moral imperative behind efforts to defend the Internet 
livre as well as the uphill battle that they seemingly faced.  
From Software Licenses to Global Networks 
I initially went to Porto Alegre to study the Brazilian FOSS movement, which had 
gained global attention in the early 2000s as it became closely aligned with the left wing PT. 
For me, as a middle-class, progressive American who had grown up with personal computers 
and who had taught myself HTML as a hobby in order to make webpages in the 1990s, the 
way that software had been at the center of this unique techno-political movement was 
fascinating. However, the more time I spent with FOSS activists, the more it became 
apparent that the issue that most electrified them at the moment was Internet policy. The fact 
that Sergio Amadeu’s presentation was one of the most popular of the more than two 
hundred presentations at the conference was evidence of this. Indeed, Amadeu, a FOSS 
militant since the late 1990s, had been appointed by President Lula da Silva in 2003 to 
spearhead a government initiative to increase the use of FOSS in government, but now 
almost a decade later and out of government he was rallying activists to defend Internet 
freedom. This shift in focus among activists altered my own research agenda as I decided to 
concentrate on the nascent techno-political Internet freedom movement in Brazil, of which 
FOSS activists were just one component. Initially, I believed that the apparent shift I saw 
from software activism to concerns with Internet policy represented a very recent change in 
activist interests. However, as I spoke with more people during the course of my 
ethnographic research and conducted my own research on the development of the Internet, I 
realized that, in fact, the emergence of FOSS and the Internet were intrinsically linked. I 
came to understand that the two could not so easily be conceptually disentangled, but were 
part and parcel of the same larger social and technological processes.  
 In this chapter, I focus on the emergence of the Internet in the 1970s and 1980s in the 
US and its subsequent global spread to Brazil in the 1990s in order to demonstrate how this 
networking technology was shaped by individuals and produced within particular socio-
political contexts. In exploring the intertwined spread of the Internet and FOSS in Brazil I 
show how Brazilian academics and activists who envisioned an alternative role for 
technology in society imbued the Internet and software with new meanings involving 
democracy and social justice. First, I present a historical overview of the emergence of the 
Internet in the US. I demonstrate how the rise of the “hacker ethic” – the belief that sharing, 
collaboration, decentralization, and the free exchange of ideas were beneficial to 
technological innovation – among computer programmers in US computer labs in the 1960s 
shaped the creation of the global network as well as led to the creation of FOSS in the 1980s. 
Then, I shift to Brazil and draw on ethnographic interviews with Brazilians involved in both 
the development of the Internet in Brazil and the spread of FOSS. I start with two individuals 
credited with spearheading the first Brazilian connections to the Internet in 1992 – computer 
engineer Demi Getschko and former political exile and pro-democracy activist Carlos 
Afonso. I show how efforts to create a decentralized global computer network were 
spearheaded in Brazil by academics and social justice activists. Next I explore how the 
spread of the Internet to Brazil exposed more people to FOSS by examining computer 
 
 
 
23 
programmer Nelson Lago’s experience launching one of the first commercial Internet service 
providers (ISPs) in the mid- 1990s. His case demonstrates how the “hacker ethic” and FOSS 
were practically embedded within the physical infrastructure of the network, and thus those 
ideologies were disseminated along with the Internet. Finally, I explore how labor union 
organizers Marcelo Branco and Mario Teza discovered FOSS and ultimately embraced it as 
part of a larger, anti-neoliberal political movement and helped launch the Brazilian FOSS 
movement. I argue that the political context and cultural values of the individuals who 
steered the geographical spread of the Internet to Brazil expose how local particularities have 
shaped the creation of a global network. This substantiates my argument that the Internet is 
socially embedded. 
The fundamental values espoused by Brazilian Internet freedom activists and the 
current structure of the Internet itself can be directly traced to FOSS ideology. The technical 
and legal arguments about software licenses that began in the 1980s in the US precipitated 
larger moral debates about access to knowledge, intellectual property, and democratic 
governance at the same time the Internet coalesced as a global network. FOSS programmers 
worldwide were instrumental in creating the technical framework on which the Internet was 
based (computer protocols, Internet service providers, website programming languages, etc.), 
and simultaneously the Internet became key to the spread of FOSS and the values and 
relationships that it exemplifies (Coleman 2013; Kelty 2008).  
I explore the politicization of the Brazilian FOSS movement at the intersection of 
global FOSS ideology, left-wing politics and the anti-neoliberal globalization movement 
(Evangelista 2010; Juris 2005; Murillo 2012) in order to explain how this well-organized, 
techno-political movement has emerged as an organizing base and ideological wellspring for 
more recent Internet freedom activism in Brazil. While not all Brazilian Internet freedom 
activists have a FOSS background, the FOSS legacy explains the emphasis on openness, 
freedom, and democratic participation that is central to the current ideology of Internet 
freedom activists in Brazil. Furthermore, Brazilian Internet freedom activists have more 
recently marshaled the links created between FOSS activists and some sectors within the PT 
to affect policy change. 
Ultimately, my goal in this chapter is not to focus on any one specific moment in the 
development of the Internet, but rather to expose the unfolding nature of this process over 
time and the different political tendencies within it. By doing so, I will link the creation and 
the configuration of the Internet to larger social trends that have become embedded in the 
network. Central among these is neoliberalism, which is a “theory of political economic 
practices that proposes human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, the free market, and free trade” (Harvey 2005:2). Neoliberalism 
initially gained traction in the 1970s and 1980s in the US and Europe and led to the 
deregulation and privatization of state resources, including in the telecommunications sector, 
as advocates claimed that private sector competition would eliminate bureaucratic red tape, 
increase efficiency, improve quality, and reduce costs; state intervention was understood to 
be detrimental to the functioning of markets (Harvey 2005:65). Furthermore, neoliberal 
emphasis on private property rights resulted in the enactment of strict intellectual property 
regimes (copyright, patents, etc.) as intellectual property, and the ability to profit from it, was 
increasingly seen as the driver of the emergent “knowledge economy.” In Brazil, neoliberal 
policies were embraced by the business elite and began being implemented in the 1990s. 
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These policies restructured the information technology sector, which had previously been 
highly protected by import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies created by the 
nationalist military dictatorship beginning in the 1970s (Schoonmaker 2002). Neoliberal 
policies primarily benefitted large corporations and resulted in capital accumulation 
worldwide, yet they also had unintended consequences. For example, neoliberal deregulation 
and decentralization in the 1990s created the openings for the type of open, global network 
that hacker computer programmers had envisioned. This, in turn, gave rise to the global 
FOSS movement which contests corporate control of knowledge and technology. 
My historical and ethnographic study is inspired by academic contributions from the 
field of science and technology studies (STS) that challenge technological determinism and 
highlight the political nature of the development of technology (Ceruzzi 2003; MacKenzie 
and Wajcman 1999; Winner 1980). My research demonstrates that there is no innate logic or 
definitive technical rationale for the current structure of the Internet. Rather, the Internet is a 
constantly evolving and contested technological platform that both reflects and creates social 
values and relationships. Thus, what is currently at stake in battles over the future of the 
Internet are essentially competing visions of what the Internet is and what it should be. 
Sociologist Saskia Sassen has argued that social scientists have too often focused solely on 
the way that technological changes have affected society rather than looking at how 
technology is embedded in society (2002). In this chapter, I heed her call to develop a more 
embedded perspective. My analysis shows that as Brazilians made efforts to connect Brazil 
to the Internet, they did not merely reproduce the libertarian “hacker ethos,” but rather 
reinterpreted it and imbued it with new meanings that were constantly contested. This in turn 
has led to a robust and politically engaged techno-political movement inspired by ideas of 
participatory democracy that first mobilized around FOSS and is now focused on Internet 
policy.  
The Hacker Ethic 
 The technological innovation that led to the formation of a global computer network, 
the Internet, and the development of FOSS began in the 1960s and 1970s at large computer 
labs at government agencies, private corporate research centers and, most importantly, public 
universities in the US. The computer scientists who worked at these institutions, and who 
spearheaded both of these projects, self-identified as hackers. A hacker was not a pejorative 
term referring to a computer criminal, but rather a positive moniker for a creative computer 
programmer who was able to find solutions to intractable technical problems, oftentimes in 
an unexpected way.10 The term hacker was first used in 1961 among computer scientists at 
the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab who understood a hack to be not only a technical 
accomplishment that served the greater good because of the problem it resolved, but also one 
in which the hacker derived pleasure from the formidable technical challenge. In part 
influenced by counterculture ideas circulating at US universities in the 1960s and 1970s, 
these hackers had idealistic notions about the potentials of technology and held to a 
“philosophy of sharing, openness, decentralization, and getting your hands on machines at 
any cost to improve the machines, and to improve the world” (Levy 1994:vvi). They believed 
                                                
10 The term “hacker” developed a pejorative meaning in the 1980s and is now commonly used to refer to 
criminals who exploit network security flaws to steal information. Non-criminal hacker communities 
distinguish themselves from these individuals by referring to them as criminal hackers, or “crackers.” 
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in the free exchange of knowledge, they mistrusted authorities and bureaucracies, and they 
subscribed to meritocratic ideals that an individual should be judged by the work they 
actually produced rather than their title or position. These values, which have been labeled 
the “hacker ethic,” proliferated in computer science communities worldwide. Ultimately, 
they became embedded in the technologies computer programmers produced, which include 
both FOSS and the Internet (Castells 2003; Kelty 2008; Levy 1994). Because the “hacker 
ethic” first emerged in the US in the 1960s and had some libertarian political characteristics, 
particularly in terms of support for decentralization and individual meritocracy, in some ways 
it resembled emerging neoliberal political thought. On the other hand, however, the mistrust 
of authority and the opposition to any restriction to knowledge sharing places the “hacker 
ethic” in opposition to neoliberal corporate enclosure of intellectual property. Thus, the 
“hacker ethic” is a capacious philosophy not easily mapped onto political ideologies. 
Nonetheless, a discussion of the emergence and spread of the Internet and the development 
of FOSS demonstrates how the two are inextricably entwined and how hacker values are at 
the core of the vision of the Internet embraced by Internet freedom activists.  
The First Networks: Openness as a Value 
The development of the Internet has been a gradual process in which a number of 
diverse, independent computer networks operating with various hardware and software have 
been slowly connected through the standardization of the software protocols that allow them 
to communicate. Of the early computer networks, the most important was ARPANET, which 
was funded by Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense, 
and was the first, high-speed transcontinental computer network. In the wake of the Soviet 
Union’s launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, the US government invested heavily in science and 
technology research. The military was particularly interested in developing networking 
technology that would allow various military computers and communications installations to 
communicate. ARPA mobilized computer scientists in the government, the private sector, 
and academia to devise technologies that would make this possible. The work of the hackers 
in these institutions centered on technical questions about how information should be 
digitally communicated, what hardware platforms should be used, and how the network 
could and should be structured. ARPANET itself was not directly employed for military 
purposes; rather it was largely an academic research project to explore the possibilities of 
computer networks. ARPANET was a constantly evolving experimental project in which 
researchers could test out different software and networking strategies.  
In an ironic twist, while the research concerning computer networking was funded by 
the US military, which was known for its secrecy and desire to create closed, centralized 
systems, the computer scientists who actually built the network created an extremely open 
and decentralized system (Castells 2003). This was because of their background in the 
academic world where the values of openness and peer-review were highly regarded. It was 
the networked embodiment of the hacker ethic. The technical expertise of the computer 
scientists gave them a certain degree of autonomy to develop technology as they saw fit. 
Their military supervisors, who did not understand the intricacies of computer networking, 
often acquiesced to the technical decisions made by the programmers and engineers. 
 ARPANET was deployed in 1969 and initially connected just four computer labs – 
UCLA, UCSB, the Stanford Research Institute, and the University of Utah. Two 
technological innovations resulted from the evolution of ARPANET that are key to the 
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functioning of the Internet: Packet-switching and Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP). ARPANET was the first computer network that employed packet-
switching. In 1964, before ARPANET was launched, young mathematician Paul Baran, who 
was working at the Rand Corporation in Los Angeles, was tasked with envisioning a network 
that could withstand a nuclear attack in which a central communications hub was taken 
offline. He conceived a distributed, decentralized network with no central authority, in which 
the nodes of the network were redundantly connected in order to improve reliability. Digital 
messages sent from one computer to another would be split up into a number of small units, 
or packets, which would be routed through different channels on the network to their final 
destination, at which point they would be recombined (Baran 1964). This packet-switching 
system differed from traditional, circuit-switched networks, such as telephone networks, 
where a direct connection is created between the origin of the data and its destination. In 
analog telephone systems, information transmission is coordinated by a central 
communications hub that opens up a direct connection between two points in the network. A 
packet-switched, digital network like ARPANET did not have a central hub. This means 
ARPANET was decentralized in that it did not depend on any one component of the network 
in order to continue functioning. 
 The other key innovation was the TCP/IP software protocol. Originally developed by 
computer scientists working at ARPA in 1974, Vincent Cerf and Robert Kahn, TCP/IP 
software protocol dictates how data is formatted, addressed, transmitted, routed and received 
on the network. In essence, these protocols are the language that allows the computers to 
communicate on the network. Building off of Baran’s decentralized network, Cerf and Kahn 
developed a system of independent and autonomous networks that were connected by 
“routers” that would direct information across the network. It is important to remember that 
TCP/IP was not the only or even the first of such computer protocols. ARPANET was 
already using another protocol, Network Control Program (NCP), and there were a number 
of alternative protocols being developed by computer scientists worldwide, most notably the 
x.25 and Open System Interconnection (OSI) protocols developed in Europe that had been 
adopted by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) as global standards.  
What made TCP/IP unique was its relative simplicity, which in turn meant that it 
allowed a number of types of computer networks running on different hardware and software 
to connect using a basic standard operating language. For example, less complex BITNET 
networks used by a number of US universities could eventually be integrated into the 
network because they also supported TCP/IP. At this point in the late 1970s and 1980s, there 
was no global standard for computer networking. The debates over what protocols should be 
used on the emergent global network were known as the “protocol wars” (Salus 1995). 
Governments, informatics corporations, and academics debated which protocol should 
emerge as the global standard. Hackers, in particular Cerf and Kahn, lobbied hard to have 
their TCP/IP system adopted. Largely because of their advocacy, in 1983 the US military 
decided to implement TCP/IP across ARPANET. By this time ARPANET had grown 
significantly (including connecting to some computer labs in Western Europe) and was the 
largest and most advanced network worldwide (Salus 1995). American corporations like 
IBM and Apple soon followed the lead of the US Department of Defense. Ultimately, in 
large part because of its adoption in the US, which has traditionally been a leader in the 
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information technology sector, TCP/IP prevailed in the “protocol wars” and became the 
protocol of the emergent global Internet. 
 The implications of protocols in shaping the Internet become clearer when one thinks 
about what a global computer network based on another protocol might have looked like. 
The Geneva-based ITU, a UN agency, adopted the x.25 network protocol in 1976 as the 
international standard for computer networks. Worldwide, the largest proponents of the x.25 
network protocols were the state-owned post and telecommunications agencies (PTTs) of a 
number of Western European countries. At the time these agencies were organizing to build 
separate centralized, government-controlled networks in each of their countries. These 
national networks would then be connected to each other at their national borders. The most 
famous example of this type of x.25 network was the French Minitel system created by 
France Télécom, which was operational until 2012. Unlike TCP/IP networks that allowed for 
network diversity and decentralization, in an x.25 system the control and accountability of 
the network was in the hands of public network providers as opposed to dispersed among the 
various computers accessing the network as in the TCP/IP system. Indeed, PTTs were 
reluctant to let private networks link up to their public systems (Castells 2003:26). The x.25 
system was attractive to the European PTTs that wanted to maintain their government 
monopolies on access to information, but this came at the expense of other groups – 
academics and the private sector – who were independently developing their own networks. 
The centralized, national vision of an inter-connected global network embodied in x.25, 
which was being promoted in statist Europe, differed starkly from the decentralized vision 
exemplified in TCP/IP that had been developed in the US. The academics in the US who 
helped create TCP/IP were opposed to centralized management of the network, but this left 
open political questions about how the emergent global Internet would actually be governed 
if it was not primarily the domain of nation-states to perform this role. 
Ultimately, TCP/IP became the global standard both because of the US military’s 
official endorsement and because it was popular among hackers worldwide who were 
attracted to its flexibility and accommodation of network diversity. The popularity among 
hackers is, in large part, due to the fact that the TCP/IP protocol was included in one variant 
of the UNIX operating system – the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) – which was the 
most widespread operating systems in computer science labs worldwide (Salus 1995). 
Networking computers depended on compatible software programs, and since UNIX was 
widely available it was a logical choice to use it as a de facto global standard. It is important 
to note that the fact that it was distributed without a cost among hackers was not a given. 
Rather, the development and dissemination of UNIX gave birth to a new ideology about how 
to create software that would eventually become known as the FOSS movement. At its core, 
this movement pushed back against the notion that access to software code should be 
restricted, which was increasingly commonplace as informatics corporations were 
increasingly commercializing software as a standalone product and thus concealing the 
source code so that it could not be copied. Hackers felt that corporate attempts to limit access 
to source code in order to increase profits was immoral because it hindered the free flow of 
knowledge and ideas. In this way it critiqued neoliberal notions about private property rights, 
which were increasingly being applied to intellectual property in the digital age. This central 
critique of the neoliberal intellectual property system ultimately launched a larger global 
movement against corporate attempts to restrict the flow of knowledge and information in 
areas beyond just software.  
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UNIX and the Birth of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS): Contesting Corporate 
Control of Knowledge 
 In the 1980s the UNIX operating system, which was developed and owned by 
AT&T’s Bell Labs, was the predominant operating system used by computer science labs, 
particularly in the US. Prevented by court order from entering the computer market because 
of its telephone monopoly, AT&T licensed the software for a nominal fee to computer 
programmers at academic labs. UNIX was unique in that it was relatively simple and was 
portable among a number of computer systems. As such, UNIX became a lingua franca of 
programmers worldwide, including hacker communities. AT&T distributed the source code 
of UNIX, which allowed programmers to see how the software functioned and also to make 
changes to improve it. Programmers shared customizations, bug fixes, and hacks to make the 
software more stable on a variety of platforms. This sharing was often done by physically 
mailing the magnetic tapes that stored the software from lab to lab. Because AT&T was not 
commercializing the software, it permitted the quasi-legal circulation of these variations, 
which in computer science terminology are referred to as “distributions.” The flexibility to 
develop these variations allowed the merger of UNIX and the TCP/IP protocols at the heart 
of ARPANET, thus “creating a situation wherein UNIX operating systems came to be not 
only the paradigm of operating systems but also the paradigm of networked computers” 
(Kelty 2008:120). Furthermore, the community of sharing that evolved around UNIX, in 
essence, generated a new collaborative software development model in which hackers in 
different locations were working on the same projects. It also raised ethical and legal 
questions about who actually owned the code – AT&T or the software programmers who 
developed it. Indeed, throughout the 1980s AT&T became increasingly concerned with 
enforcing its copyright over the software by controlling and restricting the circulation of 
different distributions. As intellectual property was increasingly understood as the driver of 
the so-called knowledge economy, corporations like AT&T were becoming more vigilant 
about staking claims to intellectual property because they saw it as central to their profit-
making strategies.  
Unhappy with AT&T’s efforts to restrict access to UNIX, computer scientist Richard 
Stallman of MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory launched the GNU Project in 1983, a 
collaborative software development initiative to create a UNIX-compatible operating system 
comprised completely of non-proprietary code. In 1984, Stallman founded the Free Software 
Foundation (FSF) in Boston, Massachusetts, to coordinate this project and to promote the 
development of other types of “free” software. In this case, free did not refer to the cost, but 
rather the liberty involved in being able to see, study, share, and change the software 
according to one’s own needs. For Stallman and his followers, it was immoral to restrict the 
flow of information in the form of restricting access to source code. He proposed a new 
development model based on hacker collaboration and the free flow of information. In most 
places worldwide, including the US, software is considered intellectual property that is 
subject to copyright. Copyright is a government-approved monopoly on the ability to profit 
from intellectual property for a specified period of time. Copyright holders of software 
licenses (individuals or corporations) are able to legally enforce their monopoly over 
software use, distribution, and sales. In 1989, Stallman created the GNU General Public 
License (GPL), which is a software license that programmers can apply to their work, which 
requires the software and all of its derivatives be distributed freely. The GPL, often referred 
to as “copyleft,” essentially prohibits the privatization of any software that uses “free” code 
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(Coleman and Golub 2008; Coleman 2010; Kelty 2008). Because it is based on the dominant 
global copyright system that gives copyright owners control over the use of their work, it has 
legal standing in countries where copyright law is enforced. This hack of the copyright 
system, through the creation of the copyleft, created a legal framework for free software to 
exist. It creatively used intellectual property law, which is most often used to restrict the 
circulation of knowledge, to ensure that software code was publicly available at no cost. This 
undermined the neoliberal tendency to commodify intellectual property for the purpose of 
generating a profit. 
In the 1990s, the spread of the Internet spurred the use and development of free 
software and also transformed how computer programmers collaborated on software projects. 
In 1991, Linus Torvalds, a Finnish computer science student at the University of Helsinki, 
started working on his own, free version of the popular MINIX software, which is a UNIX-
like software primarily used to train programmers. He announced his project to other 
programmers on USENET, an Internet discussion board system, and then released the code 
of the program so that other hackers could contribute to his project by improving and writing 
new source code that could be incorporated into the software, which he named Linux. 
Torvalds then served as a curator of the project and managed the integration of the various 
contributions. What made Linux so important was that when combined with software 
developed via Stallman’s GNU project, GNU/Linux served as a comprehensive operating 
system that was completely free and licensed under the GPL. Because of its practicality, very 
quickly a virtual software development community including thousands of programmers 
emerged around Linux. It eventually became one of the most popular computer operating 
systems worldwide, particularly among hackers who were using it to connect to the Internet. 
What also set it apart was that it represented the first large-scale collaborative software 
project done almost entirely via the Internet. Thus, it served as a model for a new form of 
software development. This shows how technological innovations gave rise to new social 
practices, in this case global, non-proprietary software projects.  
As the number of programmers in free software projects grew in the 1990s, an 
increasing number were less concerned with Stallman’s radical, anti-corporate ethos and 
more interested in the collaborative programming method it employed and that they 
considered superior to proprietary development models. They argued that the benefits of this 
method included the quick debugging of the software because of the increased number of 
individuals who had their eyes on the code. Also, the customizability of free software made it 
more desirable than proprietary software, which often was not flexible enough to meet the 
needs of individual users. They also were more interested in creating business models that 
would financially support the development of the software.  
In the late 1990s, a new business model emerged whereby start-up companies 
distributed free software, such as versions of the GNU/Linux operating system, but then 
charged a fee for providing technical support to users. In 1998, programmer Eric Raymond 
called upon hackers to use the term “open source software” as an alternative to “free 
software” in order to accentuate this business-friendly posture (1998). He founded the Open 
Source Initiative to lead the charge by creating licenses that were more restrictive than the 
GPL. This allowed proprietary software corporations to “open” parts of their code, while 
limiting access to other parts. Corporations such as IBM, Apple, and Microsoft, which had 
fiercely opposed free software because they saw it as a threat to their bottom line, launched 
open source initiatives in order to profit from this new trend (Hess 2005).  
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For Stallman and his followers who supported “free software,” the new term “open 
source” referred more or less to the same thing as “free software,” but “without talking about 
freedom or presenting the issue as a matter of right or wrong” (Stallman 2014). Thus while 
the schism between free and open source software represented a real philosophical difference 
among hackers, in the end both types of software licenses represented alternatives to the 
dominant proprietary software model. For this reason both became commonly referred to 
collectively as free and open source software, or FOSS. Moreover, the focus on digital 
collaboration and sharing had broader social consequences in that it launched a movement 
for individuals to become actively engaged in producing and disseminating knowledge. 
These practices would reach a larger audience with the expansion of the Internet to a broader 
public in the late 1990s. The emergence of FOSS is important because it presaged current 
battles over the flow of information on the Internet as corporations sought to restrict access to 
intellectual property that they claimed ownership over. It also represented a new form of 
collaborative knowledge production facilitated by networking technologies that would later 
be applied to realms beyond just software. 
The World Wide Web and the Emergence of the Digital Commons 
Changes in US government policy that resulted in transferring the backbone of the 
network to private corporations in the 1990s transformed the Internet from a platform 
primarily restricted to a small number of computer scientists at research labs to a much 
wider, commercial audience. This process began in 1985, when control of ARPANET was 
transferred from the military to the US National Science Foundation and was rechristened 
NSFNET. The creation of NSFNET extended access to more individuals by increasing the 
number of academic institutions in the US and abroad that were connected to the network. 
However, NSFNET was reserved for academic research and there was already intense 
interest from the private sector to commercialize the network. Indeed, private computer 
networks such as America Online and CompuServe,already had large subscriber bases, and it 
was apparent that selling access to the network could be potentially lucrative. In 1995, 
NSFNET was decommissioned and control of the backbone of the network was transferred to 
a handful of private sector telecommunications corporations. It was hoped that the 
privatization of this “Information Superhighway,” as it was referred to by the Clinton 
administration in the US, would radically transform the American economy by increasing 
access to the network by individuals and corporations. Policymakers and corporations 
envisioned the Internet as ushering in a new, knowledge-based economy in the US. This 
transition from an industrial economy to one based on intellectual property was the result of 
neoliberal policies first enacted in the US in the 1980s during the Republican administrations 
of Reagan and Bush and continued during the Democratic administration of Clinton in the 
1990s (Harvey 2005). The privatization of the Internet’s telecommunications infrastructure 
backbone dovetailed anti-state neoliberal rhetoric of the time. The Clinton administration 
argued that the so-called “Information Superhighway” was vital to the US’s national interest, 
but tellingly the network itself was largely transferred to private hands.  
The launch of the World Wide Web in 1991 represented a new stage in the 
massification of the Internet. British computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee, who was working 
at CERN in Geneva, Switzerland, along with his Belgian counterpart Robert Cailliau, 
developed the suite of protocols to both create and browse web pages – Hyper-text Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) and Hyper-text Markup Language (HTML). In the early 1980s, Berners-
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Lee had developed a hyper-text software called ENQUIRE, and with the increased access to 
the Internet he realized that if these two technologies were wedded they could transform how 
people shared information. Indeed, the true genius of the system of graphic web pages that 
are viewable using a web browser was its ease of use and flexible format. It made accessing 
information much easier for people who were not skilled computer programmers and adept at 
interpreting computer code. In 1993, Berners-Lee released these software protocols into the 
public domain. This meant that they would not become proprietary and that no one would 
need to pay licensing fees in order to use these protocols. This ensured the open nature of the 
World Wide Web by creating a global standard accessible to anyone who was interested in 
creating a webpage.  
The digital platform that the World Wide Web created blossomed in the 1990s and 
2000s. For many, it became practically synonymous with the Internet itself. It was also here 
that a new “digital commons” coalesced after the turn of the century. The principles of 
sharing, collaboration, and openness that are central to the Internet and FOSS generated a 
number of other initiatives that promoted the free exchange of knowledge and culture. A host 
of open source and open access initiatives were fostered by the emergence of this new 
platform (Kelty 2008). One example is the Creative Commons initiative launched in 2001 
that creates a licensing system for creative works (music, photos, video, etc.) based on the 
GPL licenses. The free and collaboratively edited online encyclopedia Wikipedia, also 
launched in 2001, represents another project that can be traced to the ethos of FOSS. The 
spread of the Internet, and in particular the emergence of the World Wide Web, has led to the 
generation of a new, commons-based peer-production model largely inspired by FOSS 
(Benkler 2006). Thus, while the spread of the Internet was linked to economic liberalization 
policies associated with neoliberalism, it also sparked a movement to expand commonly held 
resources in the form of the “digital commons” that stands in stark contrast to neoliberal 
philosophy about privately-held intellectual property.  
Technological Geographies: The Birth of the Brazilian Internet 
The Internet spread beyond the US and Western Europe in the 1990s and 2000s, 
extending its reach to Brazil. The digital platform became truly global in scope. Yet, the 
technical process of building the network, which included both the creation of the physical 
computer infrastructure and decisions about what software and computer protocols to use to 
do this, took place in locations with very different socio-political contexts. In Brazil it was 
taking place in the immediate wake of the return to civil control of the government and the 
formation of a new political framework embodied by the Constitution of 1988. I will now 
turn to the Brazilian case to show how these varied political geographies and cultural 
particularities became entangled in the Internet, which substantiates my argument that the 
Internet is a socially embedded technology. I will also highlight the entwined relationship 
between the Internet and FOSS to explain how philosophies of openness, collaboration, and 
participation spread as the Internet expanded and took on different meanings in Brazil. These 
processes demonstrate how the Internet as a technological platform is socially embedded and 
also how these technologies, particularly FOSS, were viewed as tools through which to 
combat economic and political exclusion.  
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Bringing the Internet to Brazil: Science and Technology Researchers Take the Lead 
Brazilian academics, primarily science and technology researchers in the STEM 
fields, played a pivotal role in building the first Brazilian computer networks in the 1980s. 
These academics were interested in connecting to research centers in the US and Europe. 
Many of them had spent time abroad during academic exchanges and had become 
accustomed to computer networking technologies, such as email. They were eager to use 
these new technologies to communicate with colleagues abroad in order to exchange ideas 
and to integrate research initiatives. The first step to connecting to the emergent global 
Internet was to create a computer network within Brazil that would then be able to interface 
with international networks. In 1988, the São Paulo public state education foundation, the 
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), created a team of 
computer scientists to network the state universities of São Paulo (USP, UNICAMP, and 
UNESP). The individual who was chosen to lead the team was electronic engineer Demi 
Getschko, a young professor at the time with expertise in computer science and 
telecommunications who had been the director of FAPESP’s data center since 1985. Based 
on his expertise working with large mainframe computers, he was tasked by the 
administrators at FAPESP with setting up a network that connected the state universities. 
This network would eventually be named the Academic Network of São Paulo (ANSP), and 
would be the launching point for Brazil’s first connection to the Internet a couple of years 
later. 
I met with Getschko at his office in São Paulo at the Núcleo de Informação e 
Coordenação do Ponto BR (Brazilian Network Information Center, or NIC.br), an NGO that 
administers Brazilian web domains (i.e., web domains with .br country codes), collects data 
about Brazilian Internet use, and makes suggestions on Internet policy. Getschko founded 
NIC.br in 2005 and has been the director ever since. The center is affiliated with the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, of which Getschko is also a board member. His 
congenial nature and slightly disheveled office full of books and policy papers gave him a 
professorial air. The history he recounted to me about connecting Brazil to the Internet was 
exceedingly technical in nature, which attests to his technical background. However, at the 
heart of his work over the years appears to have been a desire to spread access to technology, 
first among academics and then to the broader Brazilian public at large. Getschko’s story is 
important because it demonstrates the role of Brazilian academics in promoting TCP/IP in 
Brazil on technical grounds because it was the same system academics in the US were using. 
While the implications of this decision were not entirely clear at the time, this eventually 
played into emerging Brazilian neoliberal projects to dismantle the state-owned 
telecommunications system. 
The network Getschko began creating in 1986 used BITNET technology, which was 
point-to-point “store and forward” technology in which information was passed in its entirety 
from one server to another until it reached its destination. BITNET was a popular networking 
platform among US universities at the time because it was relatively inexpensive, and 
because while it did not use TCP/IP it was still capable of exchanging emails with computers 
connected to the Internet. The prevalence among US institutions and its relative low cost, 
given that FAPESP already possessed the necessary IBM computers, made BITNET 
appealing to Getschko and his colleagues. Brazilian physicists in São Paulo had a long 
working relationship with American peers at Fermi, which was connected to BITNET and 
made it a prime candidate for partnering to create the international connection. First though, 
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Getschko needed to get the approval of the Secretaria Especial de Informática (SEI), a 
federal agency created during the protectionist military regime, to approve all international 
data links. According to Getschko, SEI could not understand why two distinct institutions 
(i.e., not different branches of the same university) would want to have a data link. 
Nonetheless, he was able to convince them to approve the connection. The first international 
connection between ANSP and BITNET took place in September 1988 through a connection 
with Fermi National Laboratory in Illinois. When institutions joined BITNET they were 
informally obliged to leave an “open door” for other institutions to connect to BITNET. This 
led to a “chaotic and collaborative” extension of BITNET services in Brazil as other 
institutors connected to ANSP to gain access to BITNET. In particular, individuals and 
institutions were interested in email and discussion group platforms.  
The connection to BITNET in itself was a significant technological milestone; 
however, connecting to the Internet, which offered a much broader network of information 
sharing, was the ultimate goal. Fermi National Laboratory informed Getschko that they were 
going discontinue BITNET and transition to the Internet as part of the US Department of 
Energy’s Energy Sciences Network (ESNET) run by the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory in San Francisco, which was in turn connected to NSFNET. However, at the time 
the Brazilian Ministry of Communications and Embratel, the federal telecommunications 
company, were still supporting x.25 and OSI protocols, which were the official international 
standards supported by the ITU. Both were opposed to TCP/IP networking technologies. This 
was an impediment to connecting to the Internet, which was based on TCP/IP. Getschko was 
a vocal proponent of TCP/IP because he felt that OSI was a clunky, difficult to implement 
technology that mainly served the needs of large telecommunications companies (e.g., it 
included a billing function). For him, OSI “was great for the telecommunications companies, 
but it was not great for the academic world.” As it became clearer to network administrators 
that TCP/IP would win out in the “protocol wars,” Getschko decided to disregard Brazilian 
government policy and connect to the Internet using TCP/IP. In part, this was due to the fact 
that in the US, TCP/IP had already won the “protocol wars” and so if Brazilian academics 
wanted to connect to the Internet they were left with little alternative. Ultimately, the first 
connection to the Internet in Brazil was made in January 1991 between ANSP and ESNET.  
The academic community in the state of Rio de Janeiro had been simultaneously 
organizing since the late 1980s to create a link to the Internet via their own state academic 
network, Rede Rio, which connected large, academic computer labs at federal universities in 
the state (PUC-RJ, UFRJ, and LNCC-CBPF). In May 1992, a link was created between Rede 
Rio and the California Education and Research Federation Network (CERFNET) in San 
Diego, California. The Internet connection was made during a public ceremony in which 
computer scientists demonstrated the capacity of the Internet by searching the UCLA library 
system for resources on famous Brazilians (Sávio 2006:105). Thus, by 1992, the Brazilian 
academic community had successfully created two functioning links to the Internet. This is 
important because it mirrors the process in the US where computer scientists, engineers, and 
physicists were the driving force in creating a non-commercial network. However, because of 
the way both connections relied on US links to connect to the Internet, an email sent from 
Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo would necessarily pass through the US. Indeed, this reliance on 
US infrastructure for transferring data persists to this day, albeit to a lesser degree. Now, 
much of the content transferred among Brazilians passes through servers in the US. This can 
happen either because of the way the telecommunications backbone still relies heavily on the 
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US network or because many companies providing Internet services that Brazilian are using 
have their servers based in the US.  
After these initial connections were made, Getschko continued working on initiatives 
to increase access to the Internet in Brazil. He was one of the principles, along with officials 
from Rede Rio and the federal government, in discussions about creating a national Internet 
backbone that would connect Brazilian universities. He was also involved in discussions 
about what institutional framework made the most sense in order to make Internet access 
commercially available to individual users at home via dial-up connections. Getschko 
believed that rather than have the state-owned telecommunications monopoly Embratel sell 
service directly to individuals, it made more sense for the company to be a provider for 
smaller Internet service providers (ISPs). This decentralized system he felt made more sense 
for the Internet. Due to his role in helping extend the Internet, Getschko has subsequently 
been dubbed the “Father of the Brazilian” Internet. While in fact a number of individuals 
were necessarily involved in such an undertaking, the fact that Getschko has been 
continuously involved in Internet governance and administration since the 1990s does make 
him one of the most knowledgeable and respected individuals in the field. In Brazil technical 
experts like Getschko have retained a high profile in administering components of Internet 
infrastructure, primarily via the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, a semi-governmental 
Internet advisory panel, and its related institutions such as NIC.br, where Getschko is 
president. Thus, the technical vision of Brazilian science and technology researchers to create 
a decentralized, non-state controlled communication tool for the exchange of information 
using TCP/IP laid the groundwork for the current configuration of the Brazilian Internet. 
Networking for Democracy: The Internet as a Tool for Solidarity 
 The Brazilian case differs strikingly from the extension of the Internet in almost every 
other country, in that in Brazil social activists played a leading role in expanding the Internet. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, social movements worldwide quickly embraced new information 
technologies like the Internet because of the political organizing and information sharing 
capabilities they offered. One of the Brazilian activists who first recognized these potentials 
and sought to exploit them was a man by the name of Carlos Afonso, a political exile during 
much of the dictatorship period due to his socialist beliefs who returned to Brazil in the 
1980s when the regime was allowing more political dissent. His case demonstrates the role of 
pro-democracy activists in helping to spread TCP/IP in Brazil and shows how the Internet 
was conceptualized as a tool that citizens and social movements could use to generate global 
solidarity networks to combat repression. In 1981, he helped found Instituto Brasileiro de 
Análises Sociais e Econômicas (Ibase) in Rio de Janeiro along with Herbert de Souza 
(Betinho) and Marcos Arruda. All three of these men had been political exiles during the 
military dictatorship, but had returned as the military regime was easing restrictions on 
political dissent as part of a slow transition to electoral democracy. Ibase’s goal was to foster 
a transition to democracy, and marshaling the power of new information technologies – 
particularly the Internet, which became central to its mission. In particular, the activists at 
Ibase focused on extending access to the Internet beyond the academic community in hopes 
of increasing access to the Internet among average Brazilian citizens. One of the 
organization’s mottos was “Democratizar a informação para democratizar a sociedade” 
(Democratize information to democratize society). Carlos Afonso, a lifelong technology 
enthusiast, spearheaded the organization’s focus on democratizing access to information 
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technology. I met with Afonso while he was visiting São Paulo to attend meetings at the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. During our interview he recounted his role in helping 
bring the Internet to Brazil. The tools he employed to do this, most importantly using UNIX-
based systems as opposed to x.25 protocols, reflected a philosophical tendency to eschew 
centralized technologies. In part this was because he had seen how the military regime was 
able to monopolize communications technologies (primarily television) in such a way as to 
censor political dissent. Decentralization through the use of TCP/IP would prevent such 
government censorship in the age of the Internet.  
Originally from a middle class family from the interior of the state of São Paulo, 
Afonso first became captivated by technology as a 12-year-old child when he completed a 
course for radio technicians via correspondence and spent his free time fiddling with 
electronics. His childhood interest led him to pursue a degree in engineering at the 
Universidade de São Paulo (USP). He started his degree in engineering in 1964, the same 
year in which the military took control of the country via a coup. Even though Afonso came 
from a conservative family from the interior, as a young man at the university he became 
exposed to socialist thought and quickly embraced the ideology. This led him to join the 
student movement against the dictatorship, which was avowedly anti-communist. He 
eventually became one of the movement’s leaders at USP. Due to a unique arrangement, the 
Brazilian navy actually ran the engineering department at USP, which made his activism 
particularly dangerous. His engagement in the movement led to his brief imprisonment in the 
1960s. Ultimately, his situation in São Paulo was so precarious that in 1970, he was forced to 
seek exile in Chile, which was then governed by the socialist administration of Salvador 
Allende. Afonso’s socialist views dovetailed with Allende’s political project and he took a 
position in the government’s planning ministry. However, he was once again forced to flee 
military repression when General Augusto Pinochet orchestrated a violent overthrow of the 
Chilean government. This time, Afonso fled to Canada, where he enrolled in economics and 
social theory courses at York University in Toronto, and became a more active user of newly 
developing digital networking technologies, such as bulletin board systems (BBS), which 
were allowing political activists worldwide to communicate and mobilize. He bought an 
Apple II personal computer, which was first produced in 1977 and was a novelty in North 
America, and practically nonexistent in Brazil where import-substitution policies made non-
Brazilian-produced computer equipment prohibitively expensive. This personal computer 
and two floppy discs were some of the few items that he brought back with him to Brazil in 
1980. Along with this cutting-edge technology, he also brought back with him a passionate 
desire to harness new digital technologies to foster the development of a vibrant democracy 
as Brazilian returned to civilian control of the government. For Afonso and his colleagues at 
the newly formed Ibase, the democratic opening presented an opportunity to develop in 
Brazil a form of social democracy that addressed long-standing issues of poverty, income 
inequality, and distribution of wealth by including the marginalized, poorer masses into the 
democratic process.  
In Afonso’s estimation, networking technologies were a way to assist activists in their 
work of laying the bases for democratic governance. For him they were revolutionary, 
particularly in the southern hemisphere. He told me, “Communication in the era was 
television, which was unilateral,” by which he meant that average viewers had very little 
input in what was broadcast in Brazil on the Globo monopoly, which had close ties to the 
dictatorship and did not broadcast any political dissent. In contrast, these new, more 
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interactive technologies would allow for more open debate and the dissemination of material 
that otherwise might be censored. Under Afonso’s guidance, in 1985, Ibase launched 
ALTERNEX, a BBS that allowed Brazilian activists and civil society groups working on 
issues such as human rights and the environment to communicate with their counterparts 
both nationally and internationally. The name ALTERNEX is a combination of Alternativo 
(Alternative) and Nexo (Nexus) and it was similar to other international bulletin board 
systems such as PeaceNet, ConflictNet, and EcoNet that also served activist communities. It 
was not a full Internet connection, but it did give groups access to email, information 
databases, and teleconferencing capabilities, which were increasingly vital for activists in an 
emerging transnational environment where mobilizations and information sharing were 
increasingly essential.  
The reliance on networking technologies among activists was now so important that 
when the United Nations decided to hold the United Nations Conference for Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (commonly referred to as Eco-92) UN 
organizers decided that allowing environmental groups to connect to the Internet was 
imperative. An Internet connection would enable participants to communicate with their 
colleagues who were unable to make the journey to Brazil, but who still wanted to participate 
in these global discussions. Indeed, this was the first UN summit open to civil society 
participants, and thus attendance was anticipated to be potentially quite large. UN organizers 
recognized that the Internet had not yet been extended to Brazil, so they asked Afonso’s 
organization, Ibase, to lead the effort to create a link to the Internet in Brazil to make sure 
conference attendees would be able to access the Internet and other networking platforms to 
which they had become accustomed. Thus, Afonso was tasked with quickly cobbling 
together the necessary technology to make this happen. Essentially, what the UN organizers 
were asking for was a “hack” to bring the Internet to Rio de Janeiro for conference goers.  
On a tight budget and with a relatively short amount of time, Afonso decided that the 
most efficient way to bring Internet access to the conference would be through a UNIX-based 
computer network that was connected internationally using TCP/IP. Legally speaking, using 
TCP/IP in Brazil was technically illegal because it was not a standard endorsed by the ITU. 
However, it was the standard of the emerging global network and what international activists 
and civil society participants would be expecting. Thus, Afonso felt the risk was worthwhile 
and he gleefully accepted his role as an “IP Guerilla” whose technical decisions helped create 
and consolidate a Brazilian connection to the Internet that relied on the open, decentralized 
TCP/IP technologies. Ultimately, Afonso’s work paid off. During the Eco-92 conference, 
thousands of participants were able to connect to the Internet to exchange email, access 
bulletin boards, and search databases.  
The success of the Eco-92’s Internet connection was a practical demonstration of the 
global dominance of TCP/IP and the role of social justice activists in contributing to this 
vision of a global network. After the conference was over, in large part due to Afonso’s 
belief in the potential democratizing power of Internet access, ALTERNEX began offering 
service to residents in Rio de Janeiro and became the first commercial ISP in Brazil. For the 
first time, citizens who were not linked to a university or a civil society organization like 
Ibase were able to connect to the Internet from their homes. While the actual numbers of 
connected individuals was incredibly small and restricted to the city of Rio de Janeiro, the 
fact that a pro-democracy organization founded by former political exiles was at the forefront 
of the effort to increase Internet access demonstrates how this new digital technology was so 
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closely linked to democratic aspirations in the country. Afonso’s case demonstrates how the 
Internet as a technological platform was perceived to be uniquely suited to generating global 
solidarity networks that could then be marshaled to combat persistent inequality. 
Neoliberal Reforms: An Opening for the Internet and the Spread of FOSS 
The arrival of the Internet to Brazil happened at a time when the telecommunications 
sector was being privatized as part of a wave of neoliberal reforms that were implemented 
throughout the 1990s. Paradoxically, while on the one hand these economic reforms were an 
affront to the work of activists like Afonso because they resulted in increased social 
inequality, on the other hand, deregulation created a temporary opening for the expansion of 
the Internet within the framework of a hacker-envisioned global network that was open and 
decentralized. Ever since 1972, when the military dictatorship created the state 
telecommunications corporation Telebrás, all telecommunication functions in Brazil were 
controlled by the state monopoly, including determining which networking protocols were 
permissible in the country. In 1992 Collor de Mello, the first directly elected president since 
the dictatorship, started the process of privatizing Telebrás. This was completed in 1998 
during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, at which point Telebrás was 
broken up into twelve regional carriers that were then auctioned off to private investors 
(Adachi 2011). In 1992, Collor de Mello also abruptly dismantled ISI policies in the 
informatics sector originally implemented with the aim of fostering Brazilian technological 
development by generating an internal market supplied by nationally developed and 
produced technology (Schoonmaker 2002). While ISI was successful at fostering a 
information technology industry, the tariffs placed on foreign imports made computers 
relatively much more expensive than in the United States and Europe, particularly personal 
computers used by the middle classes. The deregulation of the IT sector meant that the price 
of personal computers fell significantly as imports increased. Thus, the Brazilian middle 
classes could now afford to have personal computers at home. Additionally, the elimination 
of the state monopoly in the telecommunication sector meant the end of the official 
government policy of only using x.25 protocols for computer networking. Hackers exploited 
increased access to hardware and a liberalization of restrictions on networking protocols. 
Deregulation created an environment in which the hacker vision of a decentralized, open 
Internet could be expanded.  
Not surprisingly, as the Internet spread it took along with it FOSS and the radical 
ideology embedded in it, which at its core challenges neoliberal philosophy. The case of a 
young computer enthusiast, Nelson Lago, in the 1990s in São Paulo demonstrates how the 
growing global computer network became a vehicle for the spread of FOSS and the ideology 
embedded within it. It also exemplifies how the changing regulatory structure in the Brazilian 
information technology sector created space for a very brief period when small providers, 
both private and publicly owned municipal providers, become a driving force for the spread 
of the Internet in Brazil before large telecommunications corporations entered the market. I 
interviewed Lago for the first time in São Paulo at the Centro de Competência em Software 
Livre (CCSL) at USP, where he is currently employed as the Technical Director. While 
Lago’s path from a teenage computer hobbyist to his current position as director at an 
academic institution that develops and promotes FOSS is somewhat unique, during my 
research I found that a large number of Brazilian FOSS activists were first exposed to FOSS 
 
 
 
38 
when they became interested in surfing the web and creating their own Internet connections 
in the 1990s.  
In the early 1990s, Lago was a teenage computer hobbyist in São Paulo who did 
freelance work as a graphic designer. In the late 1980s, he started using the proprietary 
Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) on his home computer and was so advanced 
that he even gave classes to his friends. He transitioned to the graphical interfaced Microsoft 
Windows 3.0 operating system after its release in 1990s and started working with PageMaker 
desktop publishing software owned by Aldus Technologies and later purchased by Adobe 
Systems Inc. Like others in the early 1990s, Lago sensed a growing excitement among 
young, urban middle class Brazilians about the possibilities of connecting to a global network 
with vast quantities of information and the prospect of connecting with people globally. He 
loved the idea that if someone was interested in a relatively specific topic, like origami, he 
could go online and connect with hobbyists worldwide and learn more than he ever wanted to 
know. This information revolution is what drove him to want to connect. However, access to 
the Internet in Brazil was still largely limited to a handful of small academic computer labs in 
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In 1995, motivated by his own desire to access the Internet and 
a belief that many shared his desire, Lago partnered with three friends to launch an ISP, 
which would provide Internet access to paying customers in the São Paulo metropolitan area. 
The neoliberal reforms meant that the government was now actively promoting the 
development of small ISPs rather than advocating for a state monopoly. This change in 
federal policy is what allowed Lago and his partners to pursue creating the ISP. They 
playfully named their endeavor “That’s Internet!” The fact that the name of their company 
was in English rather than Portuguese demonstrates how the Internet was perceived as a 
foreign, and specifically American, technology. 
While conducting research on how to technically configure and operate the computer 
hardware necessary to run an ISP, Lago came across FOSS for the first time. A computer 
science student at USP who was an acquaintance of Lago’s suggested they use GNU/Linux 
as the operating system on their server. At the time, GNU/Linux was the most popular 
software worldwide for this purpose because it included TCP/IP and was available at no cost. 
Lago went to the computer science department at USP to obtain a copy of GNU/Linux. He 
and his partners specifically purchased Linux-compatible computer motherboards, because at 
the time there were still many motherboards that were not compatible with the software. 
They rented a small office and purchased 10 telephone lines and modems, and then 
contracted with the Brazilian branch of the informatics corporation Unisys to provide them 
with their connection to the Internet. When “That’s Internet” debuted in July 1996, it was one 
of roughly a dozen small ISPs in the São Paulo metropolitan region. In the next couple of 
years the number of subscribers hovered around 250. According to Lago, “That’s Internet!” 
never generated a profit, but it always broke even.  
By 1998, the partners decided to sell their business to a larger ISP. This transaction 
was part of a larger process whereby a number of small ISPs were purchased by the large 
telecommunications companies that had emerged in the wake of neoliberal reforms, and 
which increasingly recognized that providing Internet service to households was a lucrative 
business venture. The temporary opening that neoliberal reforms created for hobbyists like 
Lago quickly gave way to an era in which the provision of Internet access was increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of a few large telecommunications corporations that viewed the 
Internet as a source of profit. Thus, in the long run, neoliberal restructuring of the 
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telecommunications industry would still prove to be a threat to the Internet, even if in the 
early days it seemed to benefit its expansion. Ultimately, while “That’s Internet” may have 
been a short-lived venture, Lago’s introduction to FOSS would have much more enduring 
effects. 
 Lago was almost instantly attracted to FOSS when he ran across it, not just because of 
its functionality, but also because of its philosophy of openness, collaboration, accessibility, 
and meritocracy. He became active in a number of online FOSS development communities 
and a member of the São Paulo NGO called Linux-SP. The NGO provided technical 
assistance to city-run, public access computer labs, or telecentros, in low-income 
neighborhoods that were created during the mayoralty of Marta Suplicy (PT). Ultimately, 
Lago decided to pursue a Ph.D. in computer science at USP under the tutelage of professor 
Fabio Kon, who helped found the CCSL, which is one of nine centers in a global network 
aimed at increasing the use of FOSS. As CCSL’s Technical Director, Lago was tasked with 
giving courses in FOSS programming and disseminating information about FOSS at 
technology conferences and gatherings. Thus, he ended up becoming one of the country’s 
most high-profile FOSS evangelists. In particular he has participated in the movement 
against allowing corporations in Brazil to patent software, which he considers a threat to 
knowledge sharing and technological innovation. Lago’s history demonstrates both the role 
of specific individuals in expanding the Internet in Brazil as well as how, through this 
process, the ideologies embedded in the Internet’s structure that are exemplified by FOSS 
reached a larger, global public.  
The Politicization of FOSS: Democratizing Digital Technologies  
 The dissemination of FOSS globally was linked to the expansion of the commercial 
Internet; however, as these two technologies spread geographically they encountered diverse 
social contexts and became imbued with new political meanings. Individuals and groups 
reinterpreted their significance and marshaled them for new purposes. In Brazil, individuals 
highly active in labor union organizing, and the PT specifically, embraced FOSS, and it 
became linked to the movement against neoliberal globalization. For these activists, FOSS’s 
opposition to corporate enclosure of intellectual property and the fact that it challenged 
foreign, primarily US, corporate domination of the informatics sector represented a 
refreshing technological vision that created alternative possibilities for Brazilian 
development. Thus, the “hacker ethic” that developed in the US merged with a radical left-
wing ethos in Brazil and FOSS was seen as the technological component of a movement 
combatting the increased power of private corporations.  
The process of reimagining FOSS in Brazil did not occur in the traditional technology 
hubs of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, but rather in the industrial city of Porto Alegre, the 
capital of the far southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. Since the 1980s, the city has been a 
bastion of left wing politics and labor union organizing. It has been a stronghold of the PT, 
which governed the city for 16 consecutive years beginning in 1989. The local wing of the 
PT turned the city into a laboratory for experiments in participatory democracy, most notably 
participatory budgeting. David Harvey has called Porto Alegre a “rebel city” because of how 
its progressive environment fostered movements that resisted neoliberalism and generated 
alternative visions of the future (2012:xii). Thus, it is not surprising that the city was the site 
of this reconceptualization of the significance of FOSS.  
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Two of the leading protagonists in this process were the IT professionals Marcelo 
Branco and Mário Teza, who both came of age politically in the early 1980s as young, 
middle class college students from Porto Alegre when the popular mobilizations to end the 
dictatorship reached a fever pitch. It was at this time, that they became union members and 
active PT militants. I met both of these men while conducting my research in the city. While 
I interviewed them separately, their histories as some of the catalysts of the Brazilian FOSS 
movement are so intertwined that I recount them here together. They have starkly different 
personalities. Branco is flashy and outspoken, while Teza has a gentle and more subdued 
manner. However, they both share an idealistic vision of a radically reorganized Brazilian 
society, in which wealth and power should be more equally distributed. In large part because 
of their background, technology became central to this political project.  
After graduating college in the early 1980s, both Teza and Branco joined the labor 
force at state-owned informatics corporations. Branco worked with computer network 
administration while Teza’s work was largely administrative in nature. They quickly became 
actively involved in the local telecommunications worker’s union, the Sindicato dos 
Telefônicos do Rio Grande do Sul (SINTTEL-RS) and the Federação Nacional dos 
Empregados em Empresas e Órgãos Públicos e Privados de Processamento de Dados, 
Serviços de Informática e Similares (FENADADOS). Both in turn were linked to the newly 
formed national umbrella labor union Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT). Founded in 
1983 in the São Paulo industrial periphery, CUT was closely linked to the PT, and in the 
early 1980s was staging strikes against the military regime to push for higher wages and 
quicker democratic reforms.  
CUT was the embodiment of what has been referred to as novo sindicalismo, or “new 
unionism,” in that it represented a cross-industry union structure that sought to foster greater 
member participation in decision-making. In this way it represented a rupture from 
corporatist, vertically organized relationships between labor unions and the Brazilian 
government that were first instituted in the 1930s by the government of Getúlio Vargas 
during the Estado Novo (Keck 1995). In the Brazilian corporatist model, in order to ensure 
harmony between labor and capital, the state took a central role in creating and managing 
unions, which were differentiated according to profession and social roles (i.e., 
metalworkers, teachers, bank workers, etc.). During the populist Vargas dictatorship, these 
state-sponsored unions were perceived of as valid channels of working class demands. This 
legitimacy weakened in the 1970s and 1980s under the military dictatorship when economic 
growth slowed. Union leaders were increasingly perceived as not being sufficiently 
independent of the regime, and thus, not working for the benefit of rank and file union 
members. In contrast, proponents of novo sindicalismo encouraged members to become the 
central protagonists in crafting union objectives which transcended profession and which 
were based on horizontal, working-class solidarity (Keck 1995:32–33). In essence, more 
democratic participation was perceived as necessary within unions in order to make them the 
true channels of working class demands.  
Teza and Branco were active members in their local unions. They participated in the 
multi-day regional and national union congresses in Brazil at which union members from 
many sectors collectively hashed out plans for collective action to bring working class 
demands front and center as Brazilian society transitioned from dictatorship to democracy. 
The values and practices in which the two young men were immersed as labor union 
militants and PT militants shaped their activism. The principles of increased democratic 
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participation and horizontal solidarity continued to motivate them as they pursued careers in 
the public informatics sector. It is through this lens that they reimagined the potentials of 
FOSS when they encountered it and incorporated the technology into a larger, left wing 
political agenda. Teza and Branco believed that the state should have a larger role in setting 
technology policy and that FOSS in particular was particularly well suited to fulfilling the 
needs of the PT’s initial political project of redistributing wealth and power in Brazil. 
Teza was first introduced to GNU/Linux in 1997 while he was working at the Porto 
Alegre branch of SERPRO (Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados), the federal data 
processing company. He came across a magazine article about Coletiva Linux, a small 
business in the city of Curitiba that provided technical assistance to companies that used the 
operating system GNU/Linux, and he instantly became interested in FOSS because it was 
distributed without a cost. This was particularly appealing to a public administrator who was 
looking for cost effective technology solutions. He first installed FOSS on computers at 
SERPRO in his free time in what he referred to as a “non-authorized” experiment. He did 
more research on the philosophical underpinnings of FOSS and became familiar with the 
anti-corporate, counter-hegemonic ethos espoused by Richard Stallman. He started 
conversations with fellow IT workers like his old network engineer friend Branco about the 
software and its potentials. Branco, in fact, had first come into contact with FOSS in 1994 
when he was working at Porto Alegre’s data processing company PROCEMPA (Companhia 
de Processamento de Dados do Município de Porto Alegre) on the effort to launch the first 
ISP in Porto Alegre called PortoWeb. PortoWeb’s servers relied on GNU/Linux. However, 
Branco had not stopped to ponder the potential significance of FOSS until Teza brought it to 
his attention again in 1997. At this point, the two became even more intrigued by the 
emphasis on collaboration and participation inherent in FOSS. The horizontal networks of 
computer programmers worldwide who collaboratively produced software and then released 
it into the digital commons intrigued them. The creation and distribution of software was a 
collective political act in their opinion. Ultimately, they associated the ideology behind FOSS 
to their own leftist, political visions and connected software to larger goals of reshaping 
society to make it more democratic. Neither Branco nor Teza were computer programmers 
themselves, but they understood the importance of software in an increasingly digital world. 
For them, promoting the production and use of FOSS was a way to help construct a more 
equitable world.  
In 1998, Branco and Teza were given a larger institutional platform from which to 
promote FOSS when Olívio Dutra (PT), long-time bank worker’s union organizer and one of 
the founding members of the PT, was elected governor of Rio Grande do Sul in 1998. This 
resulted in new PT leadership at the state’s informatics corporation Companhia de 
Processamento de Dados do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (PROCERGS). Branco joined as 
Technical Director and quickly rose to the position of Vice President in 2000. He brought 
Teza to PROCERGS to lead a group focused on promoting FOSS in the public sector. Their 
work promoting FOSS was blessed by the President Marcos Mazoni, who would also became 
a strong supporter of FOSS. Branco and Teza became convinced that a physical gathering of 
FOSS advocates was necessary to mobilize individuals to support their cause and to pressure 
policymakers to take action. This belief in the power of in-person gatherings was shaped by 
their earlier experiences in labor union organizing. Thus, Teza started the preparations for 
such a conference by reaching out to local Linux programming communities and university 
computer science departments. The first FISL took place on May 4 and 5, 2000, at the 
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campus of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Notably, Richard 
Stallman, the founder of the GNU Project, was flown to Porto Alegre to give one of his 
quirky, thought-provoking lectures about how proprietary, corporate-owned software was an 
affront to individual liberty and freedom. Teza, however, had drastically underestimated the 
interest in the software conference. While he and others had originally expected no more than 
a couple of hundred people to participate, ultimately 2,210 people participated and the event 
was broadcast live on the Internet. The physical gathering of FOSS enthusiasts, who had 
previously primarily interacted with each other only virtually, created a new venue for them 
to discuss their goals as an emergent techno-political movement.  
The FOSS activism of Branco, Teza, and others convinced Governor Dutra (PT) to 
embrace FOSS adoption as a component of state public policy. Dutra began advocating for 
an increased use of FOSS in government. Because of the way Dutra incorporated the 
software into his anti-neoliberal political platform in 2000, Linux Magazine, an international 
magazine devoted to FOSS, dubbed Dutra the “Free Software Governor.” For Dutra, FOSS 
was a viable alternative to the expensive proprietary software of foreign multinationals, like 
Microsoft, on which state agencies largely depended. Thus, it represented a form of national 
technological autonomy. Furthermore, Dutra explicitly connected FOSS to participatory 
democracy when he suggested it could be used for participatory budgeting. In the interview 
with Linux Magazine Dutra stated, “We make an important contribution to citizenship, using 
our professionals and investing in non-governmental organizations to produce software that 
makes the life of citizens easier, with more participation in State control. Imagine if everyone 
in Rio Grande do Sul can participate from the definition of the budget and the control of 
investments, from their homes, using Free Software produced by the State?” (Murillo 
2012:25). Dutra’s comments demonstrate how software, specifically FOSS, had become 
enmeshed in the PT’s political agenda, which also included a strengthening of state power in 
the name of more egalitarian distribution of wealth. 
The following year, Porto Alegre hosted the first World Social Forum (WSF), a 
gathering of activists and social movements from around the globe who were advocating for 
a non-neoliberal vision of global development. The conference’s location in Porto Alegre 
was in large part due to the institutional strength of the local PT and its desire to host global 
activists. In large part because of the influence of local FOSS activists like Teza and Branco, 
FOSS was eventually incorporated into the global platform of the organizers of the WSF 
(Juris, Caruso, and Mosca 2008; Murillo 2012). In this way, FOSS became globally linked to 
the anti-neoliberal movement that was gaining steam worldwide at the beginning of the 21st 
century. 
The success of the first FISL conference resulted in PROCERGS continuing to 
organize the event for the next three years. In 2003, Branco, Teza, and other FOSS activists 
decided to form the Associação de Software Livre (ASL), an NGO whose principal role 
would be to organize the event each year. According to Teza, even though the organization is 
based in Porto Alegre, they gave it a generic name that did not reference Rio Grande do Sul 
or Brazil because they envisioned the organization leading larger national or perhaps even 
international movements to promote FOSS. Indeed, FISL has grown since 2000 and now 
often attracts upwards of 5,000 people. The vast majority of attendees are Brazilian, but a 
number of foreigners, particularly invited speakers, also attend. This makes it one of the 
largest FOSS conferences worldwide. The focus has expanded beyond merely software to 
include technology more broadly. The motto of the conference is A tecnologia que liberta – 
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technology that liberates. It encapsulates the organizers’ goal of reimagining technology as a 
tool geared toward promoting creativity while at the same time reducing social inequalities 
exacerbated by neoliberal capitalism. In this way, these “free” technologies represent 
mechanisms to help construct a more democratic and open society. 
After helping launch the Brazilian FOSS movement in the early 2000s, Branco and 
Teza continued to be key players in movements to democratize technology. In 2003 during 
the Lula administration, Teza was given a management positions at the Empresa de 
Tecnologia e Informações da Previdência Social (DATAPREV), a federally-owned data 
processing corporation associated with the Ministry of Social Security, where he worked to 
increase FOSS use in the agency and was one of the most vocal supporters of FOSS in the 
federal government alongside Sergio Amadeu, the professor-activist mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter. Branco left PROCERGS and spend a couple years in Barcelona 
performing consulting work for the regional government on digital issues. In 2008, he helped 
launch Campus Party Brasil, an annual, weeklong technology festival in São Paulo. The 
event was organized by the Spanish company Futura Networks, which had organized similar 
events focused on gaming and digital culture around the world. However, Branco insisted 
that, much like FISL, discussions about the political nature of technology needed to be front 
and center at the event. Thus, a series of talks and debates about technology production and 
use were incorporated into the festival. In this way, along with FISL, Campus Party Brasil 
became one of the most important organizing events for Brazilian FOSS and Internet 
freedom activists. Both Branco and Teza continued their relationship with the PT, and 
Branco was the social media director for Dilma Rousseff’s presidential campaign in 2010.  
The case of Branco and Teza demonstrates how the meanings of FOSS were 
transformed in the Brazilian context. Whereas the “hacker ethos” of the American computer 
scientists who first created FOSS in the 1980s was highly indebted to libertarian notions 
about individual freedom, in Brazil FOSS became linked to movements against neoliberalism 
that promoted forms of participatory democracy. The ideas about the importance of broad-
based democratic participation that emerged out of novo sindicalismo and informed the ethos 
of the PT became entwined with a techno-political project that had FOSS at its core. The 
development of an organized FOSS movement in Brazil with close party ties to the PT 
ultimately would be central to the emergence of Internet freedom activism in Brazil in the 
late 2000s.   
Conclusion: Alternative Visions of Technology 
The work of individuals highlighted in this chapter shows how the Internet, like all 
technology, is socially imbedded and has taken shape amid larger social, political and 
economic trends. It is the result of the efforts individuals who have been shaped by their 
social context and thus reflects larger socio-political trends. Seemingly technical decisions, 
like using TCP/IP instead of .x25 protocols, have larger political implications. This was 
particularly apparent in Brazil where using TCP/IP was perceived as counteracting a 
centralized communications system that had been created during the military dictatorship. 
These technical decisions then generate new material realities that, in turn, shape the social 
context. For example, the dissemination of GNU/Linux software in Brazil in order to connect 
to the global network via TCP/IP spread FOSS ideology among Brazilian programmers and 
technicians. Once again, these ideas interpreted through the Brazilian context as left-wing 
 
 
 
44 
political activists began to champion FOSS as a technological antidote to neoliberal 
globalization. 
In retrospect, Professor Sergio Amadeu’s impassioned call in 2009 to defend the 
Internet Livre at a FOSS conference in Porto Alegre highlights the mutually constitutive 
relationship between FOSS and the global Internet. Furthermore, given his long-time 
militancy within the PT, Amadeu’s speech also shed light on how, in Brazil, notions of 
openness, collaboration, and participation, which were central to the “hacker ethic,” were 
reinterpreted and incorporated into a larger political project that promoted participatory 
democracy and challenged neoliberal globalization. In this way, his call for an Internet livre 
is part of a larger trend among Brazilian activists to promote an alternative, counter-
hegemonic technological future.  
In the following chapters, I explore the ways Brazilian Internet freedom activists have 
shaped state Internet policy by applying FOSS ideologies of collaboration to create new 
mechanisms of citizen participation. Indeed, some of the same individuals highlighted in this 
chapter have led these efforts, such as spearheading the creation of the Internet freedom bill 
the Marco Civil da Internet and creating participatory channels within the structure of the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. I argue that for these individuals, particularly for the 
FOSS activists, attempts to create new mechanisms of democratic participation which are 
collaborative, open, and decentralized represent an application of the “hacker ethic” to state 
governance.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
HACKING THE STATE – THE BRAZILIAN MARCO CIVIL DA INTERNET 
 
 
On April 23rd 2014, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff signed into law the 
pioneering Internet freedom bill the Marco Civil da Internet (MCI), commonly referred to in 
English as, the “Civil Rights Framework for the Internet.” She did so in front of an 
international audience at the global Internet governance conference, NetMundial, held in São 
Paulo. At the time of the law’s passing, Brazilian Internet freedom activists had been 
working for more than five years to help establish a digital rights law that “establishes 
principles, guarantees, rights, and responsibilities for the use of the Internet in Brazil” (Marco 
Civil da Internet, Lei nº 12.965 2014), as the law’s first article states. The law had three key 
policies that addressed the concerns of Internet freedom activists: 1) It safeguarded user 
privacy by placing restrictions on corporations and the government from maintaining 
indefinite browsing history logs; 2) It mandated a judicial review of requests to remove 
potentially offensive or illegal material, including content an individual or corporation 
claimed infringed copyright; and 3) It mandated net neutrality – a technical policy that 
prohibits restricting or fast-tracking the flow of information on the Internet for commercial 
purposes. Brazilian activists considered the passage of this law in 2014 as one of their biggest 
victories and an example for activists in other countries to replicate.  
Indeed, the law gained global attention. Tim Berners-Lee, the man often referred to as 
the “Father of the World Wide Web” for his role in creating HTML in the 1990s, publicly 
stated that the law "reflects the Internet as it should be: an open, neutral and decentralized 
network, in which users are the engine of collaboration and innovation… the [law] has 
among its foundations the guarantee of human rights such as privacy, of citizenship and the 
preservation of the diversity and the social purpose of the web” (World Wide Web 
Foundation 2014). For Berners-Lee, these policies created a legal framework that empowers 
citizens and encourages democratic participation. In fact, he has called for a global Magna 
Carta on Internet rights, which would be largely inspired by the Brazilian law.  
 The Marco Civil da Internet is also important in that it represented one of the most 
high-profile experiments worldwide, in what Brazilian Internet freedom activists referred to 
as governo aberto – which can be glossed in to English as either open or open-source 
government. By using the term governo aberto, activists were talking about initiatives that 
sought to use the Internet to increase citizen participation in democratic decision-making by 
opening up the process to a broader spectrum of society and making it more transparent. At 
the behest of Internet freedom activists, the language of the MCI was drafted via a 
government website that allowed individual citizens and organizations (e.g., NGOs, 
businesses, political parties, etc.) to interact and debate the law’s contents. This open, 
interactive, and collaborative process was inspired by the methods that hackers pioneered to 
develop FOSS via virtual, online communities in the 1990s. It relied on a belief that the 
collective intelligence employed in this process improved the final product and resulted in 
one that was less beholden to powerful corporate lobbies. Because the process of drafting the 
MCI was transparent and markedly different than the traditional method of drafting bills 
“behind closed doors,” activists proudly referred to this as the “hacking” of the legislative 
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process.11 Thus, for activists, the MCI represented the application of a FOSS philosophy to 
the democratic process. 
The case of the MCI raises questions about the possibility of new mechanisms of 
citizen participation facilitated by the Internet to lead to a more socially just policy. The 
notion that the spread of the Internet and related digital technologies will inherently 
strengthen democracy emerged in 1990s when the Internet began reaching mass publics in 
North America and Europe. A number of scholars and public intellectuals asserted that the 
“digital revolution” ushered in by new information technology would fundamentally reshape 
the world in a positive way as the world transitioned from an industrial-based economy to 
one based on information (Benkler 2006; Castells 2000). The general argument of these 
Internet celebrants revolved around the belief that the Internet was “broadening the public 
sphere, increasing political participation, involving citizens in political activities that were 
previously closed to them, and challenging the monopoly of traditional elites” and would 
thus strengthen democracy (Hindman 2009:6). For proponents of these ideas, the Internet 
would empower citizens and pave the way for more socially equitable public policy. This 
conviction translated into so-called digital democracy initiatives that used social media and 
Internet websites to help develop public policy. This included experiments like the Obama 
administration’s We the People website launched in 2009 that allowed US social media users 
to collectively petition the White House and the government of Iceland’s attempt to crowd 
source a new constitution in 2011. A facile analysis of the MCI might interpret the passage 
and signing of the law as evidence of the effectiveness of digital democracy mechanisms. 
However, upon closer inspection, I argue that chalking this victory up to the power of digital 
mechanisms of participation is overly simplistic and misses the political battles that actually 
shaped how the law came into being, which will be the focus of my analysis in this chapter 
and the next. 
In The Myth of Digital Democracy, political scientist Daniel Hindman (2009) argues 
that the initial hope of the Internet as an innately democratizing force has not been 
substantiated by real world experience. He contends that online filtering and gatekeeping 
practices, often by commercial websites and search engines, mean that people may be given a 
place to speak, but this does not necessarily mean that their opinions are being taken into 
account by elite policy makers. For him, the “difference between speaking and being heard” 
is fundamental when thinking about the democratizing power of the Internet (Hindman 
2009:12–13). Media scholar Robert McChesney, who has written about how global 
capitalism poses a threat to the Internet, argues that the Internet celebrants mistakenly 
believed that “digital technology [had] superpowers over political economy” (McChesney 
2013:15). McChesney contends that they largely ignored the political realities of 
contemporary neoliberal capitalism, which was not trending towards greater redistribution 
and broader political participation in the wake of major technological innovations. In 
contrast, Brazilian Internet freedom activists are not naïve about how technology is entangled 
with the broader political economy. No one I spoke with subscribed to the cyber-utopian 
notion that the Internet itself would necessarily lead to more democratic and socially just 
society. Rather, their political trajectories and beliefs demonstrate a conviction that neoliberal 
                                                
11 The term hack in this case does not refer to committing a crime using digital technology, but rather it invokes 
the original meaning developed by computer programmers in the 1960s in which a hack refers to generating a 
clever fix to a technical problem. 
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policies are circumscribing public debate. In fact, for many of them the MCI is just one 
component of larger political efforts to create a more equitable society. From this 
perspective, the Internet is not a cure-all for global injustice, but rather the most recent 
vehicle for broader discussions about how and for whom society is organized.  
While using the Internet to foster democratic participation was not unique to Brazil, I 
contend that it gained support among Brazilian activists because in Brazil it is perceived as 
part of a larger push to promote participatory democracy and reshape state power. The 
unique significance of governo aberto in the Brazilian context can be understood through the 
words of Marcelo Branco, the longtime FOSS activist and PT militant from Porto Alegre 
who helped start FISL in 2000 and who has been a longtime proponent of governo aberto 
initiatives. In a blog post titled Governo aberto não é governo eletrônico (Open government 
is not electronic government), he concisely summed up the key elements of governo aberto 
initiatives in this way: 
 
Governo aberto, in concept, refers to new, interactive, and participatory practices so 
that the population, in a collaborative way, can participate in the construction of 
public policies using social media as a platform…governo aberto should alter the 
status quo and the functioning of the administrative apparatus, empowering 
individuals, questioning the limits of representative democracy, and creating new 
channels for participation and the making of decisions using social media and the 
Internet (Branco 2014). 
 
For Branco, the goal of governo aberto then was not to simply employ digital technologies to 
make governing more efficient or more transparent, but rather to fundamentally alter the 
governance process itself. In theory, increased citizen participation effectively diminishes the 
power of legislators and civil servants in crafting state policy, and thus ultimately represents 
an endeavor to reshape the configuration of state power. The focus on citizen empowerment 
and participation harkens back to other participatory democracy initiatives, like experiments 
with participatory budgeting that began in Porto Alegre in early the 1990s and which Branco 
advocated for as a local PT militant (Abers 1996; Avritzer 2007; Baiocchi 2005; Santos 
1998). While the topics being debated and the mechanisms used for discussion were 
different, the same underlying goals to increase citizen participation in democratic 
governance remained in the case of crafting the MCI.  
In this chapter, I explore the role of Brazilian Internet freedom activists in creating 
the MCI. I show how their practices, values, and goals were fundamentally shaped by the 
legacy of the Brazilian redemocratization process and efforts to promote participatory 
democracy. This is evident in three ways. First, activists discursively linked attempts to 
monitor and censor Internet usage to the censorship practices of the Brazilian military 
dictatorship. Second, activists made demands upon the state to enumerate the rights of 
citizens in relation to the Internet by calling for the creation of an Internet rights bill. This 
differed from the approach of Internet freedom activists who up until then eschewed state 
intervention in Internet governance, and the fact that this tactic gained purchase in Brazil is 
indicative of more widespread opposition to neoliberalism in Brazil. And third, activists 
employed an interactive, collaborative website to draft the bill’s language in an attempt to 
foster new channels of citizen participation in the law-making process. I draw on literature 
about Brazilian redemocratization and participatory democracy in order to suggest that these 
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characteristics are distinctive to Brazilian socio-political context (Abers 1996; Baiocchi 
2005; Holston 2009; Keck 1995; Santos and Avritzer 2007). Ultimately, I argue that the 
“hacking” of the legislation drafting process created openings that allowed activists to push 
their policy agenda by participating in the writing of legislation. The employment of governo 
aberto in this case represents a tactic by which Brazilian Internet freedom activists were able 
to leverage, albeit temporarily, more influence over state power. I conclude with a brief 
discussion about the shortcomings of this experiment with governo aberto in terms of its 
failure to directly result in structural changes in the exercise of state power. In this way, the 
practice of participatory democracy did not immediately fulfill the expectations of its 
proponents. 
Counter-hegemonic Technological Visions: Intellectual Property and the Internet 
When I watched FOSS activist Sergio Amadeu give his passionate lecture at the free 
software conference FISL in 2011 warning young hackers about emerging legislation that 
threatened an Internet livre, he focused mainly on new laws being proposed or passed abroad 
that would have negative impacts on Internet users globally. However, just a couple years 
earlier, the target of his criticism in speeches at technology conferences and on his personal 
blog was not any foreign law, but rather a Brazilian cybercrimes bill being debated in the 
Brazilian senate. The so-called Lei Azeredo – Azeredo’s Law – was the consolidation of a 
number of previous, smaller cybercrimes bills and was introduced by center-right senator 
Eduardo Azeredo (PSDB), whose party supported economic liberalization policies associated 
with neoliberal thought.12 The language of Lei Azeredo was heavily influenced by the 2001 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes, which sought to create a global legal structure for 
combatting copyright infringement, digital piracy, child pornography, international terrorism, 
and network security. It also drew heavily from the US’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) of 1998, which strengthened copyright protections on the Internet by criminalizing 
not only the sharing of copyrighted material, but also the creation of technology (hardware 
and software) that could potentially be used to share content. Azeredo’s goal was to 
harmonize Brazilian law with US and European laws, which he argued would be good for 
global information technology companies, and would therefore promote private investment 
and technological development in Brazil. Azeredo had experience in IT as he was trained as 
an analyst at IBM in the 1970s and had led a number of Brazilian state informatics 
corporations (i.e., SERPRO, Prodemge, Prodabel) during his political career. Azeredo’s bill 
attempted to restrict the free circulation of knowledge on the Internet and was part of a larger 
global intellectual property enforcement regime being erected by supporters of neoliberal 
globalization (Souza, Solagna, and Leal 2014).  
For Professor Amadeu, the policies in Lei Azeredo were anathema to the type of 
Internet livre he championed, which was characterized by collaboration, sharing, and 
freedom of expression. As such, Amadeu actively organized fellow bloggers, techies, and 
left-wing activists to defeat the bill. In order to understand both his perspective and the 
weight of his opinions among activist techies, it is important to understand his political 
background. I spoke with him at the sidelines of the technology conference, Conexões 
                                                
12 Azeredo was a founding member of the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), a center-right party 
formed by individuals who had opposed the military dictatorship and who advocated for policies of economic 
liberalism. He was first elected mayor of Belo Horizonte (1990-1992), then governor of Minas Gerais (1995-
1999), before ultimately entering the Senate in 2003. 
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Globais, in 2013 prior to the signing of the MCI. The following analysis of his background is 
augmented by other public interviews Amadeu has given. Amadeu’s story illustrates how 
current struggles over privacy and freedom of expression on the Internet in Brazil are shaped 
by the activists’ experiences of the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985) and the 
country’s recent redemocratization process.  
Amadeu first became politically engaged with radical pro-democracy activism as a 
young, middle class high school student in the city of São Paulo in the early 1980s. He joined 
other student activists in reestablishing the União Brasileira dos Estudantes Secundaristas – 
the Brazilian Union of Secondary Students, or UBES – a national high school student 
organization linked to the university student movement and left-wing organizations. The 
organization had been essentially outlawed in 1968 as the result of Ato Institucional #5 
(Institutional Act #5, or simply AI-5), which closed Congress, suspended habeas corpus, and 
instituted a strict regime of media censorship. This act essentially put an end to student 
organizing and legal political opposition and ushered in an era of violent repression. Amadeu 
was central to the re-formation of UBES in 1981 and was elected national UBES president at 
the organization’s national congress in Curitiba that year. The military government did not 
approve of the re-formation of UBES and for this, Amadeu was briefly jailed for his actions. 
For Amadeu, “the secondary school movement…was a movement for democracy…the 
movement fought for democracy in the country and within the schools” (CESPI 2012). The 
specific demands of UBES under Amadeu’s leadership included increased enrollment at 
public universities, more funds for public education, and a less authoritarian treatment of 
students in the classroom. However, what drove Amadeu and many others of his fellow 
student activists was a desire for the country to return to democratic, civilian rule.  
After leaving the UBES presidency, he remained very active in the left-wing, pro-
democracy youth movement in São Paulo. He joined the PT in 1984 during the Diretas Já 
(Direct Elections Now!) movement in which millions of Brazilians took to the streets to 
demand the return of direct presidential elections. Amadeu became an active militant in the 
party structure. In the 1980s and 1990s he worked in the PT’s São Paulo offices, at which 
time he developed ties with the upper-echelons of PT leadership, including José Dirceu, one 
of Lula da Silva’s closest confidants and future chief of staff. It was in this political milieu of 
overlapping trade unionism and left-wing student activism that notions of participatory 
democracy and movements against neoliberal globalization were taking shape. 
Amadeu’s engagement with technology and the Internet began in earnest in the mid- 
1990s when he was pursuing his master’s degree in sociology at the Universidade de São 
Paulo (USP). He had started to use email and was a heavy user of bulletin board services 
(BBS). This sparked an interest in the effects of the Internet on nation-state sovereignty, 
which would become the topic of his master’s thesis, Poder no Ciberespaço - O Estado-
Nação, a regulamentação e o controle da Internet (Power in Cyberspace – The Nation-State, 
regulation, and control of the Internet). In his thesis, he critiqued the “myth of the global 
democracy of the network” and argued that despite the anarchistic origins, US government 
agencies “define the domains, protocols, and architecture of the Internet” (Amadeu da 
Silveira 2000). In our interview more than a decade later, he summed up his argument this 
way: “Who controls the infrastructure, controls the Internet – it’s geographical and it is 
owned.” While researching the history of the Internet, Amadeu became more familiar with 
FOSS. He was particularly drawn to the way that the FOSS model challenged corporate 
power and created new, collaborative mechanisms for knowledge production. For him, the 
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ability to control the source code represented power and autonomy, particularly from large 
informatics corporations based mainly in the Global North. He quickly became a vocal 
advocate for the adoption of FOSS in São Paulo and within the party structure of the PT. In 
2001, he was appointed by the mayor of São Paulo, Marta Suplicy (PT) to run a digital 
inclusion initiative in the city. This led to the creation of the largest network of telecentros – 
public computer labs located primarily in poor communities with little access to technology– 
that were operated using FOSS at Amadeu’s insistence. In this high-level position in the 
government of the largest city in Brazil, Amadeu became one of the PT’s most vocal 
advocates for an alternative technology policy centered around FOSS, which he argued 
would lead to greater social inclusion of poor people and increased Brazilian innovation. It 
was during these years that he began to frequent the FISL and emerged as one of the central 
figures of the Brazilian FOSS movement. 
In 2003, he was approached by newly elected President, Lula da Silva (PT), to take 
charge of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia de Informação (ITI), the federal agency 
entrusted with the government’s cryptographic codes and encryption technology. With Lula’s 
consent, however, Amadeu pursued a different agenda. He used this new institutional 
platform to lead a charge to transition government computers away from expensive 
proprietary software purchased from multinational corporations to FOSS. Through his 
leadership at ITI, Amadeu gained global attention as he, in essence, became the spokesperson 
for an alternative vision of technological development through FOSS. At the time, he 
articulated his support for FOSS this way: 
 
We are not opting for a product, we are opting for a software-use development model. 
This is a political decision, and I cannot emphasize this enough, based on an 
economic reason -- a reduction in the remittance of royalties. It also expands Brazil's 
technological autonomy and strengthens our collective intelligence (Amadeu cited in 
Cadina 2004). 
 
Known for his fiery rhetoric, Amadeu was famously sued by Microsoft for defamation, 
when, in a public speech he compared the company’s practice of giving away free trials of its 
operating software, Windows, to the tactics of a drug-dealer trying to push a drug. In 2005, 
Amadeu left ITI after a strong pushback from the proprietary software industry stalled 
Brazilian government adoption of FOSS, and Amadeu felt his work had been stymied by 
bureaucratic foot dragging (Shaw 2011). Amadeu returned to academia as a professor at the 
Universidade do ABC (UFABC) in the state of São Paulo. Despite no longer having a high-
level government position, he was still widely regarded as one of the most influential 
thinkers in the area of technology policy within the PT. His blog, Blog do Sergio Amadeu, 
where he discussed issues related to software, intellectual property, and the Internet became 
one of the most highly read among technologists. Leaving government liberated Amadeu to 
become a sharper, more outspoken critic of policies with which he disagreed. One such 
technology policy proposal he opposed was Lei Azeredo, which became one of Amadeu’s 
main targets. Amadeu would find more allies in this process, particularly from the growing 
community of bloggers and individuals with social media accounts. 
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Opposition Mounts Online in the Blogosphere: AI-5 Digital and the Digital Dictatorship 
Senator Azeredo first introduced his cybercrimes bill in 2003, but it lingered, largely 
unnoticed, until November 2006 when Azeredo altered the bill’s language. This new 
language in Lei Azeredo mandated the registration of all Internet users in Brazil and required 
that Internet service providers store and monitor all data communications passing through 
their networks. Azeredo argued that increased monitoring of Internet users would decrease 
digital piracy of intellectual property, which he claimed was costing corporations billions of 
dollars in profit each year. He contended that the bill needed to be passed urgently because of 
the quick pace of technological change and the threat that an unregulated Internet posed to 
Brazilian society (Rená da Silva Santarém 2011). The draconian nature of the bill started 
raising alarms, particularly among Brazilian bloggers. Their concern was that the bill was 
written so vaguely that many of their practices, including sharing links to content on their 
blog, could potentially be deemed criminal. Indeed, the digital copyright components of the 
bill effectively criminalized the daily actions of many Internet users who shared files (music, 
videos, etc.) on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. The law was written so imprecisely that young 
legal scholar and technology expert Ronaldo Lemos argued it could be interpreted to 
potentially ban the public transmission of television signals, something which the bill’s 
author had clearly not intended (Lemos 2007). The threat of corporate control of intellectual 
property was something that Sergio Amadeu had been warning people about for years 
through his FOSS activism, but now that the corporate target was perceived as the Internet, 
broader swaths of Brazilian society became involved. 
One blogger who rose to prominence during this time was João Carlos Caribé, a 
freelance digital marketer from Rio de Janeiro who maintained an active blog called 
Entropia!. He has since become one of the most outspoken proponents of Internet freedom 
and travels around the world to technology and international policy conferences to deliver his 
message. I spoke with him at the sidelines of FISL in 2012. Caribé first became enamored 
with the possibilities of the Internet when he started logging on in the late 1990s when 
commercial Internet was becoming available to the public in Brazil. While surfing the 
Internet, he discovered and became proficient in Flash—a proprietary multimedia software 
used for creating graphics and animation for websites. He eventually turned his knowledge of 
the software into a successful career doing online marketing and consulting with his business, 
Flash Brasil. Up until this point in his life, Caribé had not been actively engaged in politics. 
As a small-business owner, he typically voted for center-right, pro-business candidates, but 
he was not a political militant of any party. In April 2005, he started his blog, Entropia!, and 
began using the Internet as a platform to publish his ideas and opinions. The topics of his 
blog posts spanned the gamut from successful marketing methods to strategies for combating 
endemic Brazilian political corruption. Thus, in addition to seeing the Internet as opening 
creative and economic opportunities, he also saw it as an important mechanism for civic 
engagement. As such, over time, his posts became increasingly political.  
Caribé become active in an online community called Cibercultura on the now defunct 
social media site Orkut, which was owned by Google and was the most popular social media 
site in Brazil at the time. The Cibercultura group was a large community of Brazilian social 
media users who discussed how technology was changing cultural practices, such as artistic 
creation, social relationships, and entrepreneurship. Many were inspired by new ideas about 
what they referred to as cibercultura or cultura digital – cyber culture or digital culture. At 
the heart of these ideas were notions borrowed from computer hackers about sharing, 
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collaboration, and decentralization. Extending from the hacking ethos of the Internet 
pioneers, these ideas were now being applied more broadly to culture in all of its forms. This 
movement was often referred to as the free culture movement, and it was inspired by the 
work of American legal scholar Lawrence Lessig, who had coined the term “free culture” 
(2004). As an active member of this group, Caribé become more familiar with the arguments 
made by FOSS activists about the danger of neoliberal corporate enclosure of intellectual 
property. While Caribé would never completely give up proprietary software, he became a 
supporter of FOSS activism and was skeptical of neoliberal policies, which he now 
considered dangerous to innovation and freedom of expression. 
 
Figure 1. Cibercultura community on Orkut 
 
Screenshot of front page of the now off-line Cibercultura community. Photo courtesy João Carlos Caribé. 
 
In 2006, when news of changes to the Lei Azeredo were announced, Caribé was 
alarmed because he felt that the monitoring of Internet users was a way for politicians to 
scare independent bloggers, like himself, from publishing their critiques. For him, as a 
blogger, the law was primarily about freedom of expression initially, and had less to do with 
Amadeu’s concerns about corporate enclosure of knowledge. Caribé used the Cibercultura 
group as a platform to organize fellow bloggers and warn them of the potential dangers of the 
law. He created a blog specifically to post about issues related to freedom of expression 
called Xô Censura (Out Censorship). The first published post appeared on November 7, 
2006, the day before the bill was going to be debated in Congress in Brasília:  
 
Tomorrow . . . may become known as the day the Internet died in Brazil, because a 
bill by Senator Eduardo Azeredo will be voted on that institutes cartorização 
[excessive file keeping] of Internet access, all we do will be registered, beginning 
with our data, webpages we access, exchanged files, e-mails, all for five years with 
the Internet service provider. Cyber cafés and universities will be required to keep 
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records and who fails to comply with this absurd law could be imprisoned for up to 
four years . . . It is necessary that each of us do something to curb these aberrations 
that are going to censor our Internet . . . The Internet as we know it may be near the 
end. We run a serious risk of a setback. This setback is only of interest to a powerful 
minority (Caribé 2006). 
 
Caribé’s reference to the “powerful minority” behind the bill demonstrates his belief that it 
would not benefit the majority of Brazilians. His fear did not come to pass as the bill 
remained in committee for discussion the following day and no action was taken. 
Nonetheless, the danger of the bill remained and Caribé continued keeping his fellow 
bloggers up to date on news of the bill’s progress in Brasília. This eventually led to the 
creation of another website called MegaNão! Diga Não ao Vigilantismo! (MegaNo! Say no 
to Surveillance) whose objective was to serve as the digital hub of the growing movement to 
defeat the bill. Caribé and others would often refer to the efforts to stop the Lei Azeredo as 
movimento MegaNão.  
Despite setbacks in Brasília, Senator Azeredo continued to push for his bill as it 
slowly worked its way through the various Senate committees that claimed jurisdiction over 
its various components. The fact that it persisted was alarming to activists. In particular, 
Amadeu was concerned about why there was not any formal opposition from Lula’s 
administration. In July 2008, Amadeu published on his blog the Manifesto em Defesa da 
Liberdade do Progresso do Conhecimento na Internet Brasileira (Manifesto in Defense of 
Liberty of Progress of Knowledge on the Brazilian Internet). In this essay, he argued against 
the Lei Azeredo and gave a long defense of the liberatory potential of the Internet, 
reproduced, in part, below: 
 
The Internet has expanded in an unprecedented way human communication, enabling 
a planetary breakthrough in the way we produce, distribute and consume knowledge, 
whether written, visual, or audible. Built collaboratively, networking is one of the 
greatest expressions of cultural diversity and social creativity of the twentieth century. 
Decentralized, the Internet is based on interactivity and the possibility for all to 
become producers and not just consumers of information, as was the case in the era of 
mass media. On the Internet, the freedom of creating content feeds and is fed by the 
freedom of creating new media formats, new programs, new technologies, new social 
networks. Freedom is the basis of knowledge creation. And it underpins the 
development and survival of the Internet  
 
We need to grow the network, not lock it down. We need access for all Brazilians and 
to stimulate their production of knowledge, culture, and with this improvement of 
their living conditions . . . Projects like [Lei Azeredo] do a disservice to society and 
Brazilian culture, they block human development and put the country at a 
disadvantage in the information age of the 21st century (Amadeu da Silveira 2008). 
 
In the manifesto, Amadeu explicitly linked freedom and the continued survival of an Internet 
livre. He concluded the manifesto by calling for the defeat of the Lei Azeredo because the bill 
was “against liberty, creativity, privacy, and the dissemination of knowledge on the Brazilian 
Internet” (Amadeu da Silveira 2008). For Amadeu, a cybercrimes bill that restricted Internet 
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usage in severe ways would be a fundamental threat to freedom and the democratic system. 
Shortly after its publication Caribé, with Amadeu’s permission, turned the manifesto into an 
online public petition on the global website Petition Online. In a matter of days it gained over 
30,000 signatories from individuals and organizations in Brazil and around the world, and it 
would eventually gain over 150,000 signers. Its popularity online garnered widespread 
attention in the mainstream newspapers (Rená da Silva Santarém 2011:74–76). This news 
coverage marked the first time that wide-scale attention would be focused on the bill.   
Towards the end of 2008, activists began to make more explicit the discursive 
connections between Internet censorship and dictatorship. In November at a public hearing in 
Brasília at the national congress, while Amadeu spoke of his opposition to the law, activists 
in the audience symbolically taped their mouths shut and held up signs that said Quem 
derrotou a ditatura não aceita o vigilantismo (“Those who defeated the dictatorship do not 
accept surveillance”). The Internet was a new platform for creative and civic engagement; 
anyone trying to restrict it was seen as replicating the repressive values of the Brazilian 
military dictatorship. A month later, in December 2008, Internet freedom activists including 
Amadeu and Caribé began referring to the Lei Azeredo as AI-5 Digital. The term refers to the 
Ato Institucional #5 (AI-5) (Rená da Silva Santarém 2011:80). For activists, the bill was the 
digital equivalent of the repressive decree of 1968 that violently repressed political dissent. 
This was because in their opinion it would stifle freedom of expression and result in 
government monitoring of Internet use. This framing of the law helped activists break 
through to the public. This language helped translate the effects of the cybercrimes law to an 
audience that might not fully understand the effects of Internet policies on their daily lives, 
but that still had vivid memories of the dictatorship. This framing relied on popular Brazilian 
opposition to the military regime to marshal support for Internet freedom. It also put political 
parties on notice. Both Azeredo’s center-right PSDB and the PT had emerged out of the 
opposition to the military regime. The fact that the parties emerged out of democratic 
opposition to the dictatorship is something that members of both parties often invoked to 
burnish their democratic bonafides. Now activists were calling upon both parties to decide 
which side they were on in the digital age. Did they support the so-called AI-5 Digital or 
were they against it? 
 
Figure 2. MegaNão poster announcing an activist meeting to oppose Lei Azeredo. 
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The Fight for Rights Goes Digital: The Marco Civil da Internet 
At the same time as individuals like Amadeu and Caribé were equating the 
cybercrimes bill to the repressive Brazilian military dictatorship, a new discourse also 
emerged about citizen rights to the Internet. Demanding citizen rights was one of the 
hallmarks of pro-democracy efforts that emanated from the urban peripheries in the 1980s as 
the poor and working classes sought to be accepted as full citizens in the emerging Brazilian 
democracy (Dagnino 2007; Holston 2009). In the 2000s, Internet freedom activists were 
demanding rights specifically related to the access and use of the Internet. This shift was 
linked to an increasing desire not to resist government regulation of the Internet altogether, 
but rather to help shape it so that it could attend to the demands of Internet freedom activists. 
Brazilian activists wanted the government to support the regulation of the Internet to insure 
its free and open nature, thus legalizing the activist vision of an Internet livre.  
 Ronaldo Lemos, a young legal scholar in Rio de Janeiro, was one of the central 
figures in inverting the debate from one of crime to civil rights. In the mid-2000s, he was the 
director of the Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade (Center for Technology and Society or 
CTS) in Rio de Janeiro, which he helped found in 2003. At the time, it was the only Brazilian 
think tank dedicated solely to technology issues. Lemos had first become interested in 
Internet policy issues in the late 1990s when he was working as a telecommunications lawyer 
for a large Brazilian corporate firm. This interest led him to return to school and pursue a 
master’s degree at Harvard Law School, which was already well known as a place where 
progressive legal scholars were generating ideas about how to create a legal framework that 
would spur innovation and creativity in the digital age. Principal among the progressive legal 
scholars at Harvard was professor Lawrence Lessig who was at the school’s Berkman Center 
for Internet and Society. Lessig was a leader of the free culture movement and had helped 
found the Creative Commons initiative in 2001. Inspired by what he saw during his time at 
Harvard, Lemos returned to Brazil and took up a position as professor of law at the 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas law school where he launched the Centro de Tecnologia e 
Sociedade, which grew as Lemos attracted a number of students interested in the same issues. 
Lemos’s research at the center focused on how new technologies, particularly the Internet, 
were giving life to a digital commons of intellectual property, and how this served as a 
catalyst for creative engagement and innovation. Lemos was most widely known for his 
leading role helping to launch a Brazilian affiliate of the Creative Commons project, which 
was inspired by the FOSS licenses and created new copyright licenses for creative works 
(music, art, literature, etc.). Creative Commons Brasil was launched at FISL in Porto Alegre 
in 2004. Lemos was media savvy and, in addition to being widely published in newspapers, 
he often appeared on television on the Globo network and had even produced a television 
series for MTV Brasil. As a public intellectual, Lemos raised issues about digital policy and 
law to broader audiences and he also inspired a younger generation of lawyers to become 
more actively engaged in debating these issues. 
 In a May 2007 opinion piece published on UOL Notícias, an online news site owned 
by Globo, Lemos argued that rather than first creating a penal law like Lei Azeredo that 
criminalized behavior on the Internet, legislators should instead pass a law that regulated the 
use of the Internet from a civil law perspective (Lemos 2007). He contended, that unlike in 
the US and other Latin American countries, in Brazil there was no law on the books that 
specifically dealt with the Internet. This meant that the first Brazilian law that referenced the 
Internet would be a criminal one if Lei Azeredo were the first to pass. For Lemos, it was 
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illogical to pass a bill telling people what they could not do on the Internet without first 
laying the groundwork for what was permissible. His opinion piece ended on this note: 
 
All the effort of the public debate around such a bill [Lei Azeredo], which aims to 
regulate the Internet from a criminal point of view, should instead be focused on the 
civil regulation of the Internet, clearly defining their regulatory framework and 
favoring innovation, as it was in developed countries. Favoring the criminal 
regulation of the Internet before its civil legislation has the effect of increasing public 
and private costs, disincentivizing innovation and above all, ineffectiveness. In this 
sense, we must first start with civil legislation, and then propose criminal measures 
that can improve its effectiveness, without burdening the society as a whole, as the 
current bill by Senator Eduardo Azeredo does (Lemos 2007). 
 
Lemos argued that rather than creating a penal law, Brazil should first pass a marco 
regulatório civil – a civil rights framework that regulated the use of the Internet. The call to 
have the state regulate Internet use via legislation was important because it differed from 
previous libertarian arguments popular among some Internet freedom activists in the US that 
governments should not regulate the Internet in any way. This philosophy was encapsulated 
in John Perry Barlow’s cyber-libertarian manifesto, “A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace,” which he wrote in opposition to the passage of the US Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, the first US law to deal with the Internet policy. Lemos was arguing that the 
Internet did, in fact, need regulations in order to function most effectively. This represented 
an inversion of tactics among Internet freedom activists from rhetorically rejecting any state 
intervention in Internet policy, to calling for the state to be a protector of an open Internet 
through beneficial legislation. This demonstrates how Brazilian activists chose a more state-
interventionist Internet policy than their counterparts in the Global North.  
While in the opinion piece Lemos did not specifically mention the Internet as a right, 
his call for civil rights framework revealed his underlying assumption that access to the 
Internet should be considered a human right. The strategy to focus on creating a legal 
framework of Internet rights was a strategy that had not been used by Internet freedom 
activists in other places around the world. Yet, it quickly gained support in Brazil. In my 
interview with him, he explained it this way: 
 
My idea came from the fact that first you regulate something from the civil law 
perspective, and then you regulate from the criminal perspective. I do believe that 
criminal law is the last resource, the last instance that you want to regulate. First you 
regulate civil, and then you regulate criminal. And that idea resonated. People said 
“Wow, that’s correct!” … And then the idea of the Marco Civil [da Internet] 
emerged. 
 
As activists railed against the Lei Azeredo, they increasingly invoked the specific demand to 
create a law that would guarantee citizen rights on the Internet – a Marco Civil da Internet.  
Also, important to note is that Lemos couched his critique of the Lei Azeredo in terms 
of its effects on innovation and entrepreneurship. Whereas Amadeu and Caribé focused their 
attacks on the way that the Lei Azeredo stifled freedom of expression and could lead to 
government surveillance, Lemos emphasized that the restrictions on sharing would have 
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negative effects on the creative industries. He contended that the vague nature of the bill’s 
language would criminalize practices of sharing that should actually be encouraged and that 
were the basis for creative innovation. In this way, in Lemos’s opinion, the law would stifle 
creativity and be bad for the creative Brazilian entrepreneurs, particularly musicians, 
filmmakers, and artists. He said that a cybercrimes law would “elevate the cost of investment 
in the sector and stifle the creation of private, public, and business initiatives in the area” 
(Lemos 2007). These arguments about innovation mirror those by Lessig and others who 
criticize increasingly strict intellectual property regimes worldwide which they contend 
benefit large corporations, but actually stifle overall creativity by “locking down culture” 
(Lessig 2004). For Lemos, the central argument for creating a Marco Civil was to create a 
legal framework that would be a catalyst for Brazilian innovation. The slight divergence 
between the initial arguments of Lemos and Amadeu and Caribé illustrates differing concerns 
among different groups of Internet freedom activists.  
 The need for some type of Brazilian government guidance about the Internet was 
becoming clearer as a series of judicial rulings showed that judges were taking actions that 
raised alarm among Internet users. In one case a judge ordered the entire YouTube website 
be taken offline until one compromising video of a famous female actress was pulled from 
the website – something that YouTube refused to do because it argued the video was stored 
in a data center outside of Brazil and was thus outside the judge’s jurisdiction. At this time, 
the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee also began working on its own document called 
the Decálogo, or ten commandments, that was meant to guide politicians and judges in terms 
of Internet policy, which I will analyze in greater detail in Chapter 5. Thus, the desire for the 
MCI was not only about securing a citizen’s rights in regards to accessing the Internet, but 
also about giving clarity to the judicial branch in terms of how to apply standing law to the 
Internet.  
FOSS Activist Mobilization at FISL: Lobbying Lula 
The movement against the law was not merely virtual. While efforts like the online 
petition demonstrated what activists often refer to as a força da rede – the power of the 
network – in terms of shaping public debate, activists were never under the impression that 
actions online could by themselves effect change. Employing tactics from social movements, 
activists organized public roundtables with sympathetic legislators and political flash mobs to 
gain attention in the press and on social media. Arguably the most important of activist 
activities were the organization and participation in progressive technology events like FISL 
and Campus Party Brasil, whose organizers were themselves Internet freedom activists. 
These forums provided a space for leaders like Amadeu, Caribé, and Lemos to articulate their 
issues with the law to conference participants. It was also a place for activists to directly 
challenge the politicians and policymakers who often made appearances at the debate 
roundtables. For example, at Campus Party Brasil in January 2009, an advisor to Senator 
Azeredo sat on a panel with two of the bill’s biggest critics - Amadeu and Lemos. Activists 
in the audience expressed their opposition to the bill by holding their computer laptop screens 
toward the stage with slogans against the bill or simply turned their backs to the Senator’s 
representative (Rená da Silva Santarém 2011:81–81). While none of these events or 
encounters changed Azeredo’s position, a subsequent encounter between Internet freedom 
activists and President Lula da Silva would demonstrate the enduring power of the Brazilian 
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FOSS movement to influence state technology policy. It would also show how traditional 
forms of political organizing were essential for the ultimate elaboration of the MCI. 
In 2009 Marcelo Branco, one of the original organizers of FISL, took on the 
responsibility of organizing the event’s 10th anniversary in July of that year. Branco and other 
activists decided to use the gathering as a moment to celebrate their success at making Brazil 
one of the leaders in FOSS promotion worldwide over the previous decade. In large part, the 
success of the Brazilian FOSS movement was due to their ability to convince the government 
to embrace their technological movement when Lula become president in 2003. Branco, who 
was well connected within the PT because of his long-term militancy within the party going 
back to the early 1980s, was able to leverage his political connections to secure the presence 
of the president at the conference. Notable among these connections was Cezar Alvarez, 
Lula’s coordinator of digital inclusion projects. Alvarez was a PT militant from Rio Grande 
do Sul who had worked in the three PT mayoral administrations in Porto Alegre before 
taking a position in the federal government. Branco leaned heavily on contacts in the 
government and these party connections were essential to securing Lula’s attendance. In an 
interview in the summer of 2013, Branco told me that the activists’ goal at the event was to 
get some type of official document or official decree that would acknowledge the 
contribution of the Brazilian FOSS movement in generating an alternative technology policy. 
Lula’s attendance at the conference would provide activists the opportunity to directly 
engage in political debate with influential party leaders. 
When the announcement was made that Lula would participate at FISL, activists 
became energized and anticipation of the event grew. It demonstrated the power of activists 
to command the attention of the government. The conference was shaping up to be one of the 
largest and most high profile FISLs ever. His presence meant that activists would have a 
chance to directly express their appreciation to Lula, but also to address their concerns about 
the ways that the government’s FOSS agenda had fallen short. More importantly, while 
activists were still lobbying to have FOSS more widely promoted by the government, the 
topic that FOSS activists were currently most concerned about was Internet freedom and the 
cybercrimes bill Lei Azeredo. They understood the bill to be a direct attack on their 
philosophy of the free sharing of knowledge. 
On July 26, 2009, President Lula da Silva and his then chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, 
visited FISL held at the Catholic University in Porto Alegre. The conference center was 
packed with thousands of participants, in large part because of Lula’s presence. Branco and 
other FOSS activists guided Lula on a tour of the exhibition floor to meet the more than 
5,000 hackers who were participating in the forum that year, which made it the most attended 
FISL ever. Lula was greeted like a rock star meeting his fans. As he toured the various stands 
and installations that touted the potential of various FOSS programs, individuals also took the 
time to explain their opposition to the Lei Azeredo. Lula admitted that he was “illiterate” in 
terms of the Internet and that he had given little thought to the issue. Touring the conference 
forced him to contemplate the issue in a way that he otherwise might not have. Hackers 
explained to him the concrete ways that the Lei Azeredo would restrict Internet freedom. 
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Figure 3. President Lula at FISL 
 
 
Caption: Marcelo Branco (center) guides President Lula (right) and his then chief of staff Dilma Rousseff (left) 
through the conference showroom at FISL. 
 
Later in the afternoon, Lula gave the keynote address to the conference. Whereas the 
previous speaker, his chief of staff Rousseff, had read from her prepared remarks touting 
government support and investment in FOSS, Lula, as was typical of his impromptu style, 
went off script. Instead he decided to recount how he had first come to learn about FOSS—
principally from Amadeu who was also in attendance at the conference—and how FOSS 
represented a new model of innovation that harnessed Brazilian creativity. As he was 
speaking, activists unfurled a large banner in the auditorium that read Veta Lei Azeredo (Veto 
Azeredo’s Law). Pointing to the banner, he stated his opposition to the law:  
 
This law here, it does not intend to correct abuses on the Internet; it intends to censor. 
What we need, Tarso Genro [Minister of Justice], my friend, might be to change the 
Civil Code . . . What we need is to make the people who work with the digital issues, 
with the Internet, responsible. We need to create responsibility but not to forbid or 
punish. 
 
Lula tasked his Minister of Justice Tarso Genro (PT), the former mayor of Porto Alegre who 
was also in attendance, to work on changing the civil code. Tasking Genro to deal with this 
issue, as opposed to his Minister of Communications who had close corporate ties, was 
important because it now became clear which Ministry had jurisdiction over this topic. 
Because of the president’s influence over the legislators in his coalition, in the wake of 
Lula’s pronouncement, the Lei Azeredo, at least in its current form, was dead in the Brazilian 
legislature. Likewise, his support of changes to the civil code was effectively a statement in 
support of Lemos’ idea of a creating a Marco Civil da Internet, which activists like Branco 
had been supporting. Thus, the presence of Lula at the conference gave activists the 
opportunity to personally confront the president about their concerns, which directly resulted 
in two significant victories for defenders of Internet freedom. First, it completely halted the 
progress of the Lei Azeredo in the legislature, and secondly it launched the formal political 
process of drafting the Marco Civil da Internet. 
Hacking the Legislative Process: Participatory Democracy in the Digital Age 
In Brazil, laws can be drafted either by lawmakers or the executive branch, which 
then sends a bill to the legislature for debate. Thus, per Lula’s request at FISL, it was then up 
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to the Ministry of Justice’s Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos (Office of Legislative Issues, 
or SAL) to draft such a bill. The president’s support for the creation of the MCI created a 
conducive political environment for Internet freedom activists to mobilize the power of the 
state. This was done by activating a number of allies in government, particularly in the 
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Culture. The ministry was led by Tarso Genro, who 
when he was mayor of Porto Alegre (1993-1997, 2001-2003) championed participatory 
budgeting initiatives and had supported the use of FOSS in public administration. At SAL, 
three young, tech-savvy lawyers were chosen to oversee the drafting of the bill, Pedro 
Abramovay, Guilherme Almeida, and Paulo Rená. All three were known to be supporters of 
the Internet freedom movement. Abramovay, a PT militant who had been at the ministry 
since 2003, had actually testified alongside Amadeu and Lemos at a congressional hearing in 
2008 where they discussed the problems with the Lei Azeredo. Thus, he was already known 
to be opposed to the bill and was very well versed in issues related to Internet policy. 
Abramovay invited his friend Almeida to work at the ministry at this time. Almeida 
previously had worked at a boutique law firm that specialized in intellectual property and 
free and open source licenses. Rená had been one of the leaders of the Mega Não! movement 
of bloggers against the cybercrimes bill. He had been working in another government job, but 
Almeida decided to bring him over temporarily to the Ministry of Justice to help with the 
drafting of the bill. He was specifically brought in for this project because he knew the issues 
that concerned activists. The ministry also relied on input from Lemos and his colleagues at 
CTS-FGV, who were some of the most well-respected legal scholars in the country with 
expertise on Internet policy. Thus, the individuals who would shepherd the law through the 
Ministry of Justice were progressive legal scholars committed to preserving Internet freedom. 
The final compiling of the bill’s language would be done by people who were already on 
record as believing that an Internet livre was important for a vibrant democracy. 
The Ministry of Culture was also important at this time because it embraced a state 
cultural policy that placed the democratization of technology at the core of its efforts to 
incentivize creativity, particularly in the urban peripheries. This was because the former 
minister, Gilberto Gil (Partido Verde), a world-famous Afro-Brazilian singer-songwriter who 
was a political exile during the dictatorship, was a longtime supporter of the free culture 
movement and cultura digital projects. These programs included free software and free 
culture components and were run by individuals who supported the concepts of Internet 
freedom. In particular, Gil himself was a longtime Internet and FOSS enthusiast. In 1996 he 
released the single Pela Internet (Via the Internet), which is an ode to the transnational, 
interactive nature of the new technological platform. While he was not a techie, he often 
referred to himself as the Ministro Hacker – the hacker minister – to demonstrate his 
endorsement of the hacker ethos, which he felt was directly applicable to creative production 
(Costa 2011). After Gil left the ministry in 2008, his second in command, Juca Ferreira, 
continued Gil’s initiatives. In 2009, the ministry launched CulturaDigital.br: Plataforma 
Pública de Blogs e Conversas, an interactive website created using FOSS that mixed 
blogging features and social media where citizens could discuss public policies related to 
artistic production. A number of young Internet freedom activists, among them José Murilo, 
Yasodara Cordova, Daniel Prado, Lincoln Clarete, were working on this and other ministry 
initiatives at the time. The fact that the Ministry of Culture had been a bulwark for Internet 
freedom policies within the executive branch now meant that individuals at the ministry 
would now play a central role in shaping the Marco Civil da Internet. 
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As the lawyers at SAL and CTS began contemplating how to proceed in drafting the 
bill, a consensus emerged that the bill should be drafted collaboratively using an online 
platform that would allow individuals and groups to have a voice in the bill’s language. The 
young PT-affiliated lawyer in charge of SAL, Abramovay, had been thinking about the 
possibility of using the Internet to create channels for dialogue for at least a couple years, and 
this seemed like the perfect time to test out such a mechanism (Solagna 2015:73). Since 
backing for the concept of the law gained steam via an online mobilization, it seemed only 
fitting that the creation of the law also take form via the same media. The idea was to debate 
the Internet on the Internet itself. Activists such as Amadeu, Branco, and Caribé 
wholeheartedly supported this governo aberto initiative. It would ensure that their voices and 
the voices of activists were heard in the drafting of the bill. Thus, the Marco Civil da Internet 
would be one of the first experiments in creating legislation this way worldwide.  
  No collaborative law-drafting process on this scale had ever been undertaken in 
Brazil, or in any other country for that matter. It was thus up to Abramovay, Almeida, and 
Rená at SAL to determine the best way to open up this process to the general public, while at 
the same time creating a document that was written using traditional Brazilian legal language 
that could be later presented to the legislature for debate. Thus, the individuals at the 
Ministry of Justice decided on a two-part process. In the first phase they would create topics 
for discussion based on the ideas that were brought up in the movement against the Lei 
Azeredo. After they had received this feedback, they would translate the feedback into legal 
language that would then be presented again on the online platform for further feedback. 
After they incorporated this feedback, the bill would be sent to the legislature for debate. 
This meant that while the input of individuals online was extremely important and would 
define the overall shape of the bill, the ultimate composition of the text was in the hands of a 
small number of individuals at the Ministry of Justice who embraced the views of Internet 
freedom activists and were in a position of power to craft the limits of questions that would 
be discussed. 
The Ministry of Justice, however, had no technological platform to undertake this 
type of online, interactive consultation. Therefore, Almeida reached out to the Ministry of 
Culture because of its expertise with interactive websites. An agreement was reached 
between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Culture to use the CulturaDigital.br 
platform for the consultation. The website already had hundreds of users who were interested 
in these topics and the interactive technologies that interested the lawyers at SAL. A team 
from the Ministry of Culture that included programmers Yasodara Cordova and Lincoln 
Clarete, quickly created a section of the website dedicated to debate about the Marco Civil da 
Internet. Thus, the fact that Internet freedom activists had gained a foothold in the Ministry 
of Culture was essential to the ability of the government to technically undertake this 
collaborative legislative process and to frame it in a participatory way. 
The official launch of the online consultation took place in Rio de Janeiro at the 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas on October 29, 2009. A number of Brazilian government officials, 
including Tarso Genro and the lawyers from SAL traveled to Rio de Janeiro for a launching 
ceremony that would include a daylong seminar on issues related to Internet policy. At the 
opening ceremony, Abramovay demonstrated how this digital form of participation was 
perceived as being a part of a larger movement to promote forms of participatory democracy: 
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We always had the dream inspired by Minister Tarso Genro to break the unilateral 
barrier between the state and the citizen at the moment of creating laws. Our everyday 
work is to write bills, make law, and we knew that we needed to find instruments to 
do this in a way that is not unilateral, not in the way that it has always been done. We 
knew that new technologies give us almost infinite possibilities to rethink our 
democracy . . . The construction of the law is not going to be done in an office. It is 
going to be done by citizens, by users of the Internet on this site that is also a space 
for debate about cultura digital. We hope that people will enter this process with the 
desire to construct something new because this experience could transform the way 
we discuss not just legislation about the Internet, but the way we discuss other bills in 
Brazil, and in this way, reconfigure our democracy (Marco Civil da Internet, Evento 
de Abertura 2009). 
 
For Abramovay, this online consultation represented a new form of drafting legislation that 
relied on mass participation via the Internet. It was his hope that this process could be 
replicated with other bills in order to make the legislative process more democratic and more 
responsive to citizen demands. 
 
Figure 4. Online Platform for the 1st Round of the Online Consultation for the Marco Civil da Internet. 
 
 
 
The initial phase of the consultation, which sought to identify key themes that needed 
to be addressed in the law, began on October 29, 2009, and lasted until December 17th, 2009. 
Debate in this period focused on the right to user privacy and freedom of expression on the 
Internet. This is not surprising given the mobilization that led to the creation of the Marco 
Civil da Internet. According to SAL lawyer and open source advocate Almeida, another key 
topic that emerged as significant during the first phase, which was not entirely anticipated by 
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lawyers at SAL, was the importance of net neutrality. After getting this feedback from the 
first round of the consultation, the lawyers at the Ministry of Justice drafted a preliminary 
version of the bill which they then shared online. The second round of consultation entailed 
getting people’s feedback on this preliminary version of the bill drafted by the lawyers at 
SAL. The second phase of consultation began on April 8, 2010, and lasted until May 30, 
2010.  
Despite the interest in the MCI as demonstrated in the mobilization against the Lei 
Azeredo, relatively few users were responsible for the majority of the input. For example, in 
the first phase two individuals contributed more than two-thirds of all 636 comments 
(Sampaio, Bragatto, and Nicolás 2013). Thus, while individuals like Abramovay had hoped 
that an online platform would allow for mass participation, this did not in fact take place. 
Another issue in terms of participation was the fact that telecommunications companies and 
other corporations interested in Internet policy largely avoided the online process, perhaps 
knowing that ultimately it would be up to individuals at the Ministry of Justice to determine 
what was included in the law. Accordingly, instead of participating in the online forums, 
telecommunications corporations submitted letters directly to the Ministry of Justice as they 
normally did. In an interview with me after the signing of the MCI, Almeida told me that he 
had made a point of posting these communications between the telecoms and the Ministry of 
Justice on the collaborative website so that in this way corporations’ input could be 
incorporated into the public debate. For him, this was a manifestation of the ministry’s desire 
to make this a transparent process, something quite different from the ways that laws had 
been traditionally drafted. 
In spite of its limitations, this new collaborative technique using a FOSS platform 
opened up doors for new types of public engagement in the legislative process. For example, 
when Almeida visited the Campus Party technological conference in São Paulo in January 
2010 to give an update about the progress of the bill, he encountered members of 
Transparência Hacker, a group of hackers who work to create programs and websites to 
increase government transparency. One of the members, Ricardo Poppi had used the online 
software Many Eyes to create a text visualization of all the comments posted to the public 
consultation. At the time Poppi was also an active member of the Partido Pirata do Brasil 
(Brazilian Pirate Party) and believed that there needed to be more forms of direct democracy 
in which citizens decided state policy rather than elected representatives. In an interview, 
Poppi told me that he hoped that these interactive images of the text would facilitate the 
accompaniment and participation of the consultation process by individuals. A longtime 
supporter of FOSS, Poppi pointed out that the ability for him to access this data and present it 
in new ways was because the CulturaDigital.br website of the Ministry of Culture was 
created using FOSS, and thus used open software formats that others were able to access. 
Almeida was impressed by Poppi’s initiative and decided that the Ministry of Justice should 
work with Poppi and Transparência Hacker to encourage activist interventions that might 
enrich the consultation process by making it easier to understand for someone not technically 
proficient in Internet policy. Almeida asked the members of Transparência Hacker “to hack 
the government.” By this he meant that he wanted to harness the work of these individuals to 
transform and open up the governance process so that it would be more transparent and 
accessible. In this way, the process of drafting the Marco Civil da Internet created a space for 
certain activist communities to become even more involved in the legislative process 
typically conducted solely by government civil servants. In this way the boundaries between 
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activists and government officials were sometimes blurred as they worked together to 
promote the online bill writing effort.  
The bill that the individuals at SAL compiled based on the input collected on the 
website had three central themes: privacy, freedom of expression, and net neutrality. Overall, 
Internet freedom activists were happy with the bill. Amadeu still had concerns about 
language in the bill that required Internet service providers to register user IPs, essentially 
enabling massive surveillance. However, he felt that these concerns could still be resolved in 
the legislature. After the bill was compiled by the lawyers at SAL, it circulated in the 
executive branch to other relevant ministries (Communications, Culture, and Science, 
Technology, and Innovation). These ministries were then able to make changes to the 
language of the bill, although no significant changes were in fact made. This inter-ministerial 
review process took a number of months and thus the MCI was not quickly sent to the 
legislature. In part, this was due to the transition from the administration of Lula to the 
administration of his successor Rousseff in which staff changes were made in many 
ministries, which stalled the government’s approval process. Activists expressed frustration 
at this point when their participation in shaping government policy was no longer wanted and 
progress on the bill seemed to be stalled. They rightfully considered this delay as evidence 
that the Marco Civil da Internet was not a priority for the Rousseff administration. This delay 
evidenced the fact that even though the experiment in participatory democracy online opened 
up new avenues of engagement for a small number of activists, it did not fundamentally alter 
the decision-making power structure of government. While the government would eventually 
pass the bill on to the legislature for debate, these same issues of power and who gets to set 
the agenda would continue to impede the agenda of Internet freedom activists. 
The MCI Moves to the Legislature: Participation then Pause 
When the executive branch finally passed a completed bill to the Congress in August 
2011, it was up to the PT leadership in the Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil’s lower chamber 
of congress, to select a lead sponsor who would shepherd the bill through the chamber. The 
party leadership selected Alessandro Molon (PT), a newly elected congressman from Rio de 
Janeiro. Molon was a lawyer and former radio journalist from Rio de Janeiro who had 
previously been a state representative. As a state representative, he had become interested in 
issues concerning Internet freedom and had even invited Ronaldo Lemos to testify before the 
state legislature about his concept of the Marco Civil da Internet in early 2009. Thus, when 
Molon became a federal representative in 2011, he decided to take up the cause of Internet 
freedom as one of his central platforms. While he had been relatively uninvolved in the 
crafting of the bill he was now sponsoring, over the course of the next two years he became 
one of the most visible proponents of the bill; he appeared on television and was often cited 
in newspaper articles. As the sponsor, he also had significant autonomy in terms of altering 
the text in hopes of securing passage, something that he would do a number of times. This 
meant that he was both an ally of the activists, while at times a target of activist ire when he 
made alterations that were against their liking in order to reach political accords to ensure the 
bill’s passage. 
Molon decided to launch another round of public consultation about the bill. He 
hoped to muster public support and to alter portions of the text mainly pertaining to net 
neutrality that activists thought were unclear, specifically portions that could create loopholes 
for telecommunications companies to sidestep net neutrality policies. To do this he employed 
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the Portal e-Democracia, a new web site launched the previous year by the PT leadership of 
the Câmara dos Deputados that gave lawmakers an Internet platform to engage citizens 
using social networks. The text of the bill was placed on the website on Wikipedia-inspired 
platform that allowed individuals to comment and suggest changes to bills. Furthermore, the 
website was connected to a number of social media websites (i.e., Facebook and Google+), 
which created a new avenue for individuals to participate. This meant that the number of 
people participating in this round was much larger than in the consultation performed by the 
Ministry of Justice. Additionally, Molon organized a number of public roundtables in 
Brasília, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto Alegre that included individuals like Amadeu, 
Caribé, Lemos, and Branco. These were aimed at generating feedback about the bill, but 
more importantly were meant to generate public support. Molon understood that 
demonstrating public support would be important to convincing legislators to pass the bill. 
This was especially true as powerful corporate lobbies, particularly the telecommunications 
sector, were already lining up against the central tenets of the bill. 
 
Figure 5. Online Platform for Online Consultation of the Marco Civil da Internet via Portal e-Democracia. 
 
 
After the consultation via the Portal e-Democracia was over, it was ultimately up to 
Molon and his advisors to decide what suggestions to incorporate. His office subsequently 
released a document that compared the text that emerged from the Ministry of Justice to the 
bill that he then presented to the Câmara dos Deputados. One of the most significant changes 
Molon made was to strengthen language relating to net neutrality, which he did based on 
feedback from activists online and in public meetings about the bill. Importantly, Molon’s 
version stated that the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee would be the arbiter of 
regulating the net neutrality components of the law. This guaranteed that issues of net 
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neutrality would be deliberated in a forum where Internet freedom activists had significant 
sway, as opposed to a government agency such as ANATEL, the Brazilian 
telecommunications regulatory agency, which many activists believed was beholden to 
corporate interests. Interestingly enough, while the mobilization against the Lei Azeredo 
revolved primarily around issues of surveillance and freedom of expression, the issue of net 
neutrality would soon take center stage. 
Conclusion 
 The activist mobilization that led to the creation of the Marco Civil da Internet and 
the collaborative, participatory methods used to write the bill demonstrate how forces in 
Brazilian society that were once channeled toward ending the military dictatorship are now 
focused on preserving the Internet as a democratic platform and guaranteeing access to the 
global network as a human right. While some of the activists like Amadeu and Branco were 
extremely politically active in the struggle for democracy in the early 1980s, the participation 
of other younger individuals like Caribé, Lemos, Almeida, and Molon shows how the values 
and practices of those earlier efforts have endured and are shaping contemporary Internet 
freedom activism in Brazil. The fact that the PT controlled the institutions of government 
created an environment amenable to this experiment in governo aberto. While critics of the 
law, and even some of the Internet freedom activists themselves, have since bemoaned the 
relatively low citizen participation rates, in fact, the Marco Civil da Internet was itself an 
experiment in new forms of democratic deliberation. Rather than holding the MCI process as 
the definitive model for future “hacking” of the legislative process, Amadeu, Branco, and 
others contend that it is part of a larger process to seek new ways to strengthen participatory 
democracy via digital technologies and the Internet. Amadeu has this to say about the 
creation of the bill: 
 
The proposal synthesized by the Ministry of Justice for the establishment of a civil 
rights framework for the Internet in Brazil is evidence that collaborative practices and 
online participation can improve the comprehension of topics and elevate the quality 
of democratic decisions. After opening a platform to hear, interact, and debate with 
society, the Ministry of Justice passed along a synthetic work that is extremely clear 
and that can be a global reference for national Internet legislation (Amadeu da 
Silveira 2010). 
 
This quote demonstrates activists’ approval of both the content of the MCI and the process 
through which it was created. Indeed, in 2010, when Amadeu wrote these words, there was 
still much hope that the bill would be quickly signed into law. 
 The story of the Marco Civil da Internet, however, did not end once it was drafted 
and sent to Congress. The fact that it included the input of so many citizens and organizations 
was not reason enough for legislators to quickly pass it into law. Indeed, there was fierce 
opposition to the bill by representatives with close ties to corporate interests. More 
surprisingly, even some high-level government officials in the Rousseff administration 
worked to undermine the bill as it was being debated in Congress, which demonstrated the 
deep divisions within the PT itself. This demonstrates that merely creating mechanisms of 
participation does not, by itself, lead to the enactment of policies produced through those 
ostensibly more democratic processes.  
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In The Myth of Digital, Hindman contends that there are a number of reasons why so-
called digital democracy initiatives do not live up to the hype. One of the central reasons for 
their lack of efficacy is failing to pay attention to the “the difference by speaking and by 
being heard” in terms of political debate: 
 
While it is true that citizens face few formal barriers to posting their views online, this 
is openness in the most trivial sense. From the perspective of mass politics, we care 
most not about who posts but about who gets read – and there are plenty of formal 
and informal barriers that hinder ordinary citizens’ ability to reach an audience 
(Hindman 2009:18).  
 
Indeed, barriers to participating in the online consultation of the MCI were relatively low. An 
individual only needed to have access to the Internet in order to participate. Yet, this did not 
mean that the legislators who would ultimately have to vote on the legislation ever actually 
paid much attention to the concerns of Brazilians who participated in the online consultation. 
In this way, online platforms for participation can often give the feeling of empowerment 
without actually empowering citizens. 
In the following chapter, I examine the fight over the Marco Civil da Internet in 
Congress, which was so fierce that it eventually ground Congress to a complete halt for over 
three months at the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014. I argue that this was the result of the 
open, participatory democratic process of the Marco Civil da Internet bumping up the 
opaque, back-room negotiations of a liberal democratic system that is overwhelmingly 
influenced by corporate interests. Ultimately, the “hacking” was successful in the limited 
sense that it produced an environment that was not corporate dominated in which to discuss 
Internet policy. However, whether this new form of citizen participation was successful at 
leading to concrete structural changes that would alter power structures in regard to 
developing Internet policy was still far from clear. Ultimately this shows that merely creating 
structures for citizen participation, online or offline, does not in and of itself lead to a more 
egalitarian distribution of power in society.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE BATTLE OVER THE MARCO CIVIL DA INTERNET IN THE LEGISLATURE 
 
 
At the end of January 2013, more than seven thousand geeks, technologists, and 
digital entrepreneurs from all over Brazil descended upon the Anhembi convention center in 
São Paulo for the weeklong, 24-hour technology festival, Campus Party Brasil (CPBr). The 
annual technology gathering was a mix of new technology showcase, programmer 
collaborative workspace, technology job fair, and video gameathon. The majority of the 
young participants camped out in a section of the convention center that had been converted 
into a campground for the event, which added to the party-like atmosphere of the gathering.13 
While the festival’s major sponsor was Telefónica – a Spanish telecommunications 
corporation—the conference served as an important organizing space for FOSS and Internet 
freedom activism, in large part because the organizers of the event were themselves FOSS 
and Internet freedom activists. Marcelo Branco, one of the co-founders of FISL had been the 
first director of CPBr when it launched in Brazil in 2008. After he stepped down in 2010, his 
friend Mario Teza, another FISL co-founder, took over the reins. Their leadership meant that 
over the years at CPBr, Internet policy was one of the central topics of discussion at panels 
and workshops. It was at the conference that opposition to the cybercrimes Lei Azeredo 
gained steam in 2008. Likewise, during the online consultation of the Marco Civil da Internet 
in 2009 and 2010, activists and government officials used the gathering to generate support 
and participation. Now, three years later, however, the Internet freedom bill was stalled in 
Congress and lacked crucial support from the new administration of President Rousseff. 
Thus, when I arrived at CPBr in January 2013 to begin a year of ethnographic research, I 
entered the field at a time in the Marco Civil da Internet’s legislative history when activists 
were frustrated by the absence of legislative progress and the seeming power of corporate 
interests, particularly the telecommunications lobby, to block the bill. Their efforts to use 
new mechanisms of participatory democracy to effect policy change had come up short.  
The disgruntlement among Internet freedom activists was visible at a panel discussion 
held on the main stage of the convention titled, O Marco Civil da Internet: uma lei que pode 
mudar sua vida na rede (The Marco Civil da Internet: A law that may change your life 
online), which was held on the main stage in the convention hall. Among the speakers was 
Guilherme Almeida, one of the lawyers from the Ministry of Justice, who helped manage the 
online consultation that resulted in the bill’s language. Almeida was joined by Demi 
Getschko – the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee member who helped establish the first 
Brazilian Internet connection in 1992, Manuela D’Ávila (PCdoB) – a young, technology-
savvy communist congresswoman, and lawyer Carlos Affonso Pereira de Souza – a 
representative from Ronaldo Lemos’ Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade. All of the panelists 
were prominent supporters of the MCI and each hoped that it would be brought up for a vote 
in Congress soon. In trying to explain why the bill had not yet been passed, D’Ávila argued 
                                                
13 Campus Party was first held in Málaga, Spain, in 1997 and has since expanded to other countries. It is 
organized by an NGO called Futura Networks and is financially supported by the Spanish telecommunications 
corporation, Telefónica. Campus Party Brasil was first held in São Paulo in 2008. 
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that the delay was not completely the fault of legislators, because the executive branch took 
two years to pass the bill on to the congress. She also noted that the bill is very technical and 
most of the legislators in Brasília had never dealt with such issues. Almeida talked about the 
importance of participação cidadão (citizen participation) in the creation of the bill and said 
that this process of online, digital collaboration, or “hacking,” was the embodiment of 21st 
century democracy. He was still optimistic that the bill would be voted on in the near future. 
Marcelo Branco and João Carlos Caribé, the blogger who helped start the Movimento 
Mega Não against the Lei Azeredo, were both sitting together in the front rows of the 
audience, and they were clearly unsatisfied with the tone of the discussion. Branco held up 
hand-made signs that read “#MarcoCivilJá!” (#MarcoCivilAlready!) and “Internet não é 
telecomunicações” (The Internet is not telecommunications). Caribé held one that read 
“#MarcoCivilJá!” and “O Brasil é dos brasileiros e não dos lobistas” (Brasil is for 
Brazilians and not for lobbyists). They held up these signs not because they disagreed with 
the positions of any of the speakers, in fact they largely supported them. Rather, they wanted 
to make explicit their sense of urgency and to directly call out the telecommunications lobby, 
which they felt was behind efforts to defeat the bill because of its net neutrality stipulations 
that the sector opposed. They knew that their signs would be photographed and be shared via 
social media and in the press. This they hoped would draw attention to the bill and spur 
action in Brasília. During the question and answer session, Branco took to the microphone 
and chastised the Rousseff administration and the PT more broadly for not backing the bill. 
At this point in time, the PT and its governing coalition controlled all three branches of 
government, which meant that if the party marshaled its political capital it could get the bill 
signed into law. This criticism coming from Branco, the longtime PT militant and the 
individual who coordinated Rousseff’s social media presence during her campaign for 
president in 2009, illustrated the rift that had opened up between the executive branch and 
many activists. Internet freedom activists no longer were so sure that the administration was 
on their side.  
The sentiments of Branco and Caribé were widespread at Campus Party Brasil 
among activists. Whereas just a couple of years before Internet freedom activists had 
successfully lobbied the executive branch to create an Internet freedom bill and then had 
been instrumental in the online, interactive method in which it was drafted, the promise of 
that participatory method leading to a more equitable and just legal framework had been left 
unfulfilled. In essence, their “hack” of the legislative process had yet to bear fruit and it 
appeared to them that corporate interests must have been blocking what they considered to be 
a democratic demand for the Marco Civil da Internet.  
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Figure 6. Activists protest at Campus Party Brasil in 2013. 
 
Marcelo Branco (left) and João Carlos Caribé (right) hold up signs at panel discussion about the Marco Civil da 
Internet at Campus Party Brasil in São Paulo in January 2013. Photo by Cristiano Sant’anna of indiciefoto. 
 
The Limits of Participatory Democracy 
 The creation of the MCI represented a victory for Internet freedom activists not only 
because the policies it included safeguarded an open Internet, but also because of how it was 
collaboratively drafted, in part, via an online web platform. In Chapter 3, I argued that this 
experiment in governo aberto was facilitated by the PT’s control of the federal government 
and the party’s history of supporting new forms of citizen participation. However, this 
support from the executive branch during Lula’s administration (2003-2010) evaporated 
when his successor Dilma Rousseff (PT) took power in 2011, and instituted ministerial level 
changes that strengthened the influence of corporate interests within the government. 
Likewise, when the executive branch forwarded the bill to the Brazilian congress for 
deliberation, it faced extremely strong opposition from politicians with close ties to the 
telecommunications sector. In this hostile environment, activists resorted to new mobilization 
efforts including street protests and online petitions to raise public awareness about the MCI 
and pressure policymakers to support the bill. Ultimately, the sustained work of these 
activists over a period of three years along with startling revelations of NSA surveillance that 
drew international attention to Internet policy created a political context in which the 
pioneering Internet freedom bill was passed and then signed into law by President Rousseff 
on April 23, 2014.  
In this chapter, I show how the logic of participatory democracy embodied in the 
creation of the MCI collided with the framework of a liberal democracy implemented in the 
mid-1980s in Brazil. By liberal democracy, I refer to a style of government that emerged in 
the 18th century in Europe and is based on Enlightenment ideals about individual liberty, 
equality, and the rule of law. Periodic elections in which voters select representatives are the 
primary mechanism through which citizens are understood to participate in governance 
decisions. This contrasts with systems of participatory democracy that attempt to increase the 
number of citizens who can take part in a meaningful way in decision-making and that seeks 
to increase the number of citizens and groups who have access to these processes. Drawing 
on the work of Santos and Avritzer (2007), I argue that liberal democracy, as currently 
constituted worldwide and in Brazil, is overwhelmingly dominated by elites and is closely 
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linked to neoliberal globalization because of the tremendous influence corporations have in 
the governance process. In other words, the open, transparent method of policy elaboration 
that encouraged citizen participation that was employed to draft the MCI bumped up against 
the traditional legislative process that includes back-room deals, political favors, and 
corporate lobbying. 
Scholars of participatory democracy institutions have noted how those arrangements, 
such as participatory budgeting forums and citizen’s health councils, effectively blur the 
boundaries between social movements and the state (Abers 1996; Baiocchi 2005). In his 
research on the neighborhood participatory budgeting initiatives in Porto Alegre in the 1990s, 
sociologist Gianpaolo Baiocchi argued that participatory democracy initiatives create an 
environment in which the state operated more like a social movement (2005). He asserted 
that social movement protests decreased in the wake of participatory budgeting not because 
social movements had demobilized in the city, but rather because social movements were 
finding new channels through which to give voice to their concerns and to actually affect 
public policy (Baiocchi 2005:xi–xii). Essentially, the participatory institutions reconfigured 
how demands were being made on the state. In contrast, the case of the MCI illustrates a 
reverse process in which activists were remobilizing as the channels of participation became 
blocked and proved to be ineffective. The failure of the online, participatory democracy 
experiment to change the law meant that activists were forced to revert to more traditional 
social movement tactics in order to command the attention of policymakers in Brazil’s liberal 
democratic system. 
In the subsequent section of this chapter, I examine how corporate influence in the 
Rousseff administration, and a general lack of interest in participatory democracy initiatives, 
resulted in the MCI being stalled in Congress. Then, I describe how a new cadre of young 
activists, who championed media democratization and who saw the Internet as the new 
battleground for debates about access to information, took on a prominent role in advocating 
for the MCI. Then, using material collected through participant-observation, interviews, and 
archival material, I describe the tactics activists used to combat corporate moves to alter the 
bill. Since they could no longer rely on the support of the executive branch, I argue that 
activists resorted to more traditional tactics such as street mobilizations, petitions, and 
meetings with policymakers to push their Internet freedom agenda.  
The MCI Sidelined: The Rousseff Administration and Corporate Influence within the 
Partido dos Trabalhadores 
The transition from the Lula administration to the Rousseff administration in 2011 
resulted in personnel changes at the ministerial level that created an openly hostile 
environment for the MCI. For many Internet freedom activists, this was somewhat 
unexpected given that Rousseff”s campaign presented her agenda as the continuation of 
Lula’s administrative agenda. Nonetheless, many of the individuals responsible for creating 
the MCI either left or were removed from their positions. Turnover at the Ministry of Justice 
meant that when Minister Tarso Genro left, so did the team of young, progressive lawyers in 
the Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos (Office of Legislative Affairs) including Almeida, 
Abramovay, and Rená. Under Rousseff’s administration, both the Ministry of Culture and the 
Ministry of Communications were headed by individuals with close corporate ties and who 
lobbied to have central components of the bill altered to make it more business friendly. 
Telecommunications companies were opposed to the bill’s net neutrality policies and media 
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corporations wanted to limit the bill’s impact on intellectual property law. Thus, from 2011 
until the middle of 2013, Internet freedom activists found themselves working to promote the 
bill in a context in which high-level members of the executive branch were trying to weaken 
or even outright scuttle the bill. While corporate pressure intensified during this period, it 
was not the only corporate lobbying that threatened the bill. Rousseff’s own political 
background and lack of interest in participatory democracy initiatives meant that she 
essentially ignored the bill entirely. Understanding her political background and the 
backgrounds of her ministers illuminates how the new political situation within the executive 
branch was an impediment to the goals of Internet freedom activists.  
Rousseff’s political trajectory was quite different from that of Lula, a member of the 
working class who cut his teeth as a metal workers union organizer in the late 1970s in São 
Paulo and was one of the primary leaders of the novo sindicalismo movement discussed in 
Chapter 2. In contrast, Rousseff is from an upper middle class, immigrant family from Belo 
Horizonte. Her political engagement began in the late 1960s when, as a college student, she 
became a member of the armed Marxist-Leninist guerilla organizations Comando de 
Libertação Nacional (COLINA) and Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares—VAR 
Palmares that fought to overthrow the military government. In 1970, she was arrested and 
tortured by the regime, and ultimately imprisoned for two years. She was released in 1972, 
but was stripped of all her political rights. She settled in Porto Alegre, and in 1979, when 
political parties were once again permitted and her political rights were restored, she helped 
found the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), a socialist democratic party that 
advocated for the type of pragmatic, state-led capitalism that she now endorsed. In the 1980s 
and 1990s the PDT faced off against the local PT, which under the leadership of individuals 
like Olívio Dutra and Tarso Genro, was innovating mechanisms of participatory democracy, 
such as participatory budgeting (Baiocchi 2005; Santos 1998). Rousseff left the PDT in 2000 
and joined the PT because she had become uncomfortable with the growing influence of 
neoliberalism within the PDT. At the time she switched parties in 2000, she was already 
serving as Secretary of the Secretaria Estadual de Energia, Minas e Comunicações (State 
Secretary of Energy, Mines, and Communications) in the PT administration of Olívio Dutra 
in the state of Rio Grande do Sul and switching parties was politically expedient. Lula then 
appointed her to lead the Ministry of Mines and Energy in the federal government before 
appointing her to be his chief of staff—one of the most influential cabinet-level positions in 
the Brazilian executive branch. She was a stern, technocratic foil to Lula’s charismatic and 
folksy character. Her election as president was largely because the immensely popular and 
term-limited Lula had handpicked her as his successor and actively campaigned for her. 
Thus, Rousseff did not emerge from the party’s base, never had close ties to social 
movements, and was not a member of the party when experiments with participatory 
democracy were first taking place in the 1980s and 1990s. Her top-down governing approach 
meant that initiatives like the MCI did not resonate with her. She was unengaged with the bill 
and left her ministers to take charge. Her ministers were largely opposed to the central 
tenants of the MCI, which proved to be an impediment to its passage.  
 Paulo Bernardo, the new Minister of Communications in the Rousseff administration, 
very quickly became one of the bill’s most high-profile critics since he sided with 
telecommunications corporations in opposing the net neutrality language in the MCI. 
Bernardo was known as an obedient and competent functionary who had congenial 
relationships with the business community. He became a member of the PT in the early days 
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of the party through his participation in the bank employee union in his home state of Paraná. 
Lula appointed Bernardo to the Ministry of Planning in 2005 after he served for a number of 
years as a PT representative in Congress. In 2011, Rousseff moved him to the Ministry of 
Communications where he promptly developed close ties to the telecommunications sector. 
In October 2012, the industry trade association Telebrasil named him the 
“Telecommunications Man of the Year” for the work he had done on behalf of the sector. 
Central to his advocacy for telecommunication interests was his opposition to net neutrality. 
For example, in an interview with a Brasília-based technology journal, Bernardo argued for 
weakening the net neutrality language in the bill. “The Internet is a massive business 
environment. This bill needs to be a bill that improves the business environment, not make it 
worse,” he said (Grossman and Queiroz 2012). Internet freedom activists unequivocally 
rejected the notion that the Internet is primarily a platform for business. Indeed, they saw 
their efforts as working to preserve the Internet as a space for creative and civic engagement 
that was not monopolized by corporate interests. Due to the way Bernardo attacked the 
concept of net neutrality in the press, activists including Branco and Caribé acrimoniously 
referred to him as the Ministro das Teles – the Minister of the Telecoms – as a way to 
illuminate the interests behind his positions.  
A change in leadership at the Ministry of Culture radically transformed it from a 
bastion for Internet freedom activists to one that aggressively opposed their cause. The new 
minister, Anna Maria Buarque de Hollanda (PT), halted the agenda of her predecessors 
Gilberto Gil and Juca Ferreira. The daughter of famous Brazilian historian Sergio Buarque de 
Hollanda and the sister of well-known Brazilian singer/songwriter Chico Buarque, Hollanda 
came from an elite Brazilian family. Because of her brother’s music career, she had close ties 
to large record labels and media companies. Upon taking her position, she immediately 
halted the ministry’s free culture, cultura digital, and FOSS initiatives, which were also 
opposed by large media and information technology companies. This included the high-
profile partnership with Creative Commons that Gil had championed. Many of the 
individuals working on these projects, including the individuals who helped create the 
CulturaDigital.br website used to conduct the online consultation for the MCI, found jobs 
outside the ministry. For activists, Hollanda became the representative for the so-called 
Indústria da Copyright in Rousseff’s administration. Hollanda left the Ministry in September 
2012 after a short but tumultuous tenure because her pro-corporate positions created a 
backlash among many artists. Nonetheless, in her relatively short time at the ministry, she 
effectively cleared it of all Internet freedom activists and their allies.  
The constellation of individuals who were now in positions of power in the Rousseff 
administration created an environment that was no longer conducive to the passage of the 
MCI. This began at the top because Rousseff had relatively little affinity for participatory 
democracy initiatives. While Rousseff herself had frosty ties with the Brazilian business 
community, the individuals she selected to oversee important ministries did have close ties to 
corporations and were actively lobbying on their behalf from within the administration. 
Rousseff’s cabinet selections, given their allegiances, effectively derailed the participatory 
goals of the MCI. This demonstrates how the PT’s original project of transforming the state 
to be more attentive to the needs of the working class and the politically excluded had stalled. 
The failure of the PT’s initial project to distribute power more broadly now put the MCI in 
jeopardy.  
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New Protagonists Take the Lead: Media Democratization Activists Take Center Stage  
 In spite of the waning support for the MCI in the executive branch, Brazilian Internet 
freedom activists pushed for the bill’s passage in the Chamber of Deputies where this bill’s 
sponsor, lawyer and former radio host Alessando Molon (PT), was working to convince the 
leaders of the chamber to allow a vote on the bill. He was optimistic and proclaimed in the 
press in early November 2012 that a vote was imminent. At this point, a new cluster of 
Internet freedom activists who were primarily motivated by a desire to radically transform 
the media sector took on an increasingly important role in organizing activists and setting the 
agenda. These young media activists were part of a longstanding left-wing movement to 
break apart the large, family-controlled media corporations (e.g., Globo, Grupo Abril, Grupo 
Folha, etc.) that dominated Brazil. In particular, these activists were concerned about new 
language Molon inserted in the bill—at the request of Ana de Hollanda’s replacement at the 
Ministry of Culture and former São Paulo mayor, Marta Suplicy (PT)—that stipulated that 
removal of content online did not apply to cases of copyright infringement. This new 
language would essentially perpetuate the prevailing notice-and-takedown regime in which 
websites tend to immediately remove content whenever a claim is made that material 
infringes copyright, even if that claim is not valid. This means that oftentimes political 
dissent or innovative creative works are removed from websites because of frivolous 
copyright claims. In an open letter to Molon, activists stated the danger of the inclusion of 
this language in the bill in this way: 
 
Giving room to the interpretation that judicial review is not necessary for the removal 
of content that violates copyright, the language creates the risk that judicial review 
will be dispensed with . . . Thus, a simple notification may be sufficient for the 
providers to withdraw the content for fear of being blamed, even if no illegality is 
found. A trial will not be done by the courts, but by the provider itself, in a private 
capacity, creating a situation of censorship, which is unconstitutional . . . In short, this 
endangers freedom of expression on the Internet for the benefit of private interests 
(IDEC et al. 2012). 
 
The private interests that they referred to were those of copyright holders, namely large 
media corporations, who they felt used copyright enforcement as a way to censor criticism 
and opposing viewpoints. In an interview about the public letter, Pedro Ekman, one of the 
media activists from the NGO Intervozes, said that the inclusion of this new language in the 
bill made it “clear that Globo and other corporations won a battle in terms of the question of 
copyright” (Artigo 15 Do Marco Civil Gera Insegurança Jurídica, Avaliam Entidades 2012). 
In the letter, which had the support of Amadeu and Caribé among other individuals and 
organizations, activists asked Molon to remove this language, which he did. The bill, 
however, did not come up for a vote as Molon was unable to marshal enough support in the 
chamber given opposition from telecommunications corporations and large media. Internet 
freedom activists did not have enough support in the legislature to command the agenda.  
Concerns about copyright and intellectual property among activists were not new. 
Indeed, Professor Sergio Amadeu had been railing against the Indústria da Copyright for 
years. However, as the Internet became an ever more important platform for accessing all 
sorts of news and media (newspapers, television, film, radio, etc.), individuals concerned 
with the corrosive effects of corporate media domination came to see the Internet as a way to 
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potentially bypass the centralizing control of corporations. For these media activists, the 
decentralized nature of the network created space for a diversity of opinions and perspectives 
that are not always tolerated by large media conglomerates. Three important individuals who 
found their way to supporting the MCI via their media activism were Pedro Ekman and Bia 
Barbosa from Intervozes and Veridiana Alimonti from the Instituto Brasileiro de Defensa do 
Consumidor (IDEC, the Brazilian Institute for Consumer Defense). Together with Amadeu, 
Caribé, Lemos, Branco and others, they become some of the most prominent promoters of 
the MCI in 2013 and 2014, helping to organize activists and guide the legislative agenda. I 
interviewed each of them individually during the course of my fieldwork in 2013. A brief 
discussion of the background of the three individuals demonstrates the ways in which issues 
involving Internet freedom had spread beyond the confines of traditional techie circles such 
as FOSS militants and science and technology researchers. 
Ekman and Barbosa were both trained as journalists at the Universidade de São Paulo 
in the early 2000s, where they both became active in the student movement on campus. In 
particular, given their interest in journalism, they were drawn to the longstanding struggle to 
reform the Brazilian media sector—a struggle that goes back more than 30 years to the 
redemocratization period of the mid-1980s. The objective of media activists like Ekman and 
Barbosa was to reduce the concentration of media control in the hands of a small number of 
corporations and families. This included curbing the power of large Brazilian media 
corporations, such as Grupo Globo, Grupo Abril, and Grupo Folha, as well as breaking 
regional media monopolies often held by politicians or elite, politically connected families. 
Given that the current media configuration in Brazil was put into place during the 
dictatorship, and because in many cases the media were complicit in propping up the regime 
and working to maintain elite control of the government, both Ekman and Barbosa articulated 
their efforts as attempts to “democratizar a mídia” – to democratize the media. It is their 
belief that true democracy could not truly exist in Brazil without a democratization of the 
media. In 2003, Barbosa was one of the founders of Intervozes, an NGO that would continue 
the efforts of the student movement to “create public systems of communication that are 
strong” and to create public policies that instantiate the notion that “the right to 
communication is a human right.” Ekman worked for a couple years as a video producer at a 
large media company before joining Intervozes. In our interview in 2013 in the NGO’s small 
São Paulo office, he stated that what made Intervozes different from other media activist 
organizations and why the organization had become so involved in the struggle over the MCI 
was that the NGO had a very broad concept of communications that was not restricted to just 
radio, television, and newspapers. For him, the “convergência digital” (digital convergence) 
– the convergence of media, information technology, and telecommunications – meant that 
Internet policy was increasingly central to all discussions about communication policy.  
Alimonti was a young lawyer at IDEC in São Paulo who had also attended the 
Universidade de São Paulo. As a student there in the mid-2000s, she had also become active 
in the student movement and grew familiar with the work of Intervozes. Her expertise in her 
program at the university was in the area of telecommunications, and after graduating she 
began working at IDEC with a portfolio including issues relating to telecommunications and 
Internet policy. Her predecessor at IDEC had participated in the movement against the Lei 
Azeredo and the creation of the MCI, and so she continued and expanded his work. In 
particular, she became involved in a large, multi-organization campaign called Banda Larga 
é Direito Seu (Broadband is your right), which attempted to get the Brazilian government to 
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make fast and affordable high-speed Internet access available to all Brazilians. Because of 
her work on this campaign, Alimonti ran for and was elected to the board of the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee as a representative of the non-profit sector in 2012. This 
position gave her a high-profile institutional perch from which to raise issues of Internet 
policy. For Alimonti, the MCI was important because it would determine what type of 
Internet access was available to citizens. Universal access would not be as meaningful if the 
Internet people could access was completely corporately controlled.  
In their capacities at Intervozes and IDEC, Ekman, Barbosa, and Alimonti gained 
experience lobbying policymakers, organizing activist networks, and analyzing public policy 
and legislation. It is important to note that while they were some of the most engaged 
activists at this point in terms of organizing, they were part of a much larger network of one 
hundred or so individuals who actively followed the progress of the MCI and participated in 
different capacities. Arguably, what separated these three individuals from many others was 
that they had organizational platforms that allowed them to focus their efforts on political 
mobilization. This gave them the time and resources to focus on coordinating the 
geographically scattered constellation of activists who were connected via email listservs and 
social media, and who came together periodically at conferences and activist meetings. The 
increased role of these individuals who were concerned about media democratization 
indicates how issues concerning Internet freedom now gained attention among groups not 
specifically focused on the Internet policy, but who shared much broader democratization 
goals that involved diminishing the power of private corporations. 
Cybercrimes – The Lei Azeredo Repackaged and the Lei Carolina Dieckmann 
 Throughout 2012, Rousseff’s administration continued to hold a hostile position in 
regard to the MCI. This made bringing the bill up for a vote in Congress incredibly difficult 
even though both chambers of congress were controlled by the allied governing coalition and 
typically worked closely with the administration to set the legislative agenda. Without 
pressure from the administration, however, there was little incentive for the leaders of the 
parties to bring the MCI up for a vote. Furthermore, in order for the coalition to bring a bill to 
debate, the leaders of all 10 parties in the ideologically diverse governing coalition needed to 
agree to bring it to the floor. This arrangement gave a great deal of veto power to individual 
political parties. Parties allied with corporate interests that opposed the bill could block 
debate without even having to vote against the legislation. This allowed them to stall the bill 
indefinitely. Activists understood this stalling tactic to be central to the strategy of corporate 
lobbies. As Caribé told me during an interview, the maintenance of the status quo without the 
MCI was essentially a victory for corporations. 
More ominously for activists, at the end of 2012 and beginning of 2013, Rousseff 
signed into law two cybercrimes bills. The media referred to the first of the two laws as the 
Lei Carolina Dieckmann (Carolina Dieckmann’s Law) after a famous blonde Globo 
television actress, Carolina Dieckmann, whose nude photos were retrieved from her cell 
phone and email account and published on the Internet. When the news of the photos broke 
in May 2012, her high-profile status drew nationwide attention. The media attention created 
pressure for the legislature to act, and activists knew that a hastily created cybercrimes bill 
could have significant, long-term, negative repercussions not fully understood by lawmakers 
in the heat of the moment. Two of the Internet freedom activists’ strongest supporters in 
Congress, Manuela D’Ávila (PCdoB) and Paulo Teixeira (PT), went on the defensive by 
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stepping forward to draft the final version of the bill, which created severe penalties for 
illegally accessing digital devices. The fact that these two individuals who had long 
advocated for the passage of the MCI would draft a cybercrimes bill at first glance seemed 
perplexing. However, as D’Ávila told me in an interview, the two felt that they would have a 
better chance of watering the bill down in the process of drafting it than they would later on 
when it was debated on the chamber floor. She contended that they had succeeded and that 
the final law was much less dangerous than what would have potentially been passed had 
other, less progressive legislators been in charge of shepherding the bill through Congress.  
The second cybercrimes law Rousseff signed was a modified version of the 
cybercrimes Lei Azeredo. While activist mobilization had successfully halted the bill in 2009, 
Azeredo (PSDB) continued reworking the bill and finally limited its scope to phishing, which 
referred to an illegal attempt to elicit sensitive information (e.g., passwords, credit card 
numbers, etc.) by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in electronic communication. 
Phishing was of particular concern to banks because criminals used this strategy to trick 
patrons into disclosing account information, which was then used to siphon money from 
those accounts. Azeredo had close ties to the banking sector that stemmed from his period as 
governor of the state of Minas Gerais, when he oversaw the privatization of a number of 
publicly owned banks. Internet activists felt that the bill had been so significantly altered that 
it no longer posed a significant threat to Internet freedom because it specifically targeted 
what was clearly criminal behavior. Nonetheless, it was disheartening for them to see more 
progress on the cybercrimes bill that had sparked their mobilization, while the MCI was 
stalled in the legislature.  
When I interviewed Ronaldo Lemos, the legal scholar who first suggested the concept 
of an Internet rights bill, he told me that the passage of the Lei Azeredo in its modified form 
was a “betrayal” by the government. This was because when Lula first backed the idea of the 
MCI in 2009 at FISL, he endorsed the activists’ belief that a civil law outlining Internet 
rights should be passed before a penal law defining Internet crimes. Now, the administration 
of his handpicked successor, Rousseff, who had been at his side when he made this 
announcement in 2009, had reneged on Lula’s promise. Lemos said that activists always 
knew getting the MCI passed in Congress would be difficult, but they initially hoped 
congressman Molon would be successful in convincing party leaders to allow the MCI to 
reach the floor for a vote by arguing that all Internet bills – the MCI and cybercrimes bills – 
should be voted on at the same time. This, they hoped, would give them leverage by 
essentially packaging the bills together. However, the Partido do Movimento Democrático 
Brasileiro (PMDB), the largest party in the governing coalition, blocked this proposal 
because it opposed the net neutrality language of the bill. In effect, the Rousseff 
administration and its allied governing coalition in Congress demonstrated no interest in 
pursuing the agenda of the Internet freedom activists. Quite the contrary, now cybercrimes 
bills – the very things that activists had fought so hard to prevent – were easily and quickly 
passed into law. The national discussion about Internet policy had been essentially hijacked.  
The failure to even be able to bring the MCI up for a vote after years of discussion 
about the bill created a great sense of frustration among activists. It was this frustration that 
was on display at the Campus Party Brasil when Branco and Caribé publicly criticized the 
lack of government action. However, beginning in June 2013, two important events – one 
global and one national – would refocus attention on Internet policy and on Brazilian 
democracy. Edward Snowden’s revelations about NSA mass surveillance ignited a global 
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debate about Internet policy and governance, while massive street protests in Brazil drew 
attention to a democratic system that was not living up to the expectations of its citizens. In 
tandem, these two events reanimated Brazilian Internet freedom activists and dramatically 
altered the political environment to their advantage. 
NSA Mass Surveillance: Edward Snowden and the Internet in the Spotlight 
On June 5, 2013, Glenn Greenwald, a Rio de Janeiro-based American journalist 
published in the British newspaper The Guardian the first article about leaked US National 
Security Agency (NSA) materials that former US intelligence operative Edward Snowden 
provided him (2013). The article revealed how the US telecommunications company Verizon 
Communications was providing the metadata of all calls on its network to the NSA. It was 
the first in a long stream of articles based on the leaked documents that exposed the massive 
NSA surveillance system, which relied both on corporate collusion in collecting data as well 
as clandestine tapping of the international telecommunications network. The revelations 
about NSA mass surveillance focused global attention on Internet policy because of the ways 
that telecommunications technologies were used to collect and monitor individuals 
worldwide. The news caused an international shockwave and drew widespread attention to 
ways that the US government was secretly using the Internet for surveillance and espionage, 
ostensibly in the name of fighting terrorism. While Snowden’s identity was initially kept 
secret, as soon as he revealed himself in a television interview with Greenwald from his hotel 
room in Hong Kong, he became one of the most wanted individuals by the US government, 
which ultimately charged him with espionage and forced him to seek political asylum in 
Russia (Poitras 2014). The effect of the NSA revelations was to discredit the US 
government’s discourse on human rights and Internet freedom, which had been a central 
talking point of the US State Department during the initial years of the Obama administration 
(Morozov 2011). Particularly damning was the fact that there was essentially no democratic 
oversight over the surveillance programs since Obama administration officials lied under 
oath to Congress about the existence of such surveillance of US citizens and foreign 
nationals. In short, US policy did not match its practice. 
For many Brazilian Internet freedom activists, the existence of US Internet 
surveillance was not shocking. Indeed, individuals like Sergio Amadeu had been warning 
people about the dangers of both government surveillance and the amount of data that private 
corporations were amassing about individuals in large data centers. The NSA leaks simply 
provided concrete evidence that substantiated their fears. Indeed, the collusion between the 
NSA and large US-based information technology companies, which was referred to as the 
PRISM program by the NSA, was particularly significant to Brazilian activists. Early in the 
Lula administration, when Amadeu was leading efforts in the federal government to switch to 
FOSS, he had argued that the Brazilian government should not use proprietary software, 
including Microsoft products, because there was no way to inspect the source code and 
confirm the software was secure. The Snowden revelation proved his fears were well 
founded as it was revealed that Microsoft had worked with the NSA to create “backdoors” in 
hardware and software to facilitate NSA access of information that clients, such as the 
Brazilian government, had been told was secure.  
The news about NSA mass surveillance alarmed the Brazilian government officials, 
including President Rousseff. The Brazilian government relied on a number of Microsoft 
software products, which meant that the NSA could easily access Brazilian government 
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materials. Likewise, because the vast majority of Brazilian Internet traffic passed through 
computer servers in the US, the NSA had the capability to easily monitor the vast majority of 
Brazilian Internet activity. President Rousseff declared in an interview with a science and 
technology reporter that her administration would reexamine the MCI in light of the NSA 
revelations:  
 
We are going to revise the Marco Civil da Internet because one of the questions we 
need to observe is where data is stored, because many times the data is stored outside 
of Brazil, principally by Google. We want obligatory storage of data of Brazilians in 
Brazil. And we will revise to see what can be done to better guarantee privacy 
(Grossman 2013). 
 
The notion that data being stored in Brazil would be safer and harder for the NSA to intercept 
was actually somewhat naïve given the nature of a decentralized, global network. However, 
this sentiment shows how Internet policy was now seen through a new geopolitical light in 
which a nationalist discourse about technological control and sovereignty was increasingly 
apparent. Most importantly, the Snowden leaks brought attention back to Internet policy and 
reminded people of the ways that the Internet could be used to violate civil liberties. 
The revelations about NSA mass surveillance broke just a couple of weeks before 
FISL in July 2013. By the time activists gathered in Porto Alegre, Edward Snowden was 
already developing into a hero among Brazilian Internet freedom activists. At the conference 
Amadeu and Caribé gave a panel presentation titled A internet sob ataque… a batalha final é 
agora (The Internet Under Attack…The Final Battle is Now) in which they discussed the 
effects of the recent news. They began their presentation by showing a short clip from an 
interview done with Snowden by documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras while he was still 
holed up in a hotel room in Hong Kong. In the clip Snowden elaborated on how the NSA was 
operating without any democratic oversight and how this was a threat to civil liberties 
worldwide. At the conference, activists first mentioned the idea of trying to get the Brazilian 
government to offer political asylum to Snowden, who had fled to the Moscow airport and 
whose status was in political limbo as the US government rescinded his passport and tried to 
have him returned to the country to face espionage charges. Edward Snowden’s case brought 
into relief the extent to which the US was using the Internet as a tool to maintain global 
hegemony. For Brazilian activists this demonstrated the potential power of digital 
technologies, and why creating a more just, democratic system of governance over the 
Internet was so important. The virtually simultaneous wave of massive protests in Brazil that 
were organized in large part via social media further highlighted what Internet freedom 
activists considered to be fundamental flaws in the Brazilian democratic system. 
Jornadas de Junho – Democracy in the Streets and the Political System in Question  
In early June 2013, a massive and unprecedented series of street protests spread 
across Brazil. Over the course of the month, millions of citizens poured into city centers and 
closed main thoroughfares during the evening rush hour to voice their disapproval of the 
national status quo. There were no clear issues that united protestors, although issues relating 
to access to social services (education, healthcare, transportation, etc.) and combatting 
corruption were popular themes. The mass demonstrations, which came to be collectively 
known at the jornadas de junho (days of June), were initially sparked by a number of small 
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protests in a handful of Brazilian cities organized by the left-wing activist collective, 
Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), which was protesting the rise of the cost of public 
transportation while calling for a completely free public transportation system. At one such 
protest in downtown São Paulo on June 13, 2013, which I attended while conducting research 
in São Paulo, the police used violent, urban counter-insurgency tactics to disband the 
protestors. In the process, they injured a number of protestors as well as journalists covering 
the protest. This police violence created a popular backlash among the middle class in São 
Paulo and throughout Brazil. This motivated more than a million people across the country to 
participate in the next protest on June 17th. Whereas the mainstream media had previously 
disparaged the bus-fare protestors as anarchist hooligans, they promptly embraced the 
increasingly white, middle class youth who now composed a significant portion of the 
protesters who filled the streets. The issues raised by protesters also expanded to include 
middle class concerns like lack of investment in public education, an inadequate healthcare 
system, political corruption, and the enormous costs of hosting mega events like the 
upcoming 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, whose concrete benefits to 
society were unclear. The political views of protestors ran the gamut from left-wing social 
justice advocates to fascists who called for the return of the military dictatorship. The lack of 
any central organization meant that no specific demands for change were ever created and 
politicians struggled to figure out how to respond given that there were no clear leaders. 
Ultimately, the issues and views of the protestors were diverse and sometimes contradictory, 
but clearly millions of Brazilians were unhappy with the current state of affairs in the 
country. 
The political class (politicians, civil servants, and members of the judiciary) was one 
of the symbolic targets of protestors. For example, at the protest in Brasília on the night of 
June 17th, thousands of protestors converged on the grassy mall in front of the Brazilian 
National Congress, which is lined by government ministries. They waded into the reflecting 
pool in front of Congress holding signs and chanting. Hundreds even managed to overwhelm 
security and climb to the roof of the building. The image of the shadows of protestors on the 
white modernist, inverted dome that houses the Chamber of Deputies became one of the 
iconic images of the protests. 
 
Figure 7. Brazilian protestors climb on top of the National Congress in Brasília 
 
On June 17, 2013, protestors in Brasília converge on the National Congress and climb onto the building’s roof. 
Photo by Valter Campanato from Agência Brasíl. 
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For many Internet freedom activists, the protests across the country represented a 
desire by Brazilian citizens to have their voice heard. In essence, the fact that the masses 
needed to turn to the streets to make demands on the state was evidence of a political system 
that was broken and in need of rejuvenation. For example, on June 20 FOSS activist Marcelo 
Branco connected the Brazilian street protests to the Arab Spring, the Indignados movement 
in Spain, and Occupy Wall Street (OWS) at a roundtable about the protests that I 
accompanied online via video streaming; the roundtable was organized by the Gabinete 
Digital, the state of Rio Grande do Sul’s office of digital participation. Drawing heavily on 
sociologist Manuel Castell’s (2013) work on contemporary social uprisings, Branco argued 
that these movements are distinct in that they are not party- or union-led and are thus 
horizontal and leaderless. This, he contended, meant that they did not have short-term, 
electoral motivations, but were seeking deeper change, even if they did not know exactly 
what that looked like:  
 
The agenda of these protestors in the network society, of the nativos digitais (digital 
natives) who are the protagonists at this moment, is a long-term agenda. It is an 
agenda of structural change, an agenda to change the political system. 
 
The long-time union activist and PT militant was not arguing that old institutions like 
political parties and unions would become meaningless, but rather that the protests were the 
rumblings of desire to restructure institutions in such a way that gives members the capability 
to more actively participate. For him, new digital platforms and governo aberto initiatives 
like the MCI represented such a solution. In essence, the protests reaffirmed Internet freedom 
activists’ belief about the potential for new digital technologies to facilitate democratic 
participation. 
Activists also pointed to the novel ways in which social media and the Internet had 
been used to organize the protests and share political opinions. For example, the viral spread 
of videos of police violence on social media provoked hundreds of thousands to take to the 
streets on June 13. Citizens also used social media platforms to document the protests 
through commentary, photos, and videos. In many ways, protestors became independent 
citizen journalists who were bypassing the filter of the mainstream media. The use of these 
technologies, however, also posed a threat to protestors. Police forces who claimed to be 
battling dangerous “foreign and anarchist elements” also attempted to use these new 
technologies as a way to monitor activists and demanded that social media corporations 
reveal the identities and locations of users whom the police felt posed a threat. Indeed, the 
reliance on social media websites owned by corporations (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, Google) 
meant that even if traditional media, like radio and television, were no longer the only 
channels through which information was disseminated to the masses, the spread of 
information was still subject to being filtered by corporations. Thus, the protests once again 
shed a light on how the Internet and digital technologies could either be used as a platform 
for democratic mobilization or a mechanism for citizen surveillance.  
In this context, the MCI became doubly important for activists. First, they believed 
that the participatory way in which the bill was created represented a model for the new 
forms of democratic participation that would address the desire to restructure old political 
structures that were no longer meeting the demands of the societies they governed. Second, 
activists felt that the MCI would preserve the Internet as an open platform for civic 
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engagement. This was something that was essential for a democratic and socially just society. 
Activists decided to take advantage of the political moment in Brazil in which all 
components of Brazilian social and political life were being examined in order to bring the 
issue of Internet freedom to the fore. They did so by taking to the streets and incorporating 
their objectives into the larger demands of the street protests. 
Na Rua e na Rede – On the Street and Online 
Many Internet freedom activists had themselves taken part in the street protests that 
erupted at the beginning of June. The police repression of demonstrators outraged them and 
exposed the extent to which their dreams of democratization were still unfulfilled. In 2008 
and 2009 during the movement to stop the Lei Azeredo, activists had staged public protests – 
atos or manifestações – such tactics were often relatively small and took place inside 
government buildings, like the national congress or state assembly buildings. However, in 
2013 and 2014, inspired by the massive street marches, activists in São Paulo did something 
that was novel for Internet freedom activists worldwide – they took to the streets to broadcast 
their demands. For activists such as Amadeu who had taken part in the pro-democracy 
Direitas Já (Direct Elections Now) street protests in 1984, this type of public demonstration 
was a time-tested method of social movements in Brazil. New digital technologies, like 
social media, had altered the techniques activists were using to gain attention for their causes; 
yet, Internet freedom activists found that virtual activism was not in itself effective. Thus, 
they decided to combine street protests with online mobilizations. They referred to this 
complimentary, hybrid tactic as ativismo na rua e na rede – activism online and on the 
streets. 
The first such action took place on the night of June 25, 2013 when Amadeu, Ekman, 
Alimonti, and others organized the Assembléia Popular Contra a Manipulação da Mídia e 
em Defesa da Internet Livre (Popular Assembly Against Media Manipulation and in Defense 
of a Free Internet) in São Paulo. Sergio Amadeu promoted the event on his Facebook page 
this way:  
 
We are going . . . to discuss the democratization of communications, liberty on the 
Internet, and the ways to denounce the distorted discourse in defense of unbridled 
economic power that is practiced by the media.  
 
We are going to join our forces against the attempts by the Minister of 
Communication to turn over control of the Internet to telecommunication 
corporations. The large telecommunications companies, the same ones that charge the 
highest prices for telephone access in the world, want the power to filter the Internet 
to turn it into a TV-cable network.  
 
An Internet livre bothers many people. It bothers Globo and Veja and their attempts 
to manipulate information. It bothers repression, because any citizen can film anti-
citizen aggression and upload it onto a social network. It bothers corrupt people who 
do not want transparency in the government. 
 
We are going to discuss the Marco Civil da Internet… because if Globo and the Teles 
(telecommunication companies) block the approval of the Marco Civil da Internet, a 
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normal citizen will have less power to denounce, discuss, inform themselves, 
entertain themselves, in short, to communicate freely (Amadeu da Silveira 2013). 
 
Starting around dusk, hundreds of protestors, who had been mobilized via social media, 
packed the plaza beneath the Museu de Arte de São Paulo (MASP) along the iconic Avenida 
Paulista—the boulevard that passes through Brazil’s most important financial district. The 
location was symbolic because shutting down Avenida Paulista had been a goal of the initial 
bus-fare protestors of early June because of the media attention that would be generated by 
blocking the avenue. While protestors this day never intended to block off the street, they did 
want to make their presence physically known. As the sun went down, activists used mobile 
digital projectors to project the words #marcocivil and Você sabe quem invade seu 
computador? (Do you know who is invading your computer?) They covered over the street-
side billboards with posters that read, A Internet é Livre! (The Internet is Free!). These urban 
interventions were intended to capture the attention of people walking to metro stations or in 
their cars headed home. The event was broadcast live on the Internet by the independent 
media group Mídia Ninja. This meant that people who were not in São Paulo on that day, 
including myself, could still participate virtually in the protest by watching it live. 
Participants were encouraged to document their presence on social media by posting photos, 
videos, and commentary. 
The event was not merely meant to rally the faithful, but also to generate new 
supporters. In particular, activists wanted to attract young people, Branco’s nativos digitais, 
who had recently been politically activated by the street protests. Protest planners envisioned 
a teach-in format. This was a natural fit for Amadeu, the university professor known for 
impassioned speeches that succinctly expounded on the issues at stake. A small stage was 
created in the middle of the plaza where individuals used a megaphone to speak to the crowd. 
Alimonti, Ekman, and Amadeu talked about the three principal threats to the Internet and 
how the MCI addressed these menaces. Up first was Alimonti who explained the concept of 
net neutrality, which she described as “the heart” of the Internet. She argued that abandoning 
this policy, as telecommunications companies wanted, would “change the Internet as we 
know it,” essentially turning it into a system comparable to cable television, which would be 
controlled by a few powerful corporations. Ekman spoke about how the MCI protects 
freedom of expression by mandating judicial review to remove content and how important a 
law governing Internet policy is in a digital age because, “who controls Internet cables is 
going to control all the communication in the world.” Amadeu gave a fiery speech about the 
threats to privacy and the recently revealed collusion between the NSA and American 
corporations (Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, etc.) to surveil Internet users worldwide. He 
proclaimed:  
 
A free country depends on free communication and without the MCI that will not 
happen… The large telecommunications corporations and the copyright industry 
know that communication and culture will be increasingly digitized and they are 
acting to defend their strictly economic interests. 
 
At the core of all three speakers’ arguments was that corporations were attempting to alter 
the Internet to increase profits. In protest, they argued that the MCI would serve to protect the 
Internet as a space for artistic and civic engagement.  
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A large photo of Edward Snowden was sporadically projected onto the façade of the 
art museum during the protest. The former NSA operative was quickly becoming a hero to 
Brazilian Internet freedom activists such as Amadeu who mentioned Snowden in his speech. 
Just as these activists had become reenergized by the democratic protests in Brazil, the 
information Snowden provided raised fundamental concerns about the way the security 
apparatus of a supposedly democratic state, the US, was operating essentially without 
democratic oversight. Furthermore, corporations were actively colluding in what amounted to 
the violation of human rights, such as the right to privacy. Ultimately, the information 
Snowden revealed and its particular impact in Brazil would change the political context in 
such a way that activists would help secure the passage of the MCI.  
The Return of the Marco Civil da Internet 
 In the wake of the revelations about NSA mass surveillance, which began in June 
2013, Internet freedom activists realized that the political terrain had shifted in Brasília, 
particularly within the Rousseff administration. Activist discussions about strategy picked up 
significantly on their email listserv. Congressman Molon’s office also reengaged and began 
more strongly pressuring for action in the Congress on the legislation. Increasingly activists 
were convinced that the MCI would be passed in some form. However, they were unsure 
what alterations the administration would make in order to secure its passage. They knew 
that the administration wanted to score a symbolic victory, but at what cost? They were 
concerned about back-room deals and concessions the administration would make during its 
passage. At this point, the political process was opaque and largely inaccessible to activists; it 
was the antithesis of the open, transparent process that they had promoted in the creation of 
the bill itself.  
 Not surprisingly, the telecommunications lobby, led by the industry association 
SindiTeleBrasil, which represents telecoms like Telefónica/Vivo, Oi, Claro, and GVT among 
others, proved to be the biggest threat to the MCI. They had a strong ally in Congress, 
Congressman Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), who was the leader of his party in the chamber. The 
goal of the telecommunication corporations was to remove or disfigure the net neutrality 
stipulations in the bill. Given that the Minister of Communications, Paulo Bernardo, had 
previously sided with the telecoms, activists were concerned that the Rousseff administration 
would cave to the sector, which also happened to be one of its largest political campaign 
contributors. Likewise, activists were apprehensive about whether or not Molon would 
succumb to political pressure. They were unsure whether he would steadfastly defend net 
neutrality if push came to shove. A number of amendments to the bill had already been 
introduced in the legislature that would essentially gut the bill in activists’ opinion. A last 
minute move during the debates by a skilled politician could have led to the passage of a bill, 
but an utter defeat for activists. Activists were on the outside looking in and had to trust that 
Molon, a politician with few historic links to Internet freedom activists, would stand up for 
the principles of the bill when push came to shove. 
Tension between activists and Molon boiled over on August 10, 2013, at CONSEGI, 
a conference in Brasília sponsored by the state-owned informatics corporation SERPRO that 
promotes the use of free software. Molon sat on a panel along with Amadeu and Ekman to 
discuss the current state of the MCI in the legislature. When Amadeu and Ekman were given 
a chance to speak after Molon, they both aggressively pressed him on news that he had once 
again inserted notice-and-takedown language in the bill, allegedly at the request of the media 
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conglomerate Grupo Globo. Amadeu claimed that this language was inserted na calada da 
noite – in the “dead of the night” – which indicated how corporate interests bypass public, 
democratic discussion in order to achieve their objectives. Molon contended that he inserted 
this language at the request of the Ministry of Culture. Globo’s indirect power was seemingly 
exerted through the ministry, reaffirming activists’ belief that corporations had undue 
influence in the Rousseff administration. Molon argued that there were so many enemies of 
the MCI that strategically it made more sense to make some changes in order to diminish 
resistance from different sectors that might result in a complete blocking of the bill. He 
argued that the mainstream media’s ability to influence lawmakers was something that 
should not be underestimated. Nonetheless, Molon agreed to review this decision in light of 
the fact that activists had indicated they could not support a bill that included a notice-and-
takedown policy. 
During the question and answer session, a longtime digital inclusion activist from São 
Paulo, Béa Tiribiça, stood up in the audience and fiercely demanded that Molon share with 
activists the language of what she called “his” bill, which was now circulating among 
legislators in Congress. This phrasing indicated the frustration of activists, who were 
concerned about deals lawmakers and policymakers where making that were not shared with 
the public. Her comments illustrated how activists now had considerably less leverage to 
influence the development of the bill. Molon said he would share the latest version of the bill 
and he urged activists to continue pressuring lawmakers and the administration. He declared 
that he was not willing to make any concessions in terms of net neutrality. However, given 
what had happened with notice-and-takedown, activists like Tiribiça were apprehensive.  
On September 1, 2013, a bombshell revelation hit that would even more radically 
shift the Brazilian debate on Internet freedom. The highly watched television newsmagazine, 
Fantástico on the Globo network, ran a segment co-produced by Glenn Greenwald based on 
the Snowden leaks that revealed that the NSA had wiretapped the personal phone of 
President Rousseff and had recorded her conversations. The segment also revealed that the 
US had conducted espionage on the state oil company, Petrobrás, and the Ministry of 
Mining. This sent shockwaves through the political class in Brasília and was front-page news 
across Brazil. President Rousseff was reportedly outraged by the surveillance conducted by a 
country that was supposedly an ally. Despite a personal call from President Obama to 
apologize, a little over two weeks later, on September 17th, Rousseff cancelled a long-planned 
official state visit to the US. By chance, I was at the US embassy in Brasília presenting some 
of my initial findings when the news broke. US diplomats at the Embassy in Brasília were 
shocked Rousseff had decided to cancel the visit and scrambled to deal with the political 
fallout from her decision. 
These revelations immediately triggered intense interest about the MCI by the 
president’s office. While none of the components of the MCI would in themselves protect 
against the type of mass surveillance being done by the NSA, the vision of an Internet livre 
and the rights of Internet users encapsulated in the bill represented a stark contrast to the 
practices of the NSA. The bill became a symbol of the alternative, ostensibly more 
democratic path that the Rousseff administration decided to embrace as a rebuke to US 
policy. 
As activists pressured congressman Molon, they also worked to directly influence 
Rousseff. Carlos Cecconi, a technical advisor at the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
who had been Amadeu’s number two at ITI when Amadeu was coordinating the 
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dissemination of free software in the federal government, began communicating with 
Rousseff’s advisors, arguing that she would benefit from consulting the Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee because of its technical expertise. Cecconi had been working on setting 
up a presidential meeting for a while to no avail, but in the wake of the NSA revelations, 
such a meeting made more sense to the president’s advisors. This resulted in a meeting on 
September 16, 2013, with Rousseff, a number of cabinet ministers including Bernardo and 
Congressman Molon, and the entire board of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. The 
committee included important Internet freedom activists such as Amadeu and Alimonti, as 
well as the electrical engineer Demi Getschko and Affonso. According to Affonso, Rousseff 
entered the conference room holding in her hand the committee’s Decálogo – a document of 
principles published by the committee in 2009 that was a precursor to the MCI, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Rousseff said that she had read the Decálogo and 
agreed with it completely. Members of the committee were each allowed to speak briefly. 
They emphasized the importance of net neutrality and not including notice-and-takedown 
language in the bill. Rousseff stated her agreement with the activists. Importantly, Bernardo 
spoke very little, which activists like Alimonti interpreted as a sign that his influence over the 
issue had waned. Activists left upbeat due to the fact that at least their voices had been heard 
directly by Rousseff.  
A week later, on September 24, 2013, Rousseff gave the opening speech of the UN’s 
50th General Assembly in New York. Speaking directly before President Obama, Rousseff 
dedicated her speech to denouncing NSA surveillance. She also forcefully backed net 
neutrality and essentially repeated the words of the activists from her meeting and portions of 
the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee’s Decálogo. She embraced the vision of Internet 
governance that members of the steering committee shared with her and that was 
championed by activists who were trying to democratize Internet governance. She said: 
 
We need to create multilateral mechanisms for the worldwide network that are 
capable of ensuring principles such as: 
1. Freedom of expression, privacy of the individual, and respect for human 
rights. 
2. Open, multilateral, and democratic governance carried out with transparency 
by stimulating collective creativity and the participation of society, 
governments, and the private sector. 
3. Universality that ensures the social and human development and the 
construction of inclusive and non-discriminatory societies. 
4. Cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, customs, and values. 
5. Neutrality of the network guided by technical and ethical criteria, rendering it 
inadmissible to restrict for political, commercial, religious or any other 
purpose. 
 
Most important for activists was her full-throated support of net neutrality. She had elevated 
this issue to the global stage in a way that had never been done before. It also meant that she 
had very publicly committed her administration to fighting for net neutrality. 
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Net Neutrality, the Telecommunications Lobby, and Corporate Influence in Congress 
In spite of the Rousseff administration’s new embrace of the MCI, corporate 
influence over legislators, particularly the telecommunications sector, was still strong enough 
to potentially scuttle the bill or alter it in such ways as to render it hollow. Before her trip to 
the UN, in early September Rousseff declared the MCI to be in regime de urgência (urgent 
regime). This classification by the president, which is reserved for extraordinary cases, 
mandates that both chambers of congress vote on the bill within 45 days or else lose the 
capacity to debate any other legislative issue. This maneuver, in conjunction with the fact 
that the president’s political coalition controlled both legislative chambers, almost certainly 
meant that a vote on the bill would take place. However, opposition among legislators with 
close ties to the telecommunications companies was unyielding. The legislator who led the 
opposition to the bill in the Chamber of Deputies was Eduardo Cunha (PMDB). He was also 
the leader of the largest party in Rousseff’s coalition, which allowed him to almost single-
handedly block a vote on the bill.  
Examining the Cunha’s background illuminates the ways that telecommunications 
multinationals and the neoliberal economic policies they promote became so influential in the 
Brazilian legislature. Cunha began his political career in the early 1990s as an ally of 
President Collar de Mello (1990-1992), who pushed through a series of neoliberal reforms 
that privatized publicly owned resources. In 1991, Collar de Mello appointed Cunha to be 
president of Telerj, the state telecommunications company of Rio de Janeiro. Cunha oversaw 
a reduction in public investments and preparation for privatization, which would ultimately 
take place in 1998 during the administration of President Cardoso (1995-2003). He left the 
position in 1992 after accusations of corruption under his watch, but continued to pursue a 
role in local politics. In 2003, after two years in the state legislature in Rio de Janeiro, he 
assumed a position as Deputado Federal (congressman) with the PMDB. In 2013, Cunha 
was elected the leader of his party in the Chamber of Deputies. Ever since his time at Telerj, 
Cunha has had a strong interest in issues related to telecommunications and strong ties to the 
telecommunications corporations. Because of these connections, he was opposed to the net 
neutrality language of the MCI. He championed the position of the telecommunications 
companies that they should be able to manage the Internet traffic on the cables that they 
owned since those cables had been privatized in the 1990s.  
While Cunha was the public face of opposition to net neutrality, he was not the only 
legislator who was opposed to net neutrality. Indeed, even members from the president’s 
party diverged on this point. In great measure, because of the technical nature of the concept 
of net neutrality, many legislators could not grasp what it actually entailed and thus its 
ramifications. Scheduling meetings to discuss the issue with legislators to explain it to them 
was a priority for activists like Ekman, Barbosa, and Alimonti who were frequently in 
Brasília. Yet, explaining the concept to these individuals, many of whom did not use email or 
even know how to access a website on the Internet, was incredibly challenging, according to 
these three. The lack of knowledge about the issue made legislators particularly susceptible 
to the misinformation campaign spearheaded by Cunha and the telecommunications 
association SindiTeleBrasil, they argued. 
In a glossy pamphlet distributed to legislators, SindiTeleBrasil declared that it 
wholeheartedly supported net neutrality as long as it did not restrict free enterprise and 
competition, define business models, or restrict providing serviços diferenciados 
(differentiated services) (SindiTeleBrasil 2013). However, providing differentiated services, 
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what has also been referred to as a creating an Internet fast lane, is incompatible with the 
concept of net neutrality because it means that corporations would be able to prioritize what 
content users could more easily access. In essence, SindiTeleBrasil used the term net 
neutrality, but defined it in a completely different way. Because many individuals still did not 
know what net neutrality meant, it was relatively easy for this lobbying group to mislead 
legislators and the public at large.  
SindiTeleBrasil’s president Eduardo Levy went one step further in attacking the 
concept of net neutrality when, on October 11th in an op-ed titled Uma ameaça à inclusão (A 
Threat to Inclusion) in the São Paulo newspaper, Folha de São Paulo, he called the net 
neutrality language of the MCI an “elitist project” because it would disincentivize telecoms 
from investing in infrastructure that needed to be built to reach poor neighborhoods. This, he 
argued, was a threat to the government’s (read PT’s) goal of reducing social inequality in 
Brazil (Levy 2013). This enraged activists, many like longtime PT militants Amadeu and 
Tiribiça, who had essentially dedicated their lives to decreasing the digital divide, the gap 
between the digital haves and have-nots. What was more worrying was that they knew that 
this rhetoric, however misleading and self-serving, would potentially influence a number of 
legislators, particularly those from the PT, who were still undecided on the issue.  
In order to make clear what was at stake in the MCI, activists once again took to the 
streets. Ekman, Alimonti, Amadeu, and Tiribiça organized a protest in São Paulo at the 
Brazilian headquarters of Vivo, the country’s largest telecommunications company and a 
subsidiary of the Spanish multinational Telefónica. They chose Vivo in part because its 
president Antônio Carlos Valente was the former president of SindiTeleBrasil and also 
because the company was foreign-owned, so it symbolically represented how the battle over 
Internet freedom was a global one that pitted activists like themselves against multinational 
corporations. Bloqueio da Vivo: Por um Marco Civil da Iniciativa Popular (The Blockade of 
Vivo: For a Marco Civil by Popular Initiative) took place on the rainy afternoon of October 
16th when more than 60 activists descended on the plaza in front of Vivo’s headquarters a 
matter of blocks from Avenida Paulista. The activists advertised the event on social media 
with the following language: 
 
Blockade of Vivo: Act Against Censorship on the Internet and for Liberty and 
Privacy Online. 
 
Telecommunication operators want to filter the network in order to impede our free 
access to sites and application where we share knowledge: archives, music, and 
movies. These corporations want to charge a lot for horrible high speed Internet 
service, they hope to break net neutrality, in other words, they want to interfere in the 
data that passes through their cables to increase their profits. We are against 
surveillance online and to impede the blocking, censoring, and breaking of our 
communication privacy. We need to pressure Congress to approve the Marco Civil da 
Internet, a bill that was democratically constructed, which aims to protect our liberty, 
privacy, and neutrality on the Internet. We are going to protest against censorship and 
the breaking of net neutrality (Marco Civil Já 2013). 
 
Vivo had dismissed most of its employees earlier so as to avoid any problems leaving the 
building. In addition to the signs that activists held demanding an Internet Livre and Marco 
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Civil Já! (Marco Civil Already!), a group of activists also unfurled a large, neon yellow 
banner that said “Unfair Players.” They charged that Valente and other telecom executives 
were jogando sujo (playing dirty) by hiring lobbyists to influence legislators and by making 
political campaign donations in order to influence politicians. They argued that these 
corporate actions threatened the democratic process, such as the one that led to the 
collaborative, democratic elaboration of the MCI. Ekman spelled out the stakes when he said 
at the protest, “The MCI defines communication as a right on the Internet, while 
[corporations] want communication to continue being only an object of commercial 
business.” This protest highlighted the divide between a corporate vision for the Internet as a 
source for profit and one that activists promoted as a space for creative and civic engagement 
that is democratically governed.  
On November 5, 2013, congressman Molon released an updated version of the bill, 
which activists felt attended to many of their lingering concerns, particularly in terms of 
issues related to copyright. Molon removed language supported by media corporations that 
would have allowed for a continued notice-and-takedown status quo. Instead, the debate 
about copyright would be saved for a bill specifically about copyright, which was already 
being debated in Congress. This essentially meant that media corporations, like Globo, would 
no longer try to scuttle the MCI due to objections about copyright policy, and instead would 
save their powder for another legislative battle. This meant that the only corporate lobby still 
working actively against the bill was the telecommunications sector. Activists pointed this 
out on a note published online on the Marco Civil Já Facebook page on November 7, 2013 in 
which they trained attention on the telecommunications lobby: 
 
Globo continues to be an enemy of freedom of expression, but it jumped off the boat 
and is no longer with the teles – the new text pushes the debate with Globo in the 
future to the reform of the Lei dos Direitos Autorais (Copyright law) and we will get 
there.  
 
But first, the Marco Civil da Internet: 
 
Our only enemies right now are the TELES – operators of 
telephones/telecommunications – who are represented by the congressman/lobbyist 
Eduardo Cunha (PMDB) and those who have been herded up by his pro corporate 
discourse. 
 
This note evidences the way that activists had to navigate various corporate pressures in 
order to push their agenda forward, and it demonstrates the power that corporations exert in 
the liberal democratic system as it is currently constituted in Brazil.  
Comissão Geral: Activists Occupy Congress 
On November 11, 2013, in an attempt to break the legislative impasse that remained 
in the Chamber of Deputies because of Cunha’s objections to the bill, the leaders of the 
chamber set aside an entire day for debate specifically about the MCI in a format called a 
Comissão Geral, or general commission. In fact, it was Cunha who requested this debate, 
potentially with the hope that his power in the congress would sway legislators to his 
position. This debate format was quite rare and activists saw this as an exceptional 
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opportunity to bring attention to their concerns – particularly the issue of net neutrality. The 
uniqueness of the Comissão Geral and the now high-profile status of the MCI meant that 
there would be significant media coverage as well. Furthermore, Internet freedom activists 
were extended unprecedented invitations to speak. Thus, Amadeu, Ekman, and Alimonti all 
planned to speak. While it might not have been his intention, by calling a Comissão Geral, 
Cunha was opening the doors for activists to cross the boundary that typically separated 
legislators from the public.  
As soon as the news of the Commissão Geral was announced, the activist email 
listserv exploded with activity as people discussed speakers’ strategies. Most believed, like 
Amadeu, that the most effective strategy would be to specifically target Cunha and depict 
him as the representative of telecommunications corporations. If they could tarnish him 
politically, they would strengthen their hand by decreasing the willingness of other 
politicians to follow Cunha. The day of the Comissão Geral, a number of activists armed 
with signs that read Eu Defendo Democracia (I Defend Democracy) congregated in the 
antechamber to the Chamber of Deputies to meet the legislators as they entered the 
legislative chamber. They then headed up to the balcony reserved for observers. As the 
speakers began speaking, they unfurled a banner that read Marco Civil da Internet: 
Democracia SIM, Corporações NÃO (Marco Civil da Internet: Democracy YES, 
Corporations NO). In between speakers the activists chanted slogans in favor of the MCI, 
such as Internet Livre. 
In his speech to the chamber, Cunha embraced neoliberal economic theory and 
defended the need for private capital, particularly foreign private capital to build Brazil’s 
Internet infrastructure. He misrepresented the concept of net neutrality by saying that it 
meant that companies would have to provide the same speed of Internet access to every 
house in Brazil for the same cost, which he said would not be a profitable venture and would 
disincentivize foreign investment. This incorrect, distorted version of net neutrality parroted 
SindiTeleBrasil’s talking points. Cunha stated that what Internet freedom activists were 
trying to do was to “communize” the Internet. Paradoxically, however, he said that this law 
would favor US corporations like Facebook and Google, which few would accuse of 
promoting communism. His errors and justifications revealed that the interests that he was 
defending were those of multinational telecommunications corporations and that the politics 
of regulating a complex digital infrastructure were difficult given that legislators had little 
knowledge of how the technology functioned. Cunha advocated that the specific net 
neutrality language from the original bill created at the Ministry of Justice be substituted for 
Molon’s current version that was the result of a public consultation, which had strengthened 
net neutrality protections. Because the language concerning net neutrality was weaker in the 
original bill, there would be more opportunities for the telecommunications corporations to 
exploit loopholes during the subsequent regulatory process, which Cunha wanted to be 
overseen by the Brazilian telecommunications agency ANATEL rather than by the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee. Activists considered ANATEL to be a government agency that 
had been captured by corporate interests, and thus could not be trusted to uphold principles of 
Internet freedom. 
Speaking later in the day, Ekman placed the debate about the MCI within a larger, 
democratic framework. He said, “This house is going to discuss whether we are going to 
construct a society based on democratic principles, or an authoritarian society based on 
surveillance and private interests.” At the end of his speech he directly engaged Cunha by 
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saying that if his party, the PMDB, opposed the current version of the MCI, it “would be 
placing itself against Brazilian society who constructed this bill.” He invoked the rhetoric of 
participatory democracy and not so subtly contrasted it with the PMDB’s history of making 
elite, political accords. As Ekman left the podium, a handful of politicians who supported the 
MCI unfurled the activists’ banner on the chamber floor. Activists in the balcony began 
cheering and chanting in favor of the bill. Cunha was infuriated by the attack and took to the 
podium once again to respond. He scolded Ekman, a “guest” in the chamber, for criticizing 
the PMDB, which Cunha said represented a significant portion of Brazilians. 
 
Figure 8. Internet freedom activists unfurl a banner in the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
Brazilian Internet freedom activists unfurl a banner that reads “Marco Civil da Internet: Democracy YES! 
Corporations NO!” Photo from Marco Civil Já Facebook page. 
 
While the large public debate was meant to break the legislative impasse, it was 
unsuccessful. Cunha and his allies in the Chamber of Deputies would not budge. Months of 
closed-door negotiations between Cunha and the administration would continue. Yet, the 
administration was unwilling to significantly alter the net neutrality language. Much as 
activists had earlier feared, Cunha used the MCI as a bargaining chip in order to extract 
concessions from the administration. He knew how important the MCI was to Rousseff’s 
agenda, and he hoped to trade PMDB support for the bill in exchange for the appointment of 
more PMDB politicians to cabinet ministries. Rousseff remained resolute and was not willing 
to make such a transparent, high-level political trade. This type of political horse-trading is 
what activists felt was wrong with the Brazilian democratic system. 
 The fact that even in the wake of the president’s designation of regime de urgência 
the bill did not pass caused great concern among activists who did not have close links to 
Rousseff as they had to Lula. Their threats as well as the fact that the president had been so 
public in her defense of net neutrality on the international stage, proved to be sufficient 
enough to ensure that the Rousseff administration was ultimately unwilling to bend. 
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Applying Political Pressure in the Halls of Congress 
 In the wake of the Commissão Geral, activists continued to apply pressure to 
politicians by making their presence felt in the halls of the national congress. According to 
the Brazilian constitution, because the Chamber of Deputies had not voted on the bill that had 
been classified as urgent by the administration practically all other business of the chamber 
had come to a halt. This strong opposition, enough to essentially shut down the legislature, 
demonstrates just how determined the telecommunications sector was to scuttle the bill. At 
this point, Barbosa, one of the journalists from Intervozes who was Brasília-based, took the 
lead in organizing activist mobilizations in the capital. Activists decided that applying 
pressure directly on legislators was essential to influencing them. Barbosa mobilized activists 
in Brasília to attend meetings with legislators to make their presence known in the halls of 
Congress. Activists took pictures with legislators who supported the bill and shared them on 
social media websites in an attempt to incentivize legislators to publicly voice their support. 
They also created a list online of the legislators that they called Enemigos da Internet 
(Enemies of the Internet), which included politicians who were against the law. These names 
were widely publicized online and citizens were urged to call or email the legislators to get 
them to change their mind. Wearing bright neon yellow shirts, their constant presence in the 
buildings of the Brazilian capital was meant to physically remind legislators that activists 
were paying attention to how representatives voted.  
Barbosa also organized meetings with administration officials at the Ministry of 
Justice and Ministry of Culture in order to pressure them to remain firm in their commitment 
to the current version of the MCI. Activists were so nervous that the administration would 
make an accord with Cunha to alter the net neutrality components of the bill, that Ekman, 
Barbosa, and Alimonti drafted a letter declaring that Brazilian Internet freedom activists 
would withdraw their support for the MCI if strong net neutrality protections were stripped 
from the bill. Opposition from the individuals who were the driving force behind the creation 
of the MCI had the potential to kill the entire project.  
 
We understand that in the new proposal [of the MCI] the fundamentals of the bill 
have been shaken, impairing the effectiveness of some of the rights that are protected 
in the project, including: the right to the inviolability of the network and net 
neutrality, the right to privacy, and freedom of expression. 
 
We understand the importance of efforts to construct parliamentary majorities to 
support the text, but these efforts must not put at risk the fundamental principles of 
the law, something that we believe is happening . . . and which will compromise the 
support of the undersigned for the Marco Civil da Internet. 
 
Activists then detailed what changes to the law they would not accept and why. They were 
willing to prepare for the possibility of scuttling the law because creating a law that 
condoned filtering of Internet traffic was so dangerous. They felt that once data filtering and 
Internet “fast-lanes” became the legal norm it would be even more difficult for activists to 
convince the public and policymakers that it was having negative effects. Thus, many 
activists believed that it would be better to have no law, rather than one that did not codify 
net neutrality. Since Rousseff had declared herself a defender of Internet freedom at the UN, 
the abandonment of Internet freedom activists in her own country, activists felt, would be an 
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embarrassment that the president would want to avoid. However, activists never had to 
release their letter, as Rousseff and her administration remained resolute in regards to 
rejecting Cunha’s demands to alter the net neutrality language. Nonetheless, this episode 
shows how up until the very days before the vote on the bill activists were still largely in the 
dark about what might happen. 
In March 2014, when a vote was considered imminent both by Molon’s office and the 
administration, activists once again turned to an online petition in order to generate public 
support for the bill. This was a tactic that worked well in the past when they were fighting 
against the Lei Azeredo, because it demonstrated that a large number of Brazilians were 
concerned about Internet policy, not just a small group of dedicated activists. This time, they 
used the site Avaaz.org, whose Brazilian campaign director was now Pedro Abramovay who 
had helped draft the MCI at the Ministry of Justice. In addition to the support of extremely 
well known Brazilian actors Gregorio Duvivier and Wagner Moura, activists secured the 
support of former Minister of Culture Gilberto Gil as well as Tim Berners-Lee, the man 
credited with creating the World Wide Web. Social media websites were used to distribute 
images of these endorsers and their statements in support of the MCI. The images spread 
virally and thousands of individuals ended up signing the online petition. On March 25, 
2014, activists delivered 10 boxes filled with printouts of the petition to members of the 
chamber. This symbolic act was meant to physically demonstrate the overwhelming number 
of individuals and organizations who supported the MCI. The underlying logic was that the 
MCI represented the will of the Brazilian people. 
At this point, the pressure on Cunha and his allies to pass the MCI was so strong that 
continuing to block the bill could have led a dramatic rupture between his party and the PT. 
Rousseff’s unwillingness to back down forced Cunha into a corner. On March 25, 2014, the 
same day activists delivered their petition, the bill was brought to debate on the chamber 
floor where it passed, almost unanimously. Seventeen members from a small opposition 
party voted against it because they felt it gave Rousseff too much power to determine 
Internet policy. Even Cunha ended up voting for the bill, despite the fact that he had 
previously excoriated its provisions as dangerous. He apparently did not want to go on the 
record as being against Internet freedom.  
Activists were ecstatic at this point, and many in Brasília headed to a local bar to 
celebrate. At many points during the previous couple of years, activists had been fearful that 
the bill would die in the legislature and that their hard work would be for naught. Yet, on this 
day their struggle had paid off. A longtime FOSS militant named Anahuac drafted a 
statement and circulated it on the activist listserv that he administered. Other activists and 
organization quickly embraced and distributed it on the Internet. For them, it summed up 
their struggle and what it meant for the global Internet: 
 
The day when the world looked to Brazil: 
 
Today global democracy should look to Brazil and smile: the Marco Civil da Internet 
was approved. Never before, in the history of technology, was there such a powerful, 
creative and plural tool like the Internet, where the most diverse actors of society can 
relate to each other in a direct, dynamic, and frank manner. 
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The Brazilian legislature, with massive encouragement from an organized and 
coordinated civil society, and with the backing of the federal government, studied – 
for more than 3 years – thousands of comments coming out of half-a-dozen public 
consultations, compromises, and hard political negotiations, to finally ensure a bill 
that is consistent with the human rights of privacy, freedom of expression and the 
principles of due process, legality, and, especially, net neutrality. 
 
The antagonistic powers were many and powerful, threatening to turn the biggest 
stage of cultural, intellectual, political and economic system into the equivalent of 
cable TV system. The rumormongering and misinformation tactics came to the point 
of accusing the Marco Civil da Internet to be an element of dictatorship and trying to 
curtail individual freedoms in the network. Utter nonsense. 
 
Among all actors – thousands of them – some stand out: the rapporteur House 
Representative Mr. Alessandro Molon and his team, members of the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee, President Dilma Rousseff with her fearless executive 
action in defense of the law. Add to that a long list of lawyers, academics and cyber 
activists, who relentlessly studied, made proposals, mobilized, and defended the 
Marco Civil da Internet in Brazil and abroad. 
 
This day will be remembered as the Marco Civil da Internet for the world. And we 
hope it serves as a model for all democracies that seek to strengthen freedom, human 
rights, and to build a more equal society. Its strength lies in being one of the few laws 
in the world that creates mechanisms to protect digital rights. 
 
This is the time of joy and to enjoy the feeling of accomplishment. Congratulations to 
Brazil and those who built and fought to ensure the free and open Internet. 
 
Yet, while the victory in the Chamber of Deputies was undoubtedly a significant step, the bill 
was still not law because it still needed to be passed by the Senate before Rousseff could sign 
it into law. Activists were convinced that the momentum from their victory in the Chamber 
of Deputies in addition to the fact that the composition of the Senate made it more favorable 
to the administration meant that they would have little trouble. There was one concern. 
Should the Senate make any changes or amendments to the bill it would need to be debated 
once again in the Chamber of Deputies. This would mean that the corporate lobby would 
once again have a chance to block the bill. Thus, while a number of senators expressed 
interest in debating the bill and making alterations (some of which activists, in theory, 
supported, such as increasing user privacy rights), activists met with party leaders to make 
the case that the bill needed to be passed in its current state and quickly. This was necessary 
so Rousseff could sign it into law at the upcoming NetMundial Internet governance 
conference in São Paulo in April – which she had called for earlier in her speech at the UN. 
Thus, while activists traditionally supported democratic dialogue, they now worked to push 
the bill through as fast as possible with as little debate as possible. Barbosa rallied activists to 
put the same pressure on senators as they had previously done with deputies by remaining 
present at the National Congress and also delivering more boxes with the Avaaz.org petitions 
to legislators.  
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The bill passed the Senate in record time on April 22, 2014. This was less than a 
month after it was sent to the Senate from the Chamber of Deputies. The majority 
successfully blocked a number of amendments from the opposition that would have altered 
net neutrality. Similarly to what had happened in the Chamber of Deputies, despite a number 
of Senators being opposed to the language in the bill and speaking about how dangerous it 
was, the MCI passed the Senate unanimously. Again, while this unanimous vote was a 
victory for activists, it was also indicative of the way that the legislative system in Brazil is 
broken. The clear and intense divisions that exist in the chamber are opaque to the general 
public. Senators who had worked behind the scenes to scuttle the bill were still able to 
declare to their constituents that they supported it. This lack of transparency and 
accountability is a characteristic of the liberal democratic system. It is one of the driving 
factors that motivates Brazilian Internet freedom activists to use the Internet to create 
mechanisms for citizens to become involved in the political process so that they are more 
educated about the true positions of their elected representatives. 
The Marco Civil da Internet on the Global Stage 
 On April 23, 2014, Rousseff signed the bill into law in São Paulo at the NetMundial – 
Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance – a summit she had 
called earlier in the year in the wake of the revelations about NSA surveillance to reevaluate 
global Internet governance structures. Rousseff signed the MCI into law in front of a packed 
audience of international dignitaries – including some of the men who helped shape the 
Internet as we know it such as Vint Cerf, who helped promote the TCP/IP protocol in the 
1980s, and and Tim Berners-Lee, who developed HTML in the 1990s. This act garnered 
coverage in the international press. Most Brazilian freedom activists were not invited to 
participate in the conference, which was primarily reserved for international representatives 
and high-level Brazilian representatives. Instead, they organized an alternative gathering 
called Arena NetMundial, which was spearheaded by Marcelo Branco who had consummate 
experience organizing activist events like FISL and Campus Party Brasil. At the time when 
the bill was signed, Lemos, Tiribiça, and Barbosa were on a panel discussing the MCI. When 
news reached Arena NetMundial, cheers leapt up from the audience. That afternoon, Amadeu 
celebrated on his Twitter account where he wrote, “We approved the most democratic 
Internet law on the planet day!” While the “we” in Amadeu’s statement could be glossed as 
“Brazil” more broadly, a perhaps more apt reading would be that the “we” referred to the 
work of Brazilian Internet freedom activists who over the past five years had used a number 
of tactics to influence government policy and who had ultimately emerged victorious.  
Conclusion - A Return to Participatory Democracy 
 Shortly after Rousseff signed the MCI into law, Amadeu and Branco participated in 
roundtable at FISL in Porto Alegre about the newly passed MCI. They celebrated the 
achievement of helping pass the most progressive Internet freedom law in the world. They 
noted that Lula had officially endorsed the idea five years earlier at this same free software 
conference. They were concerned, however, about how the law would actually be 
implemented by the government. The MCI stipulated that both ANATEL and the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee would regulate net neutrality. Given ANATEL’s link to 
corporate interests, this was of great concern to activists. Additionally, corporations have the 
money and resources to follow and influence bureaucratic decisions in Brasília, something 
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that activists and social movements have a much more difficult time doing. Once again, 
activists turned to the notion of participatory democracy as a way to ensure that the principles 
of Internet freedom would prevail. They wanted to use a similar online, participatory system 
to create transparency in the regulation process so as to check the power of corporate 
interests. Indeed, the debate over the MCI had refocused attention on participatory 
democracy more broadly.  
On May 23, 2013, President Rousseff announced at a large gathering in Brasília with 
representatives from social movements that the regulation of the MCI would be done via an 
online, interactive platform similar to the platform used to draft the language of the MCI. The 
presidential decree to make this happen was placed within a larger package to increase social 
participation in the governing process. Opposition parties, most notably the Democratas 
(DEM) party – one of the offspring of the military-sponsored ARENA party – came out 
forcefully against this popular participation initiative. This demonstrates how the MCI is part 
of a larger movement to increase citizen participation in democratic governance and to 
reshape the power structures of the Brazilian state. The elite forces that have been weary of 
direct political participation since the return to democracy in the 1980s continue to push back 
against initiatives aimed at broadening democratic participation. 
In this chapter, I have illustrated how the logic of participatory democracy promoted 
by Brazilian Internet activists bumped up against the workings of a liberal democratic system 
that is still largely elite-controlled and highly influenced by corporations. The ability of 
corporations to put pressure on the legislative process demonstrates the extent to which the 
current Brazilian democratic system can be influenced by the interests of the elite. It is 
important to underscore that while Snowden’s revelations about NSA mass surveillance were 
crucial to bringing Internet policy back to the center of political debate, the Rousseff 
administration would not have been able to so quickly embrace the MCI had it not been for 
the years of work of Brazilian Internet freedom activists. Furthermore, the contours of the 
final version of the bill might have been quite different if activists had not persisted in 
fighting for their positions, notably net neutrality. Ultimately, activists saw their victory not 
merely as successfully protecting Internet freedom, but also as part of a more long-term 
process to increase citizen participation in decision-making, and thus deepening the Brazilian 
democratic endeavor. However, as the legislative battle over the MCI demonstrates, merely 
creating mechanisms for citizen participation does not necessarily alter existing power 
structures.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE BRAZILIAN INTERNET STEERING COMMITTEE: NEGOTIATING 
NEOLIBERAL REFORMS AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 
While the legislative battle over the Marco Civil da Internet discussed in the previous 
chapter centered primarily on debates about national Internet policy (i.e., net neutrality, 
digital copyright, and user privacy), it also involved a fundamental dispute about which 
Brazilian institutions should have jurisdiction over Internet policy and governance. In 
particular, Brazilian Internet freedom activists argued that the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee – a semi-governmental, multistakeholder national Internet policy advisory board 
– should be the institutional forum where these issues were discussed. Activists felt that its 
organizational structure made it more democratic and less beholden to corporate interests 
than ANATEL, which activists felt had been captured by the telecommunications lobby and 
was therefore a threat to an Internet livre. For these activists, strengthening the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee was a technique to promote a more democratic and participatory 
form of Internet governance. 
On November 5, 2013, congressman Molon, the legislative sponsor of the Marco 
Civil da Internet, released an altered version of the bill in which he re-inserted text in Article 
2 that explicitly gave the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee an official advisory role in 
determining technical reasons for exceptions to net neutrality.14 He also inserted the 
following sections in Article 24 that represented an endorsement of the committee: 
 
Article 24. Guidelines for the actions of the Union, States, Federal District, and Cities in 
the development of the Internet in Brazil. 
I. The establishment of mechanisms of multiparticipatory (multiparticipativa), 
transparent, collaborative, and democratic governance with the participation of 
the government, the business sector, civil society, and the academic community.  
II. The promotion of rational management and expansion of Internet use with the 
participation of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (Anon 2014). 
 
When the new language was released activists engaged in a discussion on their listserv as 
they analyzed Molon’s modifications to determine whether the changes were positive or 
negative, and they quickly fixated on these two important changes. One activist wrote, 
“Article 24 was elected my favorite!” while another called the article, “Top,” – Brazilian 
slang for awesome. The formalization of the role of the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee was important for activists because it effectively meant that Internet governance 
role would not be entirely ceded to ANATEL.  
In this chapter, I examine the history of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
since its creation in 1995. I argue that the evolution of the Brazilian Internet Steering 
                                                
14 According to the text, permissible exceptions to net neutrality could potentially include network management 
(i.e., combatting SPAM email), and prioritization of emergency services. 
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Committee, a national Internet policy advisory board, demonstrates how Brazilian Internet 
freedom activists negotiated the neoliberal restructuring of the state during the 1990s in such 
a way as to construct an institutional mechanism to defend against total corporate capture of 
Internet governance. The creation of this semi-governmental, multi-stakeholder organization 
with representatives from the government, business, and academia was undertaken in the 
lead-up to the privatization of the telecommunications sector by the Brazilian government. 
However, it was done so at the insistence of the country’s Internet pioneers in hopes of 
preventing telecommunications corporations from dominating Internet governance. 
Institutional reforms implemented in 2003 at the behest of Internet freedom activists created 
new positions on the committee for elected representatives from non-profits and NGOs. This 
exemplified the efforts by activists to further democratize Internet governance by opening 
participation to more sectors of society. Ultimately, the development and strengthening of the 
steering committee represents a unique tactic by which Brazilian Internet freedom activists 
are carving out an important institutional platform that is not corporate-dominated and 
through which they believe they can defend the Internet as an open, public platform for 
creative and civic engagement.  
At the same time, whether or not the multistakeholder governance model employed 
by the committee will inherently lead to more democratic and socially equitable policy is not 
entirely clear. The fact that the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee has endorsed policies 
advocated by Internet freedom activists is at first glance surprising given that 
telecommunications corporations have a representative on the 21-member committee and 
committee decisions are supposedly made by consensus. Indeed, the multistakeholder model 
gives veto power to non-elected corporate representatives who are not accountable to voters. 
I contend that the success of Internet freedom activists has up until now been largely due the 
fact that the entities that opposed the activist agenda (i.e. telecommunications corporations) 
at times ignored the committee because they believed that real power ultimately resided 
elsewhere, primarily in the legislature and ANATEL. Indeed, before passage of the Marco 
Civil da Internet the actual power of the committee was unclear as there was no clear-cut 
government framework of how the Internet would be regulated in Brazil. Moreover, a small 
group of technical experts who advocate for an Internet livre continues to retain an outsized 
influence in setting the agenda of the steering committee. Their enduring power raises 
questions about whether or not all Internet freedom activists are equally committed to 
radically opening up the governance process to include more people and organizations. These 
governance issues highlight some of the potential pitfalls of the current multistakeholder 
model of Internet governance in Brazil. The rhetoric of participation and redistribution of 
power often invoked by Internet freedom activists who support the Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee model may not be matched in practice. 
The ethnographic data from this chapter comes from my interviews with a number of 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee members as well as with the handful of individuals 
who work at its secretariat in São Paulo and its associated institution the Brazilian Network 
Information Center (Núcleo de Informação e Coordenação do Ponto BR, or NIC.br). 
Principal among those interviewed were electrical engineer Demi Getschko and former 
political exile Carlos Afonso who were instrumental in connecting Brazil to the Internet in 
the early 1990s and who subsequently had a foundational role in conceptualizing the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. Also important to note are interviews with FOSS 
militant and professor of sociology Sergio Amadeu and lawyer Veridiana Alimonti from the 
 
 
 
99 
non-profit IDEC, who were both protagonists in the fight for the Marco Civil da Internet and 
who used their positions on the committee as a platform to promote Internet freedom. In 
2013, I also participated in the third Fórum da Internet held in Belém, Pará. This conference 
is organized by the steering committee’s secretariat to discuss Internet policy and attracts 
hundreds of individuals annually. By attending this conference, I was able to experience first-
hand the ways that activists mobilized.  
I first begin this chapter with a discussion of how the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee emerged during the neoliberal restructuring of the Brazilian state in the 1990s. 
Then, I show how elements of participatory democracy were introduced into its structure in 
the early 2000s during the Lula administration. Then, I shift to how the steering committee 
became a site for Internet freedom activism, and how this, in turn, put its existence in peril as 
corporations lobbied for its elimination. Finally, I return to how the organization gained 
political legitimacy and power with the passage of the Marco Civil da Internet and I argue 
that this impeded, at least temporarily, corporate capture of Internet governance in Brazil. 
Ultimately, the case of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee provides one example of 
how Brazilian Internet freedom activists have applied theories of participatory democracy in 
hopes of developing more socially equitable Internet policy. However, it also highlights the 
ways that increased forms of participation that gloss over class and power inequities can be 
incorporated into neoliberal governance models that essentially weaken state power and 
potentially strengthen the role of corporations in public life. In this light, the long-term 
efficacy of the multistakeholder model of governance to defend against neoliberal capture of 
the Internet may be illusory.  
Neoliberal Reforms and the Formation of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee  
The original creation of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee in 1995 
demonstrates how Brazilian Internet freedom activists negotiated neoliberal reforms of the 
Brazilian state. Neoliberal reforms in Brazil began in 1990 under the first directly elected 
president after the end of the dictatorship, Fernando Collor de Mello (PRN). These reforms, 
popularly referred to as the Washington Consensus, resulted in the privatization of public 
resources and the reconfiguration of state power. A central argument of neoliberal 
proponents was that the private sector could more efficiently manage and distribute 
resources, and thus control of certain sectors of the economy should be ceded to private 
capital in order to promote economic growth (Harvey 2005). In Brazil, one of the largest 
sectors slated for privatization was the telecommunications sector that was then controlled by 
the state-owned corporation Telebrás, which was created in 1972 during the military regime. 
The drive to privatize briefly stalled after Collor de Mello’s impeachment on corruption 
charges, but was restarted in earnest by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) at the 
beginning of his term in 1995. In order to privatize Telebrás, a constitutional amendment was 
passed the same year that would legalize the transfer of this state-owned sector to the private 
sector. Three years later in July 1998, Telebrás was finally broken up and sold as 12 separate 
regional telecommunications companies. As the process of privatization slowly unfolded 
during the Collor de Mello administration, individuals like Getschko, Afonso, and others 
who were involved in extending the Internet to Brazil paid close attention. This is because 
the Internet depends on the telecommunications infrastructure to connect computers to the 
network. Whoever owned and controlled the telecommunications network would have an 
overwhelming impact on the development of this emerging computer network. Individuals 
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involved in spreading the Internet in Brazil recognized the impact that privatization of the 
telecommunications industry most likely would have. 
Change in the telecommunications sector was not something that was seen as 
necessarily bad for the Internet. It is important to remember that the state telecommunications 
monopoly Telebrás had been an initial impediment to the extension of the Internet to Brazil 
in the early 1990s. Telebrás endorsed the x.25 networking protocols promoted by a number 
of state telecommunications corporations worldwide that relied on a centralized network as 
opposed to the decentralized TCP/IP standards on which the Internet is based. Both Getschko 
and Afonso had flouted government policy when they created the first Internet connections. 
These Internet pioneers in Brazil had been actively working against the policy of Telebrás 
and hoped to change its policy. Thus, the question was not whether there needed to be change 
to help the Internet develop, but rather what changes needed to be made. There was a 
consensus among these individuals that private telecommunications companies did not 
understand the hacker vision of the Internet and were more likely to support a centralized 
vision of a global computer network.  
Afonso argued that the Internet and telecommunications were not synonymous. 
Instead, the Internet was a serviço de valor adicionado – a value added service – that utilizes 
telecommunications infrastructure to function. Afonso was joined in this opinion by 
computer science professor Tadao Takahashi, who helped create the National Research 
Network (RNP) that connected universities to the Internet, and professor Ivan Moura 
Campos, who led the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development 
(CNPq) of the Ministry of Science and Technology which invested heavily at that time in 
developing the Internet in Brazil. These two men were instrumental in helping to invest in the 
technological infrastructure needed to further extend the Internet in Brazil. In essence, these 
individuals felt that the Internet was so different from past telecommunications technologies 
– like telephones, radio, and television – that it should be treated differently. In 1995, these 
individuals lobbied the Ministry of Communications, the ministry that was overseeing the 
privatization process, to officially recognize the distinction between the Internet and 
telecommunications.  
The Minister of Communications, Sérgio Motta (PSDB), was ultimately the final 
arbiter in the decision about how the Brazilian government would handle Internet regulation. 
Motta had been President Cardoso’s campaign manager when he successfully ran for 
president in 1994, and was one of Cardoso’s most trusted advisors (Adachi 2011). Motta was 
an industrial engineer by training who had first become politically active in the 1960s as a 
member of Ação Popular, a moderate student organization associated with the Catholic 
Church that worked to end the military dictatorship. In those days, he became friends with 
Betinho, Afonso’s colleague at Ibase, the NGO they co-founded upon their return from 
political exile. After the return to electoral democracy, he was one of the founding members 
of the PSDB, the party most closely associated with neoliberal reform in Brazil. His 
endorsement of neoliberalism was one of the reasons that Cardoso chose him to oversee the 
privatization of the telecommunications sector. His history as being part of the pro-
democracy student movement made it easier for Afonso, Betinho, and others to gain his ear 
to argue that telecommunications and Internet regulation should be separated. 
In 1995, Motta issued a ministerial declaration titled Uso de Meios da Rede Pública 
de Telecomunicações para Acesso à Internet, Norma 004/95– The Use of The Public 
Telecommunications Network to Access the Internet, Rule 004/95 (Ministério de 
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Comunicações 1995). This document, commonly referred to simply as Norma 4, classified 
the Internet as a serviço de valor adicionado, just as Afonso and others had wanted. This 
meant that the Internet would not be treated as a telecommunications service and would not 
be dealt with in the process of the privatization of the telecommunications sector. Also, this 
new ministerial level declaration prevented Telebrás from becoming an Internet service 
provider (ISP). Motta reasoned that excluding Telebrás from the market would create an 
incentive for the private sector to provide this service, particularly small businesses (Adachi 
2011). Indeed, a number of small ISPs, such as Nelson Lago’s “That’s Internet!,” detailed in 
the first chapter, did spring up in the mid-1990s, largely as a result of this policy. In the short 
term, this represented a victory for Brazil’s Internet pioneers because by insulating the 
Internet from telecoms, as technical experts they would continue to have significant sway 
over the future path of Internet development in Brazil. While Norma 4 did not specifically 
mention the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, among many committee members and 
individuals who worked at the committee’s secretariat, Norma 4 was considered fundamental 
to the current organization of Brazilian Internet governance in which the committee is 
central. 
The document that gave birth to the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, which 
was issued almost simultaneously in 1995, was an inter-ministerial agreement between the 
Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Science and Technology titled Portaria 
Interministerial N° 147 – Inter-ministerial Ordinance 147 (Ministério de Comunicações and 
Ministério de Ciência e Tecnologia 1995). This document, signed by Sérgio Motta and his 
counterpart José Israel Vargas, enumerated the responsibilities of the committee, which 
included recommending Internet standards, coordinating the distribution of IP addresses and 
.br website domain names, collecting and distributing information about Internet use in 
Brazil, and recommending network management procedures. Additionally, it specified the 
composition of the committee. There would be one representative from each of the following 
institutions that would serve a two-year term: the Ministry of Science and Technology, the 
Ministry of Communications, Telebrás, the National Research Network, and the National 
Council for Scientific and Technological Development. Also one representative from each of 
the following sectors would sit on the committee: the academic community, the business 
community, the ISPs, and the community of Internet users. Importantly, the Ministry of 
Communications and the Ministry of Science and Technology would jointly nominate all of 
the representatives. The document also stipulated that the representative from the Ministry of 
Science and Technology would be the coordinator of the committee. This was Afonso’s 
“pluralist” model. 
For Brazil’s Internet pioneers, this arrangement was important because it allowed 
them a number of seats at the table of the advisory board so that they could continue to 
influence Internet policy and governance. Afonso, Tadao Takahashi, and Ivan Moura 
Campos were all original appointed members of the committee. Demi Getschko joined six 
months later as a representative of the technical community. The voices of these technical 
experts who spearheaded efforts to extend the Internet to Brazil would continue to shape its 
future expansion.  
At this point in 1995, the parallel process of privatizing the telecommunications 
sector was still in process. Left-wing opposition parties, such as the PT, vehemently opposed 
the neoliberal privatization agenda, but were unable to muster the political forces to stop the 
reforms. When privatization did occur in 1998, the Cardoso administration created 
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ANATEL. Thus, a division of labor was envisioned where ANATEL would regulate the 
telecommunications sector and the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee would serve as an 
advisory board for Internet governance. This division was largely the result of individuals 
like Afonso, who had lobbied to separate the Internet from telecommunications. This division 
would be crucial for Internet freedom activists in years ahead as they continued to fight 
against corporate efforts to dominate Internet policy and governance. 
Participatory Democracy and Institutional Changes at the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee 
 Lula da Silva’s rise to the presidency in 2003 represented the launching of a new 
national political project focused on social inclusion and popular participation that would 
have considerable, long-term effects on the contours of Brazilian Internet governance. In 
particular, the PT’s history of supporting participatory democracy initiatives that 
incorporated broader sectors of society into policymaking processes would become reflected 
in the changes Lula’s government would make to the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. 
The number of Brazilian Internet users and webpages had grown significantly in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, which meant that it was of increasingly greater concern to 
policymakers and legislators. Even before he took power in 2003, individuals involved with 
the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, like Afonso and Amadeu, were looking for ways 
to preserve the institutional setup that they had helped create during the Cardoso 
administration, but whose permanence was considered far from consolidated. Afonso stated 
in an interview that there was fear among some involved that the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee would be disbanded entirely and turned over to the private sector, or that its role 
would be transferred to an entirely state entity. The president’s technology policy was still 
being defined and no one knew whether Lula’s call to strengthen the state in the wake of the 
neoliberal reforms of the 1990s would include getting rid of the multi-stakeholder Internet 
governance model. Thus, this political transition represented a potential risk to the 
committee’s model of Internet governance.  
In order to defend the committee, members like Afonso and Getschko lobbied to get 
the new administration to officially recognize the organization. They were now joined in 
lobbying by the FOSS and PT militant Sergio Amadeu, who had been appointed by President 
Lula to lead the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação (National Institute for 
Information Technology, or ITI). In his capacity of president at ITI, Amadeu also served as 
the representative from the President’s Office (Casa Civil) to the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee. Along with Afonso and others from civil society, Amadeu pushed not only to get 
the committee officially recognized by a presidential decree, but also to create a system 
whereby non-governmental committee members are elected rather than appointed by the 
government. Ultimately, the goal was to increase the participation by various sectors in 
determining Internet policy and governance.  
 In September 2003, President Lula issued Decreto #4829, which recognized the role 
of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and instituted governance mechanisms in hopes 
of increasing its democratic characteristics. The document repeated verbatim much of the 
language from the Portaria Interministerial N° 147 from 1995 that created the committee 
and delineated its powers. However, it also increased the total number of representatives 
from 12 to 21 and detailed new steps through which non-governmental representatives would 
be elected through an electoral college of entities within their specific sectors. This was 
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important for two reasons. First, the number of government representatives now stood at 10. 
This meant that the government no longer had a clear majority on the committee, although 
the representative from the Ministry of Science and Technology would still always be the 
designated committee coordinator. Secondly, new slots were created for non-governmental 
representatives. There would now be three representatives from academia, four from the 
private sector, and three from the so-called terceiro setor – the third sector – which refers to 
the non-profit/NGO sector. For activists, these slots for the terceiro setor were particularly 
important because they created more positions for NGOs and social movements to participate 
in committee decision-making. Indeed, while business also benefited from an increased 
number of representatives, the inclusion of more non-profit/NGO representatives was quite 
important to activists because they felt that it gave them more alliances to leverage on the 
committee. 
 Electing members as opposed to having them all appointed by the government was 
understood as a significant step in democratizing Internet governance. The elections would 
be conducted via a website, which was thought to make the process more accessible and 
transparent. The then-coordinator of the committee and representative from the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, Arthur Pereira Nunes, declared in a newspaper interview that civil 
society was “going to use the Internet in order to democratize the Internet” (Folha de São 
Paulo 2004). However, elections were not open to the public, but were limited to 
government-recognized institutions that were divided based on the sector they were 
considered to represent. For example, voting for representatives from the terceiro setor was 
limited to organizations considered to be a part of the terceiro setor. In this way, while 
participation was broadened, it was still highly circumscribed. Nonetheless, for activists 
associated with organization in the terceiro setor, it created new spaces for them on the 
committee to voice their concerns.  
One of the first elected representatives from the terceiro setor in 2003 was Mario 
Teza, the labor union organizer and FOSS activist described in chapter one who helped found 
FISL in Porto Alegre in 2000. He represented the Projeto de Software Livre, the organization 
that promoted FOSS and organized the annual free software conference. Because FOSS and 
the Internet are two technologies that are so closely entwined, hackers wanted a space on the 
committee to advocate for their vision of the Internet and how it should be approached as a 
technology. At the time, he stated as a representative of the free software community, his 
goal was to “broaden democratic space on the Internet. This means this mandate will be at 
the service of popularizing the topic of ‘governance.’ For this ideas like an Internet 
conference, seminars, and tutorials will be important” (Teza 2003). This desire demonstrates 
how notions of participation and democracy were now becoming central to discussions that 
would take place at the committee. Carlos Afonso, who had served on the committee for two 
years when it was created in 1995, once again joined the committee, this time as a 
representative of the terceiro setor. The spaces created by Lula’s decree for representatives 
like Teza and Afonso altered the committee’s agenda by bringing new concerns to the fore.  
Brazilian Network Information Center (NIC.br): Internet Pioneers Take the Helm 
While the reforms of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee were meant to 
broaden citizen participation, a small number of science and technology experts retained 
outsized influence in shaping the committee’s agenda and policy. In particular, the Brazilian 
Internet pioneer, Demi Getschko, who in 1992 oversaw the first Brazilian connection to the 
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global Internet, enjoyed increased power when, he founded NIC.br in 2005. Getschko’s 
organization registers all websites with a .br domain name, performs research on Brazilian 
Internet use, monitors network security threats, and coordinates infrastructure projects related 
to network expansion. Before NIC.br was created, these tasks were performed by FAPESP, 
the large state-financed research foundation that had spearheaded initial efforts to connect 
Brazil to the Internet in the early 1990s under Getschko’s leadership.. The growth of the 
Internet, however, meant that this task was increasingly big and it diverged from FAPESP’s 
primary education mission. Thus, Getschko helped create NIC.br in December 2005, where 
he has been president ever since.  
The legal charter of NIC.br defines it as an independent, non-profit organization. Its 
primary mission is to implement the policies of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
and many of the positions on its board of directors are reserved for steering committee 
members. Furthermore, Getschko was appointed to the steering committee in his capacity as 
an Internet expert. In fact, in addition to incorporating more representatives from non-profits 
and NGOs, Lula’s decree also created a Notório Saber representative on the committee who 
is appointed by the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation. The position is 
reserved for a highly esteemed individual with technical expertise. Getschko, often referred 
to in the press as the “father of the Brazilian Internet,” has served in this position since 2004. 
The fact that he is the president of NIC.br and has a position on the committee makes him 
extremely important. It shows the way that one of Brazil’s Internet pioneers has continued to 
exercise outside influence on shaping Internet policy. 
Since 2005, the secretariat of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and the office 
of NIC.br have been located on the sixth and seventh floors of a tony high-rise in the Berrini 
commercial district of São Paulo, which is also home to the Brazilian headquarters of 
multinational technology corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. The fact 
that these offices are located in São Paulo, as opposed to the capital Brasília where one might 
expect a national advisory board to be located, is another reminder of how both organizations 
strategically distance themselves from being conflated with the Brazilian government. Each 
month in a conference room here, the 21 steering committee members meet to discuss issues 
related to Internet policy. All committee decisions must be approved by consensus. The 
office of the Executive Secretary of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, physicist and 
former FAPESP administrator Hartmut Glaser, is right down the hall from Demi Getschko, 
the president of the NIC.br. The individuals who hold the highest positions in these two 
organizations are from the community of science and technology researchers that was central 
to the expansion of the Internet in Brazil. In between their two offices are the offices of the 
steering committee’s permanent secretariat, which is composed of a handful of experts in 
Internet and technology issues. Members of the secretariat conduct research at the 
committee’s request, help guide the committee’s agenda by pointing out timely issues to be 
discussed, and take care of administrative tasks. The rest of the space is occupied by the 
various departments of NIC.br branches and by Internet-related NGOs like the World Wide 
Web Consortium of Brazil (W3C) and the Internet Society of Brazil (ISOC-BR) that help set 
global Internet protocols and standards. In total, on these two floors there are more than 100 
people working for these organizations that help shape Internet policy and governance.  
The institutional boundary between the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and 
NIC.br is quite blurry. Indeed, to many outsiders and even individuals who work at one of 
the organizations, the difference is not entirely clear. Both share the same office space and 
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source of funding. The fees charged to individuals and organizations that purchase .br 
domain names for websites entirely fund the organizations. With the increase in the number 
of Brazilian webpages in the past 15 years, the money collected from these fees is significant. 
This makes the organizations completely financially independent, and thus not subject to the 
demands of any outside funders or the government. The blurred boundaries between the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and NIC.br have created tension between efforts to 
increase participation through elections to the steering committee’s board and attempts to 
preserve the influence of individuals at NIC.br and who see themselves as Internet 
caretakers.  
The Decálogo: The Ten Commandments of the Internet 
In the past five years, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee has passed 
resolutions supporting policies that are fundamental to activist conceptions of Internet 
freedom. By far the most important of these was Resolução CGI.br/RES/2009/003/P in 2009, 
which has unofficially been called the Decálogo – the Ten Commandments – because it is a 
list of ten policies the committee considers imperative for the ideal functioning of the 
Internet. Examining the long process through which this resolution was crafted, the deep 
internal committee divisions it exposed, and how it was adopted in spite of significant 
opposition demonstrates how the steering committee operates, and how Internet freedom 
activists have successfully turned it into a platform from which to promote their agenda. 
The impetus to create the Decálogo was a number of judicial rulings that attacked 
Internet freedom. The most notable of these cases occurred in 2007 when a Brazilian judge 
ordered that Google’s video-sharing website, YouTube, be entirely blocked from Brazil 
because the company refused to remove a video of television host and model, Daniela 
Cicarelli, seeming to engage in sexual intercourse with banker, Tato Malzoni, on a Spanish 
beach that was filmed by a papparazo. The judicial ruling gained worldwide attention. 
Removing the entire website, one of the most trafficked worldwide, because of one 
controversial video filmed in a public place, was clearly excessive. Mario Teza put it this 
way: “Brazilian Internet users should not be punished for an individual squabble. Cicarelli 
and her boyfriend have every right to defend their rights, but the judiciary should not punish 
the entire Brazilian Internet community” (Teza 2007).  
Steering committee members, and in particular, Getschko, because of his status as 
one of Brazil’s Internet experts, were often asked by journalists and policymakers their 
positions on these types of rulings and policies. He became tired of having to repeatedly 
explain to people the technical aspects of how information is shared via the decentralized 
Internet. Also, at the same time the debate about the cybercrimes bill, the Lei Azeredo, was 
heating up as Internet freedom activists were mobilizing to have the bill defeated in 
Congress. In this context, it became apparent to Getschko and others that a document should 
be created that would give guidance to policymakers and judges about the fundamentals of 
how the Internet is configured and what policies would best preserve its open and 
decentralized nature. In essence, it would encapsulate their vision of the Internet in a way 
that was easy to understand for others. Getschko worked closely with Afonso on drafting 
such a document. They did so in consultation with fellow committee members over the span 
of two years. Often times these discussions took place during committee meetings, but they 
also were done on the sidelines and in personal communications among committee members. 
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The final document they created is notable because it reinforced the idea of the Internet as a 
democratic and collaborative platform:  
 
Principles for the Governance and Use of the Internet 
  
1) Freedom, privacy and human rights 
The use of the Internet must be driven by the principles of freedom of expression, 
individual privacy and the respect for human rights, recognizing them as essential to 
the preservation of a fair and democratic society. 
  
2) Democratic and collaborative governance 
Internet governance must be exercised in a transparent, multilateral and democratic 
manner, with the participation of the various sectors of society, thereby preserving 
and encouraging its character as a collective creation. 
  
3) Universality 
Internet access must be universal so that it becomes a tool for human and social 
development, thereby contributing to the formation of an inclusive and 
nondiscriminatory society, for the benefit of all. 
  
4) Diversity 
Cultural diversity must be respected and preserved and its expression must be 
stimulated, without the imposition of beliefs, customs or values. 
  
5) Innovation 
Internet governance must promote the continuous development and widespread 
dissemination of new technologies and models for access and use. 
  
6) Neutrality of the network 
Filtering or traffic privileges must meet ethical and technical criteria only, excluding 
any political, commercial, religious and cultural factors or any other form of 
discrimination or preferential treatment. 
  
7) Non-liability of the network 
All action taken against illicit activity on the network must be aimed at those directly 
responsible for such activities, and not at the means of access and transport, always 
upholding the fundamental principles of freedom, privacy and the respect for human 
rights. 
  
8) Functionality, security and stability 
The stability, security and overall functionality of the network must be actively 
preserved through the adoption of technical measures that are consistent with 
international standards and encourage the adoption of best practices. 
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9) Standardization and interoperability 
The Internet must be based on open standards that facilitate interoperability and 
enable all to participate in its development. 
  
10) Legal and regulatory environments 
The legal and regulatory environments must preserve the dynamics of the Internet as 
a space for collaboration (Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil 2009). 
 
Yet, while this resolution was eventually passed by the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee in 2009, it was actually quite contentious and faced opposition from 
representatives of the telecommunications sector. In particular, they did not agree with 
principle number 6 regarding net neutrality. According to committee members, this was a 
serious roadblock. However, Getschko, Afonso, Teza and others were not willing to remove 
this principle in order to pass the resolution. For them, the concept of net neutrality was so 
fundamental to the Internet as a democratic platform that it would be wrong to remove it.  
According to committee members and individuals who work at the secretariat and 
NIC.br and with whom I spoke, all resolutions passed by the steering committee are passed 
by consensus. In theory, this means that the committee speaks with a unified voice and that 
committee members are in agreement. However, the case of the Decálogo demonstrates that 
the concept of consensus is itself a contentious term. The representative of the 
telecommunications sector and president of the telecommunications lobby SindiTeleBrasil, 
Eduardo Levy, was opposed to the inclusion of the concept of net neutrality even though the 
majority of the committee endorsed it. Ultimately, rather than continuing to block the 
resolution the representative who opposed it, Levy, merely abstained; he did not attend the 
meeting at which the resolution was approved. Nonetheless, individuals like Afonso and 
Getschko contended that the resolution was passed by consensus, or at least near consensus. 
For them the passage of this resolution was an example of how the multi-stakeholder model 
of deliberation among many sectors would produce policy that was beneficial to the public 
interest. Indeed, the passage was a massive victory for those advocating for Internet freedom. 
Carlos Afonso referred to it as a gol de placa, which is Brazilian soccer parlance for a goal 
that is so beautifully executed that it merits its own trophy. The passage of the Decálogo by 
the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee gave the policy document imprimatur of multi-
stakeholder support and it gave Internet freedom activists a document around which they 
could rally. 
The passage of the Decálogo in 2009 took place at the same time as activist efforts to 
defeat Lei Azeredo had given way to demands to create an Internet freedom bill – the Marco 
Civil da Internet (MCI). Thus, the Decálogo was fundamental to shaping the original outline 
of the Internet bill of rights that activists were working on alongside the Ministry of Justice 
and Ministry of Culture, as detailed in Chapter 3. For example, lawyer and open source 
activist Guilherme de Almeida, from the Ministry of Justice, reached out to the steering 
committee, and Getschko in particular, in order to help guide this process and to give input as 
an Internet expert. In large part because of the Decáologo, the steering committee, as an 
institution, was now perceived as an organization working to defend Internet freedom.  
In 2011, Congressman Alessandro Molon (PT) began promoting the MCI in 
Congress. He made an addition to the bill by including the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee. Under the change, the steering committee would dictate the circumstances under 
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which the policy of net neutrality could be disregarded in cases of an emergency or for 
technical reasons. In this way, the committee as an institution became fundamentally 
associated with the goals of Internet freedom activists. When individuals like Getschko, 
Afonso, Teza, and others gave interviews, they almost always mentioned their position on the 
committee, which reinforced the idea that the multi-stakeholder committee had reached a 
consensus on these issues. Yet, while rhetorically employing the committee as a supporter of 
Internet freedom lent the cause symbolic power, it also made the committee a target by forces 
opposed to portions of the MCI. Indeed, the battle over the MCI became intrinsically linked 
to the future of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee itself since the committee was now 
mentioned explicitly in the bill.  
Attempts to Sideline the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
 When the telecommunications representative Eduardo Levy did not attend the 
meeting at which the Decálogo was approved, this was not a sign that the 
telecommunications sector had given up the fight against net neutrality. Instead, it had 
become clear that the steering committee was not a friendly territory for their vision of the 
Internet. Instead, the telecommunications corporations continued lobbying in other venues, 
principally at ANATEL, the Ministry of Communications, and in the halls of congress. In 
this way, they appeared to be pursuing a strategy that would either neutralize the power of 
the steering committee or get rid of it entirely. Since the steering committee had become so 
closely aligned with the objectives of Internet freedom activists, it posed a threat to the 
objectives of multinational telecommunications corporations.  
The work to delegitimize the committee intensified after the transition from the Lula 
administration to the Rousseff administration at the beginning of 2011. The new Minister of 
Communications, Paulo Bernardo (PT), the man that Internet freedom activists dubbed the 
Ministro das Teles (Minister of the Telecoms) because his positions aligned so closely with 
those of telecommunications corporations, became a member of the steering committee 
between 2011 and 2013. Yet at this same time, he publicly challenged the jurisdiction of the 
committee. In an interview with a Brazilian technology magazine about the MCI, the 
minister noted that mention of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee had been removed 
from the bill in regards to its jurisdiction to regulate net neutrality at the request of the 
government. He contended that since the steering committee is not a state organization, it 
should not participate in setting policy: 
 
We think that a presidential decree or regulation by ANATEL represents an 
instrument elaborated by the Brazilian state with rules about transparency, open 
financial accounts, public consultations, and dialogues with specific sectors… The 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee is not a state entity. It does not have public 
servants, it does not have the same governance rules as ANATEL…[at ANATEL] 
you have Brazilian-senate approved appointees with appropriate technical 
backgrounds. ANATEL is the organization that has the competency to [regulate net 
neutrality] (Bernardo 2011). 
 
The notion that ANATEL was more transparent than the steering committee was a direct 
challenge to supporters of the steering committee and individuals who worked at the 
committee’s secretariat and NIC.br who felt the opposite. Furthermore, the idea that 
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ANATEL should regulate the Internet stood in stark contrast to the Norma 4 of 1995 that 
explicitly stated that the Internet was not a telecommunications service and should not be 
regulated as such. In effect, Bernardo was questioning the entire jurisdiction of the steering 
committee of which he was himself a member.  
At the request of the Ministry of Communications, in 2011 ANATEL began a process 
to revise Norma 4. In particular, the agency wanted to alter it so that the Internet would be 
considered a telecommunications technology and could thus be regulated by ANATEL. The 
agency’s then-director, Ronaldo Sardenberg, and its vice-director and close ally of 
Bernardo’s, Jarbas José Valente, would oversee the process of revising Norma 4. The goal of 
this was to increase ANATEL’s regulatory power, which would in effect reduce the authority 
of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee; Internet governance decisions would be made 
at ANATEL as opposed to the steering committee. Considering the fact that ANATEL’s 
policies often were closely aligned with those defended by the telecoms, this was particularly 
concerning to Internet freedom activists who understood this move as an attempt to 
unilaterally end the debate in the Brazilian congress about Internet policy and governance 
embedded in the MCI. 
In response to efforts by the Ministry of Communications and ANATEL, the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee released a resolution opposing ANATEL’s attempt to 
both disregard Norma 4 and circumvent the debate about Internet policy taking place in the 
Congress in the form of the MCI. In Resolução CGI.br/RES/2011/004/P the committee 
reaffirmed its position on the nature of the Internet as a serviço de valor adicionado, the 
committee’s jurisdiction based on previous government decrees, and its belief for the need of 
increased participation in Internet policymaking. This concluding portion of the resolution 
captures these positions: 
 
Reaffirm the understanding that Internet connection service is a value-added 
service, which should not be confused with the telecommunications network that 
supports it. 
Reaffirm that, notwithstanding always-necessary revisions and updates to the 
existing situation, considering the concepts provided in Rule 4/95 [Norma 4] of the 
Ministry of Communications, essential to a proper understanding of the nature of the 
services required for the development of the Internet… 
Reaffirm its commitment to a better and more inclusive Internet, expressing 
the need for the involvement of Brazilian Internet Steering Committee in dialogue 
and debate on issues relating to the Internet and related matters, in the spirit of the 
provisions of the Decree of its creation (Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil 2011). 
 
The fact that the committee needed to issue a resolution defending its own existence 
demonstrates the perilous situation its defenders felt they were in. Hartmut Glaser, the 
executive secretary of the secretariat and a committee member himself, said in an interview 
that the release of the resolution was delayed because of “diplomacy with ANATEL,” which 
had originally blocked the resolution (Aquina and Jordan 2011). Surprisingly, in this 
instance, representatives from the telecommunications sector supported the resolution 
because they contended it would ensure competition among Internet service providers (ISPs). 
However, down the line they would continue to support initiatives that would strengthen 
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ANATEL at the expense of the steering committee. In many ways, this vote was an 
aberration.  
Not all sectors of the Rousseff administration supported the de-legitimization of the 
committee. For example, in 2011 the new representative from the Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Innovation, Virgílio de Almeida, was a strong defender of the committee. 
As the representative from the ministry, he was by default the committee’s chairperson. A 
computer science professor from Belo Horizonte and PT member, Almeida was the director 
of the ministry’s Secretaria de Política de Informática (Department of Information 
Technology, or SEPIN). Among the many IT-related issues this department handles, one of 
them is administering the Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa (RNP) – the National 
Education and Research Network – which is the backbone for national academic Internet 
networks and connections. Likewise, since the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation helped create the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee via Portaria 
Interministerial N° 147 in 1995, the ministry was far less willing to cede jurisdiction of the 
Internet to ANATEL, which would in effect give more control over Internet policy to the 
Ministry of Communications. The fight over revisions to Norma 4 was thus very contentious 
within the Rousseff administration itself. 
Participatory Democracy Back to the Fore: Democracia Pluriparticipativa 
 At roughly the same time in 2010 and 2011 that the steering committee was coming 
under increasing attack from the Ministry of Communications and ANATEL, there were 
moves by some committee members and individuals at the committee’s secretariat to broaden 
citizen participation. For example, in 2010 the secretariat of the steering committee gained a 
staunch, long-time advocate of Internet freedom and participatory democracy when Carlos 
Cecconi was hired as the technical director – the number two position in the organizational 
structure under Professor Hartmut Glaser. Since 2007, Cecconi had been the director of the 
W3C.br, the Brazilian branch of the World Wide Web Consortium organization founded by 
the creator of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, to harmonize global Internet 
networking standards. W3C’s offices are in the same office suite as the steering committee 
and NIC.br, and thus Cecconi had already been working extremely closely with the 
secretariat and NIC.br prior to his appointment as the technical director of the steering 
committee. In his new capacity, he managed the day-to-day operations of the secretariat.  
 Cecconi comes from a lower middle class family from the urban periphery of São 
Paulo. As a young man in the late 1970s and early1980s, he became involved in the neo-
Marxist liberation theology movement and became a leader in local Comunidades Eclesiais 
de Base (Christian Base Communities, or CBE), which are Catholic community groups that 
interpret the teachings of Jesus as a call to empower the poor to address inequality through 
political participation in this lifetime, rather than waiting for the promise of a better future in 
the afterlife. In the São Paulo region these progressive, left-wing Catholic groups were 
closely linked to union organizing and participatory democracy initiatives. Thus, Cecconi 
became a founding member of the PT, and when then-PT politician Luiza Erundina was 
elected mayor of the city in 1988, Cecconi took up a position in the administration. It was in 
this administrative capacity that he first became interested in software for bookkeeping. Then 
in the late 1990s, in another administrative job at a business association, he became familiar 
with FOSS, which he saw both as a cost-effective technical solution and also as the 
technological embodiment of democratic engagement. When Lula da Silva (PT) assumed the 
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presidency in 2003, Cecconi joined the administration and became Sergio Amadeu’s second-
in-command at the ITI, the government agency that was spearheading the attempted 
transition to FOSS. He left the agency shortly after Amadeu and eventually was offered a 
position at W3C.br by Hartmut Glaser. There, his job was to advocate open source platforms, 
but also Internet freedom more broadly. As such, when he moved to his new position at the 
secretariat activists felt like they had a true ally in one of the highest positions on staff at the 
offices of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. 
Cecconi had a slightly different take on the ideal nature of the committee that 
departed slightly from the multi-stakeholder model espoused in committee documents and by 
most others including Getschko and Afonso. More than just multi-stakeholder model, 
Cecconi stated that he hoped Brazil’s Internet governance model will develop into one that is 
pluri-participativa (pluri-participative). By this he meant: 
 
All sectors involved [in the Internet] need to be present in the decision-making 
process concerning the development of the Internet and its governance. But it is not 
sufficient to just be present. The process of participation needs to be fair 
(equânime)…This mathematics of power of Internet governance is still in the process 
of being constructed. You need to involve all the sectors, but more than this you need 
to guarantee that participation is fair in such a way that an organization that defends 
rights has the same decision-making power of a government. 
 
For Cecconi it was important that different sectors of society are not only listened to when 
decisions are being made, but that they are actually able to influence decision-making. 
Indeed, activists have often felt that they are given space to speak, but that their opinions are 
not taken into account when policies are enacted. However, as Cecconi indicated, putting 
these lofty ideas of participation into practice was still being discussed. To this end, a new 
forum for in-person participation was created soon after Cecconi joined the secretariat, which 
further empowered Internet freedom activists. 
The launching of the annual Forúm da Internet no Brasil in 2011 represented a more 
concrete effort to include citizen participation in steering committee policy formulation. 
These annual meetings organized by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and NIC.br 
are open to the public and include hundreds of participants including many committee 
members, representatives from non-profits and NGOs, academics, and citizens. The first 
event consisted of a general plenary and a number of panels and workshops dedicated to 
specific Internet-related topics such as privacy, net neutrality, freedom of expression, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship. Internet freedom activists began using these forums as 
spaces to organize and make demands.  
In 2011 charismatic and indefatigable organizer Sergio Amadeu rejoined the steering 
committee after deciding to run for a position as a representative of the terceiro setor. He 
was joined on the committee as a representative of the terceiro setor by lawyer and consumer 
advocate, Veridiana Alimonti, from IDEC – a Brazilian consumer rights non-profit – who 
was also quickly becoming one of the central organizers of the movement to pass the MCI. 
At this point, the MCI was stuck in the Brazilian congress as lobbying by the telecom 
corporations opposed to it had essentially blocked it. Activists, led by Amadeu and Alimonti, 
used these meetings as opportunities to try to influence committee decisions. Likewise, 
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bringing activists from all over Brazil together created important networking opportunities 
and strengthened the activist front. 
In 2012, activists at the second Forúm da Internet no Brasil, held in the colonial 
Northeastern city of Olinda, collaboratively drafted the Carda de Olinda – Letter from 
Olinda – that was addressed to policymakers in Brasília in an effort to push them to pass the 
MCI. The letter began this way: 
 
We, citizens, representatives of civil society, organizations, and Internet freedom 
activists present at the 2nd Forúm da Internet no Brasil in Olinda consider it 
imperative the immediate approval of the Marco Civil da Internet in Brazil in relation 
to its importance for the guarantee of liberty and the rights of citizenship, individuals, 
and Internet collectives. 
 
The Internet is under attack. In various countries corporations and retrograde 
segments of the government bureaucracy want to restrict the democratic possibilities 
that the Internet has brought, and they want to block the sharing of cultural goods and 
prevent the free creation of content, platform, and technologies. 
 
The Carta de Olinda was disseminated online and a number of organizations and individuals 
endorsed it. It is important to note that the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee did not 
endorse this letter, as its representatives from the private sector would surely vehemently 
disapproved of its language. However, the fact that this was drafted at a conference created 
by the committee is significant in and of itself. It shows how these new avenues of 
participation created platforms for activists to organize. Surely, the Carta de Olinda would 
not be the deciding factor in a congressman’s decision to support the MCI or not, but it was 
symbolic nonetheless. Indeed, Congressman Molon cited the letter as evidence of support for 
the MCI. Whether intended or not, the letter became associated with the committee because it 
was created at a conference the steering committee had organized and financed.  
The third Fórum da Internet no Brasil in 2013, held at the beginning of September in 
the Amazonian city of Belém, once again attracted a large number of activists, many of 
whom had actually received funding from the steering committee to attend and who had been 
planning to do so for months. Representatives from the telecommunications sector however, 
perhaps in reaction to the hostility they felt at the forum in 2012, decided not to attend. 
Activists called this a boicote (boycott). Instead of attending the meeting, representatives of 
the telecoms stayed in Brasília where they testified before Congress and argued against the 
passage of the MCI with net neutrality provisions. At the time, passage of the MCI looked 
gloomy. Fátima Conti, a long-time FOSS militant, took to the plenary where she said that 
activists needed to start thinking about other tactics to defend Internet freedom because she 
felt that the bill would be passed in such an altered way that it would not be worth activist 
support. At the conference, Alimonti helped coordinate the drafting of another letter urging 
Congress to pass the bill. Portions of the letter are as follows: 
 
At the public hearing held by the Senate on September 3, 2013, as reported in the 
press, the representative of the telecommunications companies said the bill called the 
Marco Civil da Internet, hinders digital inclusion and privileges some users at the 
expense of many. 
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We, civil society organizations, representatives of academia, and Internet service 
providers, gathered at the third Fórum da Internet no Brasil would like to clarify 
some points of this argument, to repudiate any distorted interpretations that disregard 
all the advances achieved by years of transparent and democratic debate on the Marco 
Civil da Internet… 
 
Finally, we emphasize that the National Congress is facing the polarization between 
private interests of a minority and the public interest in the scientific, technological 
and social development of the nation, as a decision contrary to net neutrality 
protection endangers the Internet as we know it and as we want in the future. We 
therefore ask that the honorable senators take into account these distortions, noting 
that broad social participation that created this bill and now pressing for its adoption 
is on the side of net neutrality and defense of the Marco Civil da Internet as a 
document of principles for the Brazilian Internet, having among its foundations 
universal access without discrimination to the Internet. 
 
The distortions that the letter refers to are arguments by the telecommunications companies 
about net neutrality. Alimonti told me at the conference that she too was concerned about the 
future of the bill, but saw no other path forward other to continue fighting for the version of 
the bill activists wanted. Unbeknownst to everyone at the forum, a meeting just three weeks 
later would radically alter the political equation and the future of the Brazilian Internet 
Steering Committee. 
Rousseff Embraces the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
 Throughout 2013, Carlos Cecconi had been working with some of his contacts in the 
Rousseff administration to try to set up a meeting with the entire Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee in order to familiarize her with its work. Finally, in the wake of revelations about 
NSA surveillance when Internet policy became a priority for the administration, a meeting in 
Brasília was finally arranged. On September 16, 2013, the entire committee met with 
Rousseff, who was accompanied by Minister of Communications Paulo Bernardo and 
Congressman Molon, the congressional sponsor of the MCI. Rousseff had done her 
homework before the meeting. According to Afonso, she started the meeting by stating that 
she, and thus her administration, agreed with the principles of the Decálogo. She also 
embraced the multi-stakeholder model of the committee. Committee members like Afonso, 
Amadeu, Getschko, and Alimonti left the meeting upbeat. The extent to which Rousseff truly 
embraced the committee became apparent a week later. 
On September 24, 2013, Rousseff gave the opening speech of the UN’s 50th General 
Assembly in New York. Speaking directly before president Obama, Rousseff dedicated her 
speech to denouncing NSA surveillance. In her remarks she essentially repeated verbatim 
portions of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee’s Decálogo. She said: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114
We need to create multilateral mechanisms for the worldwide network that are 
capable of ensuring principles such as: 
1. Freedom of expression, privacy of the individual, and respect for human right. 
2. Open, multilateral, and democratic governance carried out with transparency 
by stimulating collective creativity and the participation of society, 
governments, and the private sector. 
3. Universality that ensures the social and human development and the 
construction on inclusive and non-discriminatory societies. 
4. Cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, customs, and values. 
5. Neutrality of the network guided by technical and ethical criteria, rendering it 
inadmissible to restrict for political, commercial, religious or any other 
purpose. 
 
Indeed, these five points were lifted almost word-for-word from the Decálogo that Getschko 
and Afonso helped write. The principles of these Brazilian Internet pioneers and Internet 
freedom activists were now the official policy of the Rousseff administration, and this was 
being broadcast to the global community and beyond. Both men were elated, as were Internet 
freedom activists across Brazil. Demi Getschko wrote this note on the micro-blogging 
website Twitter: “Dilma practically reads the Decálogo of the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee at the opening of the UN General Assembly!”(2013). While it would still be 
months before the MCI passed the Brazilian Congress, at this moment it became clear that 
the chances of that happening had increased since Rousseff had now thrown her support 
behind the bill. It was also only a couple of weeks after Rousseff’s speech that Molon 
modified the text of the Marco Civil da Internet to re-insert language about the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee, which pleased activists and was mentioned at the beginning of 
the chapter. 
Conclusion: Innovating Internet Governance 
When President Rousseff finally signed the MCI into law on April 23, 2014, at the 
NetMundial gathering in São Paulo, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee gained more 
permanent legal standing because it was specifically mentioned in the law as one of the 
organizations that would regulate net neutrality along with ANATEL. Whereas previously its 
legitimacy was based on a presidential decree, now it was backed with the force of 
congressionally passed legislation. Additionally, the committee and its unique governance 
system were showcased by the Rousseff administration, who presented the steering 
committee as the embodiment of the more democratic form of Internet governance that 
Rousseff was now urging other countries to embrace. As Carlos Cecconi said to me, in the 
wake of the event the steering committee had become prestigiadíssimo – highly prestigious – 
on the world stage. Indeed, at the meeting other countries expressed interest in copying the 
Brazilian Internet governance model. The government of Italy even paid for Getschko to visit 
in order to consult on how to set up a comparable, multi-stakeholder national Internet 
governance system. The combined legal and symbolic power that the passage of the MCI had 
given to the steering committee was undeniable. 
 The project of creating a more democratic Internet governance institution is still a 
work in progress. The various terms used to describe the ideal organizational structure – 
multi-stakeholder, multi-sector, multi-participatory, and pluri-participativa – indicate the 
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continued tensions over who has power in this organizational setup. Even the current model’s 
most ardent proponents recognize that the elections to select representatives are limited in the 
sense that only registered organizations can participate. Opening these elections up to more 
citizens and groups could be a way to broaden participation. Another proposal often 
mentioned by Amadeu and Alimonti would be to create online consultas públicas – public 
consultations – similar to the ones conducted to help construct the text of the MCI, to include 
more citizen participation in policymaking.15 At the same time, efforts to broaden the number 
of individuals in the decision-making process also potentially challenge the power of the 
Internet pioneers like Getschko who continue to exert a great deal of. Indeed, Getschko holds 
a permanent position as the representative of Notório Saber because of his expertise, but this 
arrangement is hardly democratic. Thus, there is continuing tension about the extent to which 
participation should be broadened to new groups and individuals or whether the benevolent 
architects and caretakers of the Brazilian Internet should have an outsized role in its 
governance because of their history. Moreover, how much citizen participation can be 
expected when the topics are often technical and complex? At what point is participation 
beneficial, and when might it be problematic? These are questions that are still being 
addressed. 
 The success of Internet freedom activists in shaping the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee into a symbolic defender of their goals, particularly around the issue of net 
neutrality, is to a certain extent due to the fact that the telecommunications corporations 
exerted relatively little effort in this particular deliberative forum. However, now that the role 
of the steering committee has been codified in law through the MCI and President Rousseff 
has embraced the committee’s role, it is quite likely that telecoms will expend more energy 
participating in the committee. Indeed, there is already evidence that this is the case. On 
November 18, 2014, the newly elected representative from the terceiro setor, lawyer and 
consumer rights advocate Flávia Lefèvre Guimarães, sent out an email with a request for 
Internet freedom activists to help create a document from the terceiro setor to submit to the 
office of the Casa Civil of the Brazilian Presidency. The administration wanted to hear 
positions of different sectors of the committee as to what the role of the committee should be 
not only in regulating net neutrality – something that it was not by law involved in – but also 
the future role of the committee more broadly. Lefèvre Guimarães’s email had an urgent tone 
because she noted that SindiTeleBrasil, the telecommunications association, had already 
prepared a document that was going to be submitted shortly. Rather than stalling, the telecom 
lobby was now being proactive, which meant that activists needed to quickly catch up if they 
wanted their opinions to be considered alongside those of the telecoms. 
 Ultimately, I conclude that Internet freedom activists have negotiated neoliberal 
reforms that transformed the telecommunications sector in Brazil in such a way as to create 
an institution, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, that is not corporate-dominated and 
which serves as an institutional platform for activists to promote their vision of the Internet. 
Indeed, Alimonti summed up the importance of the committee to activists in an interview 
with me when she said, “In general when these types of spaces do not exist it is not rare for 
governments to only listen to corporations. So this is the principal contribution of the steering 
                                                
15 In 2015 the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee conducted its first an online consulta pública about how 
exceptions to net neutrality referenced in the Marco Civil da Internet should be regulated. At the time of writing 
the results of this online consultation were still not known. 
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committee – to transform this advisory channel into something more equal.” For Alimonti, 
while the current multi-stakeholder structure of this committee is far from perfect, it has 
opened up new space for democratic participation. At present, central to the agenda of 
activists is to continue deepening these forms of citizen participation in the steering 
committee at a point in time when its role in Internet governance has become increasingly 
important. However, the case of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee also raises 
concerns about who is actually allowed to participate in these processes and whether or not 
these institutional structures are actually impervious to corporate cooption. Thus, while the 
rhetoric and practices of participatory democracy have been thus far used as a tactic to 
defend Internet freedom, the long-term effectiveness of this strategy is still to be determined. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
NETMUNDIAL: EXPORTING THE BRAZILIAN MODEL OF  
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
 
 
On April 23 and 24, 2014, in São Paulo thousands of representatives from 
governments, Internet governance organizations, as well as other Internet luminaries gathered 
for NetMundial: The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance. 
This was one of the largest, most high profile international summits on Internet policy ever 
held. The Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff had called the meeting in the wake of 
disclosures about US government mass surveillance by the NSA using the Internet and the 
global telecommunications infrastructure, which had been exposed by former contractor 
Edward Snowden in June 2013. These revelations raised serious doubts about the US 
government’s intentions regarding the Internet, especially considering that the US 
government still exercised outsized influence at Internet governance institutions like the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).16 In the wake of 
revelations about NSA mass surveillance ICANN’s relationship with the US government, 
which originally founded ICANN and still maintained veto power over some of its decisions, 
was called into question. This continuing relationship was increasingly problematic now that 
other governments felt that the US government used the Internet as a tool for espionage. An 
international consensus emerged that governance decisions needed to be internationalized, 
but what this meant was not clear. Governments like Russia, China, and a number of Middle 
Eastern countries that had a history of restricting Internet access had been calling for Internet 
governance to be the purview of the ITU, a UN body in which all UN-member states are 
represented. Critics of this arrangement, including many Internet freedom activists 
worldwide, felt this arrangement would bolster the power of repressive regimes, and was thus 
undesirable (DeNardis 2013). On March 14, 2013, the Obama administration announced that 
it would relinquish its privileged role at ICANN. The NetMundial summit was, thus, meant 
to chart a new path for Internet governance – one that the Brazilian government hoped would 
potentially be more democratic and have more international input. 
 The summit was held in the plush Grand Hyatt Hotel in the Berrini commercial 
district of São Paulo, just down the street from the offices of the Brazilian Internet Steering 
Committee, which had been charged by the Brazilian government with co-organizing the 
logistics of the conference along with Brazilian government officials. Rousseff and her 
administration wanted to highlight the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee’s 
multistakeholder model, which entailed participation by representatives from government, 
the private sector, academia, and non-profits/NGOs. The multistakeholder model was not 
entirely unique to Brazil, in fact even ICANN had implemented components of the 
multistakeholder model, but the Brazilians were proud of both how they had implemented it 
                                                
16 ICANN is the California-based non-profit organization that oversees the allotment of Internet protocol (IP) 
numbers and manages the Domain Name System (DNS) – two functions essential for the operation of the 
Internet. ICANN was created in 1998 because the Internet was growing quickly and the ad-hoc registration 
system that emerged out of ARPANET in the 1980s was no longer viable. Thus, the US government agreed to 
cede logistical oversight of these tasks to the non-profit ICANN, while at the same time retaining veto power.   
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and of the results that it had produced, which were discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, 
the summit was an opportunity for proponents of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, 
like Afonso and Getschko, to urge others to follow Brazil’s lead in creating multistakeholder 
institutions that in theory would develop more socially equitable policy that they considered 
better for the development of the Internet. 
On the first day of the conference Rousseff gave a speech to the gathered dignitaries 
in which she championed Brazil’s Internet policy and governance achievements. She argued 
that other countries should follow Brazil’s lead:  
 
Brazil believes that Internet governance should be multistakeholder, multilateral, 
democratic, and transparent in nature. It is our view that the multistakeholder model 
is the best way to exercise Internet governance. Very much in accordance with this 
view, our local governance system, which has been in operation for 20 years, has 
relied on actual participation of representatives from civil society, members of 
academia, the business community, and the government at large at the [Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee] We truly want to make relations between governments 
and societies more democratic, as well as the relations among governments. We want 
more, not less, democracy… The [Marco Civil da Internet] clearly shows the 
feasibility and success of open, multistakeholder discussions as well as the innovative 
use of the Internet as part of ongoing discussions as a tool and an interactive 
discussion platform.  
 
Immediately following her speech, Rousseff signed the Marco Civil da Internet into law. She 
did so in front of a large audience that included some of the men who helped create the 
Internet in the first place. This included Vint Cerf, who in the 1980s had helped develop the 
TCP/IP software protocol on which Internet networking is based and Tim Berners-Lee who 
created HTML and gave birth to the World Wide Web in the 1990s. Berners-Lee, who had 
been advocating for passage of the bill, hailed its signing as a “gift to the Web on its 25th 
birthday.” He once again declared that an international equivalent of the law, a global Magna 
Carta of Internet rights, was needed in order to protect the Internet.  
The fact that the Brazilian government was hosting this conference was evidence of 
its leading role in starting a debate about global Internet policy. Both the Marco Civil da 
Internet and the multi-stakeholder Brazilian Internet Steering Committee institutional 
structure were held up at the summit as examples of how Brazil had been a leader in 
democratizing Internet policy and governance. As Carlos Cecconi, the technical director at 
the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and longtime FOSS militant later told me in an 
interview, “Brazil is not a big player in the creation of technology, but it became a big player 
in terms of formulating Internet governance policy.” For him, these legal and institutional 
models were some of the biggest Brazilian contributions to discussions about the future of 
the Internet. More specifically, I argue, it was the result of years of dedicated work by a 
particular group of techno-political Brazilian Internet freedom activists who were able to 
command the attention of government policymakers.  
Arena NetMundial: Activist Participation at Arms Length 
At NetMundial, President Rousseff presented the Brazilian government as an 
unmitigated supporter of global democratic Internet governance. This support was evidenced 
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by its backing of the Marco Civil da Internet and the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. 
Yet, as my research shows, this support was quite recent and highly contested. Indeed, the 
long political battles over the Internet freedom bill and the Internet advisory board went 
unmentioned. Uniformed onlookers from abroad might mistakenly have come away with the 
impression that Brazil was a paradise for new mechanisms for participatory democracy, 
when, in fact, they were highly challenged and internally divisive, even within the governing 
PT. Furthermore, while Rousseff was calling for increased citizen participation in shaping 
Internet governance at the summit, at the same time, many Brazilian Internet freedom 
activists found that they were prevented from actively participating in NetMundial and that 
some of their primary policy concerns had been ignored. Thus, the organization of the 
NetMundial summit demonstrated how the government’s notion of participation was 
circumscribed in ways that preferenced corporate lobbies and marginalized more radical 
activist participation even while highlighting the Brazilian government’s attempt to create a 
global Internet governance that was more inclusive and participatory. 
Without a doubt, Internet freedom activists were universally elated that Brazil was 
hosting the global Internet governance conference, however, there was dismay over the 
relatively limited amount of participation in the main event that would be afforded to them 
by the organizers. This was because to participate in the conference individuals needed to be 
invited and space was limited given that there were hundreds of representatives from various 
countries attending. This meant that even though the summit was in Brazil, the number of 
Brazilians who could participate would be limited. Activists, however, did not let an event of 
this magnitude take place in their own back yard without making their voice heard. To this 
end, they organized a parallel event called Arena NetMundial that was held at the Centro 
Cultural de São Paulo, miles away from the NetMundial summit site. Marcelo Branco, the 
FOSS activist who helped start FISL in 2000, led this alternative forum, which was co-
sponsored by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, the city government of São Paulo, 
and the Secretary-General’s office of the Brazilian Presidency. All of its events were 
streamed live online and participation via the Internet was encouraged. Arena NetMundial 
was meant to serve as a gathering place for activists worldwide who headed to Brazil during 
the summit. It was meant to be a space for open dialogue where controversial issues could be 
actively debated. In her speech at NetMundial, Rousseff hailed Arena NetMundial as the 
gathering place for “organized civil society.” This at once recognized the efforts of activists, 
while also relegating them to a separate, albeit associated, event.  
Arena NetMundial demonstrates how even though the demands of Brazilian Internet 
freedom activists were extremely influential in shaping the context which led to NetMundial 
being held in Brazil, many activists were excluded from participating in the summit itself. It 
was the arguably more corporate-friendly, consensus-based multistakeholder model of the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee that was on display at the official summit, as opposed 
to the more radical, grassroots approach that some Internet freedom activists had been calling 
for. Those international and Brazilian activists who were able to participate at NetMundial 
complained that they were given little time to speak (30 seconds) and that traditional lobbies, 
primarily corporations, had easier access drafting the policy statements that would be 
included in a final summit agreement. Likewise, when activist concerns were discussed at the 
summit the powerful corporate lobby was able to water down or depoliticize them. For 
example, in the final non-binding summit agreement there was no condemnation of NSA 
mass surveillance, something that the Brazilian government had lobbied hard for. Also, in the 
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summit agreement there was no explicit mention of the term “net neutrality.” While the 
technical language in the document did indicate support concepts central to net neutrality 
(e.g, no filtering of content on the Internet), the fact that the term itself was excluded 
indicates the lack of political will to engage in the debate. Activists had been working so hard 
to educate the public about the central importance of this technical rule, and now it had 
seemingly disappeared from the official agenda. Because of this, French Internet freedom 
activist Jérémie Zimmermann called the document “weak, toothless, and disappointing” 
(Napolitano 2014). Ultimately, the most important item in the document was a consensus that 
governance of ICANN should be under international, rather than US, control by September 
2015.  
So while in many ways NetMundial was a massive victory for Brazilian activists in 
that it exhibited renewed global attention to Internet policy and the rights of Internet users, it 
also revealed that activists would need to continue making demands and mobilizing in order 
to effect change. The very fact that Arena NetMundial existed at all, and that activists were 
marginalized from the official global summit, raised questions about what types of 
participatory democracy the Brazilian government would continue to advocate for and 
whether or not they would actually result in the social changes desired by activists. The 
Brazilian multistakeholder model of governance was on display, but it proved to be a 
letdown for many activists who contended that it did not represent radical, democratic 
change. In a blog post following the conference, Deborah Brown, an American Internet 
freedom activist, wrote, "By promoting 'equal footing' among stakeholders without putting in 
place mechanisms to better facilitate the inclusion of underrepresented and marginalized 
groups, as well as increased transparency and accountability, the same powers will continue 
to dominate” (Brown 2014). Nonetheless, even in spite of the limitations of NetMundial, it is 
impossible to deny the impact of Brazilian Internet freedom activists in reshaping 
international debate about Internet policy and governance. 
Participatory Democracy: Reshaping the Internet through Citizen Participation 
 In the preceding chapters, I have examined how Brazilian Internet freedom activists 
have used the rhetoric and practices of participatory democracy in hopes of creating more 
socially equitable Internet policy. I have argued that this strategy was linked to the Brazilian 
redemocratization process beginning in the late 1970s when a number of progressive, left-
wing social movements working against authoritarian and elite control of the state began 
employing notions of participatory democracy by incorporating the working class and 
previously marginalized groups in the decision-making process (Santos and Avritzer 2007). 
The broadened notion of citizen participation endorsed by these social movements was meant 
to challenge the liberal democratic system in which elites and corporations exercised outsized 
control. The work of Brazilian Internet freedom activists is thus one of the most recent policy 
areas in which notions of participatory democracy have been put into practice. In contrast, 
my research also highlights the limitations of this strategy to effect radical social change 
given the ways that, as Dagnino (2007) points out, the call to citizen participation can also 
serve the neoliberal project by giving it the veneer of popular approval. When participation is 
conceptualized as merely a way for people to voice their opinion with little regard given to 
actually redistributing power, it runs the risk of reinforcing the status quo and failing to 
substantively address issues of social inequality. In particular, I have explored the limits of 
citizen participation in post-dictatorship Brazil where the current liberal democratic system 
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continues to overwhelmingly favor the input of elites and corporations. Thus, I have 
characterized the unfinished political project of left-wing movements to radically redistribute 
power in Brazilian society in hopes of creating a form of democracy in which resources and 
political influence are more equitably distributed. In this way, I have documented varying 
notions of what the term democracy actually means and whose interests this political 
arrangement should serve. 
 Ultimately, my research builds on existing research regarding participatory 
democracy, but is innovative in the fact that it looks at how these theories are being applied 
to Internet governance. In the Introduction, I framed my research within a larger body of 
scholarship analyzing the emergence and application of theories of participatory democracy 
in Brazil. I showed how Brazilian activists were part of an emergent global Internet freedom 
movement, but contended that they were unique because not only were they calling for 
policies that would preserve an Internet livre, but they also championed new forms of citizen 
participation in the democratic process. I noted how Internet freedom activism in the US in 
the 1990s was largely cyber-libertarian in nature in that activists eschewed any state 
intervention, whereas, in contrast, more recent Brazilian activism has been focused on 
making demands on the state to uphold what they consider to be positive Internet regulation. 
I contend that in this sense, Brazilian Internet freedom activists have been pioneering, and 
that activists around the world are now taking a similar tack. I expanded on the three main 
policy areas that have been of concern to Internet freedom activists worldwide for the past 
five years: maintaining user privacy, preserving freedom of expression by combatting 
restrictive intellectual property policies, and defending net neutrality. For analytical 
purposes, I divided the Brazilian Internet freedom activists that are the object of my study 
into four broad categories: Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) Militants, Media 
Democratization Activists, Progressive Legal Scholars, Science and Technology 
Researchers. These categories, which I referred back to throughout the dissertation, shed 
light on the internal tensions within this activist network that rallied around the common 
cause of promoting an Internet livre, but which had varying notions regarding the role of the 
state and corporate actors in shaping Internet policy and about how the larger political 
economy should be structured. 
Technological Geographies and Brazilian Counter-Hegemonic Visions of the Internet  
 The narrative I have presented illustrates Brazil’s unique position as a place where the 
politics, meanings, and uses of new digital technologies have been envisioned in a way that 
differs from those in the Global North where these technologies were first developed. 
In Chapter 2, I detailed the emergence of the Internet in the US and its spread to Brazil in the 
1980s and 1990s. I argued that the Internet as a technology is socially embedded, which 
means that it is produced by individuals within particular socio-political contexts and 
constantly in flux as new technologies and social uses are incorporated into it. I demonstrated 
how the global spread of the Internet in the 1990s was linked to neoliberal policies, but also 
how in Brazil the concomitant spread of free and open source software resulted in the 
software’s incorporation as the technological platform of a larger anti-neoliberal political 
project among left-wing labor union organizers aligned with the Brazilian Worker’s Party. 
This history exemplifies how Brazil has served as a base for developing counter-hegemonic 
technological visions and helps explains the emergence of the techno-political Internet 
freedom activism in Brazil.  
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 In Chapter 3, I explained how notions about how increasing citizen participation in 
decision-making, which is central to theories of participatory democracy, were employed by 
activists in the creation of a pioneering Internet freedom bill called the Marco Civil da 
Internet. Drafting the bill’s text via an online, collaborative website was an example of an 
open government (governo aberto) initiative, which activists contended would create policy 
that was not beholden to corporate interests, but was more responsive to popular demands 
and thus more socially equitable. However, I found that while this online method created a 
platform for a small number of people, including many Internet freedom activists, to voice 
their concerns, it did not directly result in change as government officials and legislators 
largely ignored the results. This showed how the Internet can give the impression that 
people’s voices are being heard, but that these new digital networking technologies in no way 
guarantee a more equal distribution of power within society.     
The Limits of Participation within a Neoliberal Political Economy 
 While Brazilian activists have innovative mechanisms of participatory democracy in 
hopes of redistributing power and resources more evenly within Brazilian society, these 
efforts have to date not fundamentally altered the Brazilian political economy. Likewise, 
participation has been coopted by proponents of neoliberalism to include corporate 
participation in the form of so-called corporate citizenship. Thus, even while neoliberal 
policies have not been enacted as completely in Brazil as they have been in other Latin 
American countries, corporate power still dominates this liberal democratic country. In 
Chapter 4, I demonstrated how Internet freedom activists resorted to more traditional activist 
tactics such as street mobilizations, petitions, and meetings with policymakers to push their 
Internet freedom agenda given that corporate lobbying in both the executive and legislative 
branch of the Brazilian government had blocked the passage of the Marco Civil da Internet. 
In this push activists employed the Internet as an organizing tool, which illustrates how 
technology can never substitute for the face-to-face encounters of old-fashioned organizing 
even while it can be a useful tool for mobilizing people and bringing them together. I then 
examine how two events – the leak of NSA documents by Edward Snowden and the 
following nationwide street protests in Brazil – altered the political environment in such a 
way as to refocus political attention on Internet policy and democratic governance. At this 
juncture, Brazilian Internet freedom activists were able to command the attention of 
policymakers and successfully argue for their positions. They continued to call for more 
citizen participation in decision-making because they continued to believe this would 
challenge the elite-controlled, neoliberal democratic system in Brazil that largely attended to 
corporate interests.  
 In Chapter 5, I noted how the debate over the Marco Civil da Internet became 
entwined with the institutional legitimacy of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, a 
national advisory panel formed in 1995 during the neoliberal restructuring of the 
telecommunications sector. The creation of this institution by the individuals who helped 
connect Brazil to the Internet was seen as a way to prevent corporate capture of Internet 
governance by the newly privatized telecommunications companies. More recently in 2003, 
Internet freedom activists led efforts to restructure the committee to increase democratic 
participation by creating elected positions from non-profits and NGOs on the committee and 
also by holding yearly forums that allow interested citizens to affect the committee’s agenda. 
However, this multi-stakeholder model also gave power to corporate representatives who can 
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exert veto power given that the committee operates on consensus. Thus, while activists have 
used this new channel of institutional engagement to at least temporarily command the 
committee’s agenda, ultimately there is no guarantee that this institutional model will 
necessarily result in more socially equitable policy in the future as corporations become more 
involved in committee deliberations. Thus, while President Rousseff has held up the 
committee as an example of a more democratic form of Internet governance at NetMundial, 
it is not clear that replicating this model in other countries will necessarily result in similar 
policy outcomes. 
 Ultimately my research shows that the call for more citizen participation in the 
decision-making process is one that is popular among Brazilian activists because it 
potentially opens up institutional spaces in which activists can exert more power to shape 
policy outcomes. In this way, it is part of a longer trajectory in Brazilian society to create a 
democratic system that is more representative of the Brazilian population. However, these 
calls to participation are potentially problematic given their vague nature, and the fact that 
they do not directly address persistent power inequities in society, and can therefore be easily 
incorporated into a neoliberal governance model. In this way, participatory democracy in 
itself is not a cure-all to addressing unequal power distribution in society. Likewise, the 
Internet as a technology, one that many have hailed as innately democratizing, will not by 
itself lead to a more just distribution of resources and influence. All technology is socially 
embedded, and thus is inserted within the broader relations of power and inequality. The 
work of Brazilian Internet freedom activists, thus, has been to marshal digital networking 
tools to activate broad-based political participation to affect change.  
Re-Coding the Internet: The Impact of Brazilian Internet Freedom Activism on Global 
Internet Governance 
In his influential book Code and other Laws of Cyberspace, legal scholar Lawrence 
Lessig argued that computer code regulates individual behavior on the Internet in much the 
same way that legal code intends to (2000). By this he means that the fundamental design 
choices incorporated into building software code ultimately determines what users are and 
are not capable of doing. In this way computer “code is law” because it governs the behavior 
of individuals and potential modes of conduct. For example, Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) technologies now embedded in hardware and software that limit copying and 
distribution of copyrighted material often end up impeding users from performing even legal 
operations. Multinational corporations that profit from intellectual property have developed 
these DRM technologies in order to deter digital piracy. In 1998, these corporations 
successfully lobbied for the passage of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 
which makes it illegal in the US to tamper with DRM. More recently, in 2013 they succeeded 
in having DRM protocols embedded into the latest version of the HTML protocol, HTML5, 
used to code webpages. This affects users worldwide whether or not they are in a jurisdiction 
with restrictive intellectual property laws. In this way these technologies effectively create a 
global policy that is developed and enacted by corporations with hardly any public debate. 
These constraints are the antithesis of the “hacker ethos” on which the Internet was originally 
developed, because these technologies limit the technological autonomy of individuals and 
groups. Lessig made this argument in order to point out how seemingly technical decisions 
about technology shape social relationships by governing how people can behave. He was 
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pointing to the importance of developing free and open software in order to preserve 
individual liberty.  
In this dissertation I have argued that Brazilian activists are on the front lines of 
preserving Internet freedom worldwide. Yet, as Carlos Cecconi, the technical director at the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee and longtime FOSS militant, acknowledged in his 
interview with me, Brazil is a relatively small contributor in terms of the creation of 
technology – hardware and software. Instead, I argue that the type of coding the Brazilian 
activists are doing is not the computer coding that Lessig refers to in his book. Rather, they 
are developing the actual legal code by which the Internet is governed. Their unique 
contribution to the legal code is to incorporate principles of participatory democracy. Thus, 
not only are they developing this legal code, but they are also transforming the way the legal 
code is developed. This is evidenced both in the creation of the Marco Civil da Internet and 
in the ways that they have attempted to transform the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
to include more citizen participation. In this light, the NetMundial conference was so 
significant because it represented an attempt to introduce the Brazilian participatory code into 
an emergent global Internet policy code.  
As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, the Internet, like all technology, is 
socially embedded. It is a constantly evolving and contested technological platform that both 
reflects and embodies social power structures. This means that the socio-political context in 
which it is being elaborated continues to shape its ongoing development. For example, in the 
wake of the Snowden leaks, the Brazilian government invested in telecommunication cables 
connecting Brazil to Europe in hopes of lessening dependence on US Internet infrastructure. 
In this way the geopolitical environment became reflected in the global Internet 
infrastructure. In a similar way, policies like net neutrality can also be expected to have 
concrete impacts on the Internet in the long run. This will be manifested in how people use 
digital technologies, who has access to them, and what content is available. In the future, the 
effects of net neutrality policies may become more apparent as some places like Brazil adopt 
net neutrality, while others do not. In this way the Internet may become even more 
geographically differentiated. In one sense then, the NetMundial summit was an attempt to 
forge a new global consensus on the Internet that its Brazilian organizers and Internet 
freedom activists hoped would be more in line with the vision being advocated by the 
Brazilian government. When the Internet first arrived in Brazil in the 1990s it became 
imbued with particular meanings and notions involving democracy and participation. Should 
others around the world embrace the current Brazilian vision of the Internet, it would 
represent a feedback loop of sorts in which the values of Brazilian Internet freedom activists 
became embedded within the global network itself. However, what that participation will 
look like and whether or not it will challenge existing power structures is yet to be seen. 
Internet Governance in Beta 
When meeting with activists at Arena NetMundial, Gilberto Carvalho, the Minister of 
the Secretary-General’s office of the Brazilian Presidency and one of Presidents Lula and 
Rousseff’s closest advisors said, “If it was not for Snowden, we certainly would not be here.” 
By this he meant that the revelations about NSA mass surveillance provoked a global debate 
about Internet policy and governance that had resulted in the NetMundial conference. While 
the impact of Edward Snowden’s actions is undeniable, I think that Carvalho’s statement 
underplayed the years of work done by Brazilian Internet freedom activists that created a 
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political environment in Brazil in which Internet policy had become a central concern of the 
government. As my research demonstrates, the work of activists in developing the Marco 
Civil da Internet and reforming the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee – the two 
initiatives the Brazilian government was showing off – long pre-date the June 2013 leaks. 
Without the decades of work that Brazilian activists had been doing, Rousseff and her 
administration would have had nothing to present to the world. In fact, before the NSA leaks 
parts of her administration had almost succeeded in scuttling the Marco Civil da Internet and 
delegitimizing the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. Now, however, Brazilian activist 
critiques of corporate control of the Internet and concerns about government surveillance 
were now two of the biggest issues being discussed at NetMundial. Thus, Snowden’s actions 
were important for creating an altered political environment that allowed activists to finally 
leverage support for policies they had been championing for years.  
Computer programmers often refer to software that is still in the trial stages as being 
in “beta.” In many ways, the push to radically democratize Internet policy and governance 
that is the legacy of the Brazilian redemocratization movement is still in the beta stage. It 
remains unclear how ordinary citizens can participate in determining highly technical rules 
about how computer networks operate. The fact that activists needed to spend so much time 
informing the public about what net neutrality means and its implications for society is 
evidence of this. Perhaps one of the most important components of this participatory ethos, 
and what distinguishes it from the way that liberal democracy has developed, is that it creates 
room for debate that is not dominated by corporate entities. It is difficult to imagine that laws 
such as the DMCA that restrict user conduct could have been produced using a participatory 
method that incorporated broader sectors of society. Likewise, it is doubtful that NSA mass 
surveillance policies would have been approved had they depended on citizen input. The fact 
that these threats to Internet freedom emanated from the US, a liberal democracy, suggests 
that new democratic models need to be developed if the Internet is to remain a democratic 
platform itself. It is the innovative spirit and desire to “democratize democracy” that makes 
Brazilian activists unique. 
In a global environment where corporations and government security agencies have 
so much power, and often work hand-in-hand, it is difficult to know whether this beta 
Brazilian code that promotes participatory democracy will have long-term, reverberating 
effects. Yet, the story of Brazilian Internet freedom activists I have presented here shows 
how they have, in at least some instances, successfully negotiated against the interests that 
threaten an Internet livre. This should serve as inspiration to Internet freedom activists 
worldwide that their vision of an open, democratic Internet still appears to be within reach. 
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